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This study examines the state of Fourth Amendment search law in relationship to the 
decision in the recent, landmark case of United States v. Jones. This study focused on the effects 
of the Jones decision, trespass doctrine, relative to the former precedent of Katz v. United States, 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, and the rates of searches being found under these two 
tests (or a combination of both). This study used a qualitative content analysis of federal 
appellate cases which cited Jones and/or Katz to answer the following questions: Which tests 
were being used in federal appellate cases where a search was in question? And; Depending on 
the test being used, was a search more or less likely to be found? This study concluded, through 
the analysis of 34 cases pre-Jones decision and 38 cases post-Jones decision, that both tests are 
still being used, depending upon the parameters within the case itself (as Jones has very specific 
criteria for determining a search). This study also concluded that since the Jones decision, cases 
citing solely Jones found more searches to have occurred (100%, 11 cases) than did cases citing 
solely Katz (27.2%, 3 out of 11 cases) or cases which cited both (37.5%, 6 out of 16 cases).
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Understanding and defining a police search is a basic, crucial task for the criminal justice 
system. A search aids in gathering evidence for cases and holding criminals responsible for their 
actions. Without police searches, there would be large gaps in evidentiary support for case 
convictions. The framers of the Constitution and in particular the authors of the Bill of Rights 
highlighted the importance of these searches when they wrote into this vital document protection 
for citizens against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. This protection is contained 
specifically in the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights as a protection guaranteed to the 
American people.1 It is necessary to be clear on this topic: the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit searches, just unreasonable ones. Therefore, a legal search (what is referred to as a 
‘search’ for this study) is one which triggers Fourth Amendment protections.  
As time has progressed, the question of what defines a police search has been asked 
repeatedly by the courts and other criminal justice institutions. Originally, a search was found to 
have occurred when law enforcement officers had physically trespassed onto a citizen’s property 
or person (the trespass doctrine).2 As time moved forward and technology changed, this physical 
trespass requirement became antiquated and in need of reform. In 1967, a case came before the 
United States Supreme Court that would fundamentally change Fourth Amendment search law.  . 
In this landmark case (Katz v. United States) involving a phone booth, it was decided that a 
search would be found if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy for the person being 
searched, and if that reasonable expectation of privacy had been violated.3 This decision was a 
drastic move away from the trespass test and ushered in a new era of search inquiries by courts in 
the United States. (Katz is explained in more detail at the end of this Introduction section). 
                                                          
1 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928. 
3 Katz v. U.S, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
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For forty-five years, Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy test had stood as the 
sole test for deciding if a search under the Fourth Amendment had occurred. Katz is widely 
applicable, as it is by itself a rather nebulous, general idea without concrete terminology or 
specifics about what is or is not a search (though courts over the years had certainly provided the 
privacy concept with more specific meaning, or content, through case law).4  
Overall, though, as technology has grown and become more sophisticated since 1967, 
questions are beginning to arise about specific instances where the Katz privacy notion is not 
necessarily adequate, in and of itself, to address  whether or not a police search has occurred. 
Specifically, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided another landmark Fourth 
Amendment search case that built upon the Katz decision, and has helped to develop more 
specific parameters for defining a search. In particular, United States v. Jones reintroduced a 
physical trespass concept to define searches under the Fourth Amendment while also retaining 
the Katz privacy concept (to define searches). Significantly, Jones involved the physical 
attachment by police of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device to a vehicle and subsequent 
monitoring of that vehicle through the device.5 (Jones is explained in more detail at the end of 
this section). Since it was decided, Jones has had an impact on federal appellate court case law, 
both in those instances when these courts now use the trespass criterion as the sole criterion to 
decide whether a police search has occurred and in those instances when these courts use the 
trespass test in conjunction with the Katz privacy test.6    
                                                          
4 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976) for third party doctrine. 
5 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012). The United States Supreme Court held “the Government’s attachment of 
the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements; constitute a search 
under Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
6 See Grady v. North Carolina, 132 S.Ct. 1368, 1369 (2015) as an example of the courts using solely the Jones test to 
answer the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. See U.S. v. Castellano, 716 F.3d 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2013) as an 
example of the courts using Jones test in conjunction with Katz test.  
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Since Katz was a foundational, familiar case for the courts, the shift into incorporating 
Jones has been more gradual but nonetheless noteworthy, at least for the federal appeals courts 
included in this study. Jones is a relatively new decision, and its full implications for Fourth 
Amendment search jurisprudence will certainly be further seen as time progresses. However, the 
changes in Fourth Amendment search law since Jones deserve further exploration and 
examination, both for their relevance to police investigatory practices and strategies under the 
law, and for their relevance to court actors and scholars. In general, this study examines how 
Jones has impacted the way federal appellate courts handle search inquiries. This research study 
first assesses whether federal appeals courts in the wake of Jones are using its trespass test to 
decide whether a police search has occurred or rather, these courts are using the Katz privacy test 
or a combination of the two tests. Second, this study analyzes the current impact of the Jones 
decision in terms of whether a federal appellate court finds a police search has occurred (for 
example, whether these courts are more likely to find a search has occurred after Jones using its 
trespass test , the Katz privacy test, or a combination of the two tests together). This latter inquiry 
allows comparisons to be made between the numbers of search findings after Jones under each 
permissible test/approach. Third, to assess the impact of Jones on search determinations by 
courts, this study evaluates and compares the number of police searches found to have occurred 
in federal appeals cases both pre- and post (i.e., following) the Jones decision. Finally, the study 
addresses overall implications for future Fourth Amendment search law.  
This research is an important step in examining Fourth Amendment search laws. These 
inquiries facilitate being able to quantify the impact Jones is having on police search law and lay 
the groundwork for future study. This will also assist in identifying any patterns that may be used 
by police and future researchers interested in Fourth Amendment search inquiry procedures. In 
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regards to police practices and strategies, this research is important because courts determination 
of a search is crucial to criminal investigations. Courts finding no search before or after Jones 
would mean that police would generally not have to concern themselves with the judicial rules 
established by the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, if courts find a search, police must follow all 
the guidelines set forth by the Fourth Amendment, which could potentially limit investigative 
approaches. Additionally, this study can assist scholars of courts and criminal law and procedure 
because it gives them further empirical evidence with which to evaluate whether judges are 
currently more due process or crime control oriented in crafting their decisions (i.e., if courts are 
more frequently finding searches in period after Jones compared to period prior to Jones, then 
there might be evidence of the courts being in a more due process orientation). 
This research study employed a comprehensive, content analysis approach to evaluating 
all significant federal appellate cases which cited United States v. Jones through May 31, 2015.7 
To obtain these cases, a legal research tool known as a citator was used (i.e., “KeyCite”). To 
have a more complete  understanding of Fourth Amendment search law post-Jones, it was 
decided to also examine through the citator all of the significant federal appellate cases which  
referenced Katz v. United States (i.e., since Jones retained Katz as a possible test to decide 
whether a police search occurred under the Fourth Amendment). This examination was 
completed from the date Jones was decided (January 23, 2012) through May 31, 2015. Finally, 
to better understand the impact of Jones on police search law, it was decided to evaluate 
significant federal appeals cases through the citator which cited Katz prior to the Jones decision, 
and explore any possible changes in search trends between the period prior to and following 
                                                          
7 Significant treatment refers to the federal appellate court cases providing substantial coverage to the case under 
examination (e.g., Jones or Katz). For a more in depth explanation, refer to the methodology section. 
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Jones. To have an adequate number of pre-Jones cases, it was decided to research cases from 
January 22, 2002-January 22, 2012. 
In Katz v. United States, Charles Katz was charged and convicted in District Court for 
transmitting wagering information.8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents obtained this 
information by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public 
telephone booth.9 This device allowed the government to listen in on the calls made by Katz. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.10 Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. 
The United States Supreme Court held that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections when he placed the calls inside the telephone booth.11 The Supreme Court famously 
stated, “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and thus, “What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”12 The Supreme Court explained once Katz entered 
the phone booth and closed the door, Katz reasonably believed that his conversation would be 
kept private. The Supreme Court stated although the Katz was physically visible inside the phone 
booth, once Katz entered and closed the door, he took the necessary steps to prevent an 
“uninvited ear.”13 Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed the former trespass doctrine was 
no longer effective at determining Fourth Amendment search inquiries.14 Thus, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Katz Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and reversed the 
                                                          
8 Katz. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 348, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 349. 
11 Id. at 352. 
12 Id. at 351. 
13 Id. at 352. 
14 Id. at 353. 
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judgment.15 It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion who first explored the notion of a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.16 
In United States v. Jones, a joint taskforce of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
Metropolitan Police Department were investigating Antione Jones for trafficking narcotics.17 
Jones owned and managed a nightclub in the District of Columbia. Over the course of the 
investigation, the joint task force used a variety of methods to monitor Jones’ movements, 
including visual surveillance, wiretaps, camera footage of the nightclub. This information led the 
taskforce to apply and obtain a warrant to use an electronic tracking device on the Jeep owned by 
Jones’ wife.18 This warrant was valid in the District of Columbia and expired after 10 days. The 
taskforce installed the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device to the Jeep on the 11th day, 
while it was parked in a public parking lot in Maryland.19 The taskforce monitored Jones’ 
movements for the next 28 days, producing more than 2,000 pages of data on Jones’ 
whereabouts. Ultimately, Jones and several associates were indicted for conspiracy to distribute 
large quantities of cocaine.20 As a result, Jones filed a motion in District Court to suppress the 
evidence obtained through GPS monitoring. The motion was granted by the District Court, but 
with some reservations. The District Court held that the information obtained while the vehicle 
was in the garage of Jones’ residence should be suppressed.21 The District Court held that the 
data obtained while the vehicle was out in the public should remain admissible because “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
                                                          
15 Id. at 359. 
16 Id. at 360-361. 







privacy in his movements from one place to another.”22 Jones’ trial resulted in a hung jury on the 
conspiracy charge. As a result, the government re-tried Jones and his accomplices at a second 
trial.23 At the trial, the government introduced all the data obtained through the GPS which 
ultimately resulted in the jury finding Jones guilty.24 Jones was sentenced to life in prison. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction 
based on the government violating Jones’ Fourth Amendment by producing evidence obtained 
from GPS device.25 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The United States Supreme Court 
decided unanimously with Justice Scalia writing the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Court 
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”26 However, the Supreme 
Court’s rationale did not rely on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Instead, the 
Supreme Court explained when the government commits a physical intrusion onto private 
property with the explicit intention of obtaining information, this intrusion is tantamount to a 
search, thus implicating the Fourth Amendment.27 The Supreme Court’s rationale revolved 
around the original text of the Fourth Amendment which has close ties to idea of common-law 
trespass. Additionally, the Supreme Court explained the common-law trespass test does not 
overwrite Katz. Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”28 As a result, the 
                                                          
22 Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081. 75 L.Ed. 2d 55 (1983)). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 949. 
25 Id. 
26 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 952. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This literature review begins by presenting historical cases which detailed the creation of 
the property based test to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches. Next, this literature review will 
explore two distinct, but important assessments among academics concerning the United 
Supreme Court decision in Jones. The first assessment describes Jones as being a crucial and 
significant change to Fourth Amendment search laws. The second assessment broadly views 
Jones as a missed opportunity to make any substantial change to Fourth Amendment search law 
with regards to modern technology.  
Historic Cases 
The definition of what constitutes a search has largely developed over time. Originally, 
the trespass doctrine was the governing jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment search law. One of 
the earliest cases known for upholding this idea of “trespass” was the case of Olmstead v. United 
States (1928).29 Olmstead was known as a high profile bootlegger during the time of 
prohibition.30 His sales of alcohol were significant, which warranted the attention of law 
enforcement. The defendant was eventually convicted of importing, possessing, and selling 
liquor unlawfully. The evidence was obtained through wire taps made by police, who believed 
they were not committing any form of trespass as the defendants did not own that specific 
property where the wire taps were placed. The United States Supreme Court held that police 
actions did not constitute a search because wiretaps on public telephone lines were not 
                                                          
29Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) 
30 Ryan Evaro, THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY WITH THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. JONES 
RETREATS TO THE “CLASSICAL TRESPASSORY SEARCH”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 120 (2013) 
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considered a trespass into a constitutionally protected area (such as individual’s private 
property).31 
The United States Supreme Court would further rely upon the trespass doctrine in On Lee 
v. United States (1952).32 In this case, the defendant, On Lee, had been living in a laundromat.33 
He was approached by an old acquaintance, Chin Poy, inside the area and the defendant made 
some incriminating statements during the conversation. Unbeknownst to the defendant, Chin Poy 
was working for the Bureau of Narcotics and was an undercover agent. Bureau of Narcotics 
agent Lawrence Lee had stationed himself outside and had been recording their conversation 
through a microphone on Chin Poy.34 From his position, Lee was able to see the individuals and 
record the conversation through the electronic device attached to Chin Poy. Defendant On Lee 
argued that the evidence should have been deemed inadmissible because it was illegally obtained 
by police; therefore, police violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and 
seizures. On Lee reasoned that the fraudulent hiding of the microphone violated his rights and 
had he been aware of his listening device he would not have consented to allowing Chin Poy 
inside.35 The United States Supreme Court ruled that an unlawful search had not occurred 
because Chin Poy had been invited into the residence by defendant, and therefore no trespass had 
been committed.36 
Law Review Journal Article 
I.  First Category 
                                                          
31Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) 
32U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) 
33On Lee v. United States, 747, 749, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952) 
34On Lee v. United States, 747, 749, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952) 
35 Ryan Evaro, THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY WITH THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. JONES 
RETREATS TO THE “CLASSICAL TRESPASSORY SEARCH”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 123 (2013) 
36On Lee v. United States, 747, 751-752, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952) 
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The articles in this category generally accept the Jones decision as being a major 
milestone for Fourth Amendment search law, and these academics provide some critical 
assessment regarding the application of a physical trespass test in an era revolving around 
modern technology. 
Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins explained how the Jones decision 
provided a more reliable form of Fourth Amendment protection.37 Namely, the Court recognized 
the government’s ability to collect, record, track, and analyze large amounts of information. 
Moreover, the Jones decision reflected an attempt by the Supreme Court’s to uphold customary 
Fourth Amendment rights in an era where technology is rapidly advancing. This is extremely 
valuable as many academics point out the pitfall of the concept of reasonable expectation of 
privacy, namely, that society has none in such an interconnected society. Finally, the authors 
mention the notion of the “justifiable reliance test.”38 This proposed standard combines both the 
Katz and Jones tests to create a broader test: “(1) that the person relied on his Fourth Amendment 
privacy and/or property rights, and (2) that the reliance was justifiable under the 
circumstances.”39 The advantage of this test would be its increased applicability to our digital 
age while still maintaining the integrity of the Fourth Amendment protections. 
Similarly, Sean Kilbane agreed that the Jones decision bolstered citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. Kilbane discussed that the former Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
                                                          
37 Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones: 
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard For Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 3 
(2013). 
38 Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones: 
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard For Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 4 
(2013). 
39 Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones: 




test failed to account for technologies involving aerial surveillance.40 More commonly referred to 
as drones, these unmanned aerial vehicles have the ability to travel through public airspace with 
high-tech cameras and peer into private areas, such as the curtilage of a home. These drones have 
the ability to fly 1,000 feet into the sky, which is important as the courts had previously held any 
altitude above 400 feet is considered public.41 However, due to the recent Jones decision, courts 
will need to analyze this form of Fourth Amendment protections from a trespass perspective 
instead of a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy perspective. As a result, Jones has provided 
citizens with more protections than Katz ever could in scenarios involving flyovers or other 
similar forms of advanced technology.42 
Erica Goldberg argued that the Jones decision is more groundbreaking than most 
realize.43 In particular, Jones has the potential to give courts an additional, analytical 
“framework” through which to evaluate a search under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, 
Goldberg claimed it is possible to see the Jones’ property test ultimately replace the Katz inquiry 
as a “clearer, cleaner metric” for courts to analyze Fourth Amendment cases.44 
 Lauren Smith briefly discusses privacy as an antiquated notion that has no place in 
today’s society.45 Smith explains privacy protections are quickly becoming obsolete, namely 
because of the technology at the disposal of common individuals and law enforcement. This 
                                                          
40 Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth 
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 249 (2014). 
41 Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth 
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 249 (2014). 
42 Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth 
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 282 (2014). 
43 Erica Goldberg, How United States V Jones Can Restore Our Faith In The Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 
First Impressions 62, 62 (2011). 
44 Erica Goldberg, How United States V Jones Can Restore Our Faith In The Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 
First Impressions 62, 69 (2011). 
45 Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States 
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1003 (2013). 
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advanced technology has diminished what many consider to be an expectation of privacy and has 
enabled law enforcement to obtain a plethora of digital information, such as email or GPS 
tracking information. The courts have been always been playing the game of catch up when 
trying to keep up with technology and the law, but many were hopeful of the decision in Jones to 
provide guidance and bolster our Fourth Amendment protections.46 Prior to Jones, it was 
difficult to discern whether one had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this type of 
information under the Katz test. Although the Jones majority focused on the specific intrusion 
made by law enforcement and GPS devices, the concurring opinions did raise hope for future 
discussions on privacy in the digital age.47 Furthermore, Smith concluded that Katz’s reasonable-
expectations-of-privacy test would become obsolete whenever there is a trespass (i.e., if courts 
find a trespass has occurred, a search has occurred, and at that point the analysis could end). 
Thus, Smith theorized the Katz test will only be applied when there is an absence of a 
governmental trespass.48  
Related to privacy, Jennifer Arner examined the Fourth Amendment rights in digital 
information, namely e-mail. This article explained that the privacy of e-mail depends on where it 
is being stored: whether on a personal computer or with a third party.49 The distinction may seem 
arbitrary at first glance; however, when email messages are stored on the computer (i.e. personal 
property), then the owner of the computer has full access to Fourth Amendment protections. 
However, if it is stored a web-based email, then it becomes unlikely that the rights will be 
                                                          
46 Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States 
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1004 (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States 
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1032 (2013). 
49 Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment 
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 349 (2014). 
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afforded to the individual.50 To conclude, Jones did not provide clear cut rules for “intangible 
property,” however, there does seem to be some hope for courts to recognize property rights in 
digital information.51 If that does come to fruition, then Jones would have been a substantial 
change in Fourth Amendment search law.  
John Stratford argued that under certain circumstances police searches have gone 
overboard with the use of warrantless GPS tracking and data retention.52 Furthermore, Stratford 
claimed these types of surveillance, whether on the “infobahn or autobahn,” are part of the same 
underlying problem, which involves “the assumption of risk” doctrine (i.e., the doctrine that in 
general one “assumes the risk” of disclosure of information to other individuals, including 
unintended individuals, when one shares his or her private information with others). Stratford 
concluded that this doctrine has become obsolete in the modern era and thus requires 
modification to reflect the realities of today’s world.53 For example, individuals expose private 
information about themselves online and in person on a regular basis in order to function 
properly in today’s society. Therefore, Stratford supports a more specific test in this area where 
certain information voluntarily exposed is still nonetheless private and must be considered for 
Fourth Amendment protections.54  
                                                          
50 Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment 
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 350 (2014). 
51 Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment 
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 379 (2014). 
52 John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data 
Retention, And A More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy”, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 986 
(2013). 
53 John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data 
Retention, And A More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy”, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 986 
(2013). 
54 John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data 




Looking more into advanced technology, Lon Berk discussed a similar concern with 
cloud computing and how the Fourth Amendment may have a difficult time protecting individual 
rights in this area.55 With the introduction to smart phones, tablets, and social media applications 
(i.e., Facebook or Twitter), society has become more focused on sharing information. The 
government has access to an incredible wealth of information, sometimes referred to as “big 
data,” and this information could contain an enormous amount of material about the individual. 
A major concern is focused on Cloud computing. The Cloud is a modern electronic storage 
device that has the capability to accumulate almost limitless amounts of information (i.e. 
pictures, documents, and data) at the discretion of the individual. This storage device is easily 
accessible by the general public and has become quickly integrated in other devices to ensure 
luxury. However, some may wish the information stored on the Cloud to be kept private. At the 
same time, the information stored on the Cloud has greatly increased the curiosity and the scope 
of data which the government may want to search and seize.56  
This has resulted in some tension and confusion between what users wish to keep private 
and what the government is constitutionally allowed to search and seize. The Courts have had 
little success in providing a reliable and socially accepted method. In fact, Lon Berk claimed 
Jones is just another example of the fact that technology has quickly evolved and improved over 
a short period of time and that the law is having a difficult time keeping up. Lon Berk further 
                                                          
55 Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment Of Information, Big Data And The 
Cloud, 14 J. High Tech. L. 1, 2 (2014). 
56 Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment Of Information, Big Data And The 
Cloud, 14 J. High Tech. L. 1, 2 (2014). 
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questioned whether returning to a property based approach in the face of modernity would 
facilitate the Fourth Amendment inquiry or create unforeseeable problems.57 
Arnold Loewy argued that the trespass test is, overall, a more sensible inquiry for Fourth 
Amendment search questions compared to the reasonable expectation of privacy test.58 
Furthermore, Loewy claimed the Katz test was so malleable that it had become nearly useless in 
determining Fourth Amendment search questions. For example, courts had created a multitude of 
exceptions under the flexible and subjective expectation of privacy test.59 Moreover, the Jones 
decision is a logical step forward in establishing a more specific and detailed form of analyzing 
Fourth Amendment searches.60 According to Loewy, Jones also has the ability to tackle some of 
the more difficult Fourth Amendment questions, such as the use of modern technology and how 
it may affect an individual’s privacy.61  
Caleb Mason described Jones as the decision which dramatically expanded the scope of 
the Katz test in this new era of surveillance technology.62 This “new” test was created by the 
Courts after analyzing what it is the threshold governing a search. Furthermore, Mason 
questioned how the exclusionary rule will apply under the newly decided Jones test, as 
thousands of pending GPS surveillance cases have the potential to be impacted by this decision. 
Briefly, the exclusionary rule eliminates any evidence which may have been obtained illegally 
and, is therefore, unusable in a court of law.63 However, there are numerous exceptions to the 
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exclusionary rule, including the Davis exception. Six months prior to the Jones decision, the 
Court in Davis v. United States held that the exclusionary rule does not apply if law enforcement 
were acting in good faith reliance on governing appellate precedent at the time.64 Mason posited 
that if courts adopted a “narrow” interpretation of Davis, then the Fourth Amendment will be 
able to adequately meet the ongoing balance between the potentially invasive use of technology 
at the disposal of law enforcement and citizens’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights.65  
After examining the rationale of Jones, Brian Davis argued that the government should 
not freely be able to obtain cell-phone location data without a warrant.66 Davis discussed how 
tracking cell-phones is a violation of Fourth Amendment protections from both perspectives, or 
tests, including location-based test (i.e., trespass doctrine) and situation-based test (i.e., 
reasonable-expectation of privacy doctrine).67 Furthermore, Davis argued, based on the location-
based and situation-based tests within the Fourth Amendment, that these electronic searches 
should be deemed unreasonable without probable cause and a warrant.68 Finally, Davis explained 
that Congress should pass legislation related to the disclosure of such data by third-party 
providers.69 This bill could help fill the gap and explain how law enforcement is required to 
conduct electronic surveillance or other investigations relying upon advanced technology under 
Fourth Amendment principles. 
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Brad Turner argued that, at one point, the third-party doctrine made sense when people 
understood that there was no expectation of privacy in information when it is knowingly 
exchanged and exposed to others; however, in today’s society, it is not so simple.70 For example, 
peoples’ actions and words today literally become data which is shared with others, whether that 
data is knowingly volunteered or not. As a result, Turner posited that the third-party doctrine 
now threatens to eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections. However, according to Turner, 
courts should follow Justice Alito’s reasoning in Jones; that is, when the government acquires 
“Big Data,” a search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred.71 This approach may help 
resolve some unsettled issues under the Fourth Amendment in light of recent advancements in 
technology.72 Turner concluded by remarking that if the government conducts a search under 
Jones through the acquisition of GPS data, then surely it would be more intrusive to obtain “Big 
Data” (and hence it should also constitute a search when the government seeks to obtain this type 
of data).73 
Stephen Henderson explained that the return of the property based approach in Jones 
along with the approach of Katz means that there is a higher likelihood courts will be able to 
more accurately determine the Fourth Amendment search question.74 The combination of these 
two tests will allow courts the flexibility necessary to analyze Fourth Amendment search 
inquiries on a case-by-case basis. However, Henderson admitted that the Jones decision does 
leave some important questions unanswered (namely dealing with third-party doctrine and 
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whether this represents the Court’s attempt to gradually remove the Katz test), and it will be 
interesting to witness how the lower courts react to this decision.  
Fabio Arcila, Jr., explained that Jones has the potential to be groundbreaking, since Katz 
was decided approximately four decades ago.75 One of the main reasons why Jones could be 
groundbreaking is because of the various rationales reflected in the justices’ opinions in the case. 
Furthermore, these opinions are important because they will influence Fourth Amendment 
surveillance jurisprudence; thus, according to Arcila, these opinions are vastly more crucial to 
Fourth Amendment search questions than the holding itself of Jones. Additionally, this case was 
a crucial decision since the federal government had used approximately 3,000 warrantless GPS 
devices annually to monitor suspects and, therefore, the case provides some necessary guidance 
to the government in this area.76 Arcila stated that Jones is also significant because it finally 
settles the relevant inquiry for Fourth Amendment search questions (i.e., property “versus” 
privacy).77 
James Dempsey mentioned Jones was a momentous change for Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because it exposed how much focus the lower courts were giving to the third-party 
doctrine.78 More interestingly, Dempsey pointed out that the Jones Court unanimously disagreed 
with the government’s claim that citizens lack any privacy interest in information voluntarily 
disclosed. Dempsey posited that Jones will usher in a new era of Fourth Amendment law that 
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will require courts to closely examine how the implications of their decisions affect the third-
party doctrine.79 
David Reichbach claimed that Jones’ modification of what constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment has strengthened privacy protections for the homeless.80 Prior to Jones, the 
homeless were generally understood by the courts to be unprotected from police surveillance 
because they were seen as having their personal belongings out in public, which means they were 
not afforded the same rights of privacy under Katz as their home-owning counterparts.81 
Reichbach stated that the Jones decision remedies this lack of protection for the homeless by 
evaluating a Fourth Amendment search under the trespass test instead of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.   Accordingly, Jones’ trespass test and its focus on ownership or 
possession of personal belongings avoid omitting the homeless from the same protections all 
citizens should rightfully enjoy.82 
The Honorable Garrison Hill explained several notable outcomes concerning the “legacy 
of Jones.”83 First, the Court universally rejected the government’s claim of no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public. Second, the Court created another model for lower courts to 
follow in Fourth Amendment search analysis (i.e., the trespass test). Third, there was universal 
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agreement among the justices in Jones that the trespass doctrine and the reasonable expectation 
of privacy doctrine are exclusive to Fourth Amendment law.84 
Melanie Reid posited the Jones decision could be the end of the privacy inquiry for 
Fourth Amendment searches, as these searches are now being governed by the common law 
trespass test.85 Moreover, this change may signal an end to society’s subjective expectations of 
privacy as the shift to a trespass-based understanding of Fourth Amendment protections occurs. 
Reid theorized that it is highly likely to be able to predict an outcome when the facts of a case 
implicate both trespass and privacy notions, or tests, but it is harder to predict outcomes when 
one test is triggered and the other is not.86 In a post-Jones era, this could cause some uncertainty 
and controversy as the lower courts attempt to tackle this critical scenario. Reid concluded, with 
an expression of hope, that either the United States Supreme Court or Congress will intervene to 
resolve this uncertainty.  
Vikram Iyengar stated that although the justices agreed that a search occurred in Jones, 
their rationales were vastly different.87 Looking specifically at Justice Alito’s concurrence, 
Iyengar reasoned a search occurred because the government’s conduct amounted to violating 
Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy. Additionally, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice 
Alito’s argument on the risks and dangers of advanced technology for citizens’ privacy rights.88 
Iyengar questioned the constitutional boundaries inherent in the government’s ability to intrude 
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on these rights in light of the vast amount of information available through social media and 
other third party sites.89 Furthermore, rules on domestic drone surveillance are still unclear in the 
wake of Jones. Iyengar concluded both Congress and the United States Supreme Court will need 
to further define the limitations for government’s use of these devices.  
II. Second Category 
The articles in this category describe how the Jones decision either didn’t meet 
expectations or the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make real headway in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. These academics discuss that physical trespass has no real place in a 
digital society. Furthermore, they posit that former Fourth Amendment search criteria (i.e., Katz 
or Mosaic Theory) are more than adequate in guiding Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence. 
Medinger discussed how at first, Jones was supposed to further change Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of advanced technology, such as a GPS device.90 However, 
instead of “breaking new ground,” the Court turned to the common-law property based Fourth 
Amendment test. Furthermore, the Court left many unanswered questions with the Jones 
holding, such as whether it applies retroactively or whether there are certain circumstances which 
would make the warrantless attachment of a GPS device “reasonable.”91 This lack of clarity has 
resulted in lower courts needing to take it upon themselves to answer these vague questions. As a 
result, the district courts have turned to long-standing precedents. Furthermore, Jones may prove 
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to change our understanding of Fourth Amendment searches. Medinger’s post-Jones data proved 
that courts had not adapted to the change as of yet.92 
 Andrew Talai explained that law enforcement has the ability to send out drones 
throughout the country in order to conduct surveillance.93 Talai pointed out a critical question on 
everyone’s mind following Jones: whether drone surveillance is considered a search. Moreover, 
there is no clear answer from the Supreme Court on how advanced technology, such as drones, is 
governed by the United States Constitution. Jones has “splintered” the law into three main 
aspects: the trespass test, reasonable expectation of privacy test, and Mosaic Theory.94 Mosaic 
Theory posits that the collection and subsequent analysis of information from non-searches could 
invoke Fourth Amendment protections.95 The main idea is that this conglomeration of non-
searches could become a Fourth Amendment search, after a certain point. Talia concluded that 
the Mosaic Theory is a good foundation for securing Fourth Amendment protections in public 
areas; however, it must be re-developed to account for police discretion.96 
Jace Gatewood described that, prior to the development of modern technology, privacy 
was more practical in nature.97 In today’s world, however, modern technology has blurred what 
is considered private and what law enforcement is legally able to do. This advanced technology 
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has the capability to track and monitor anyone, regardless of time and place.98 Gatewood 
suggested that the Mosaic Theory could help alleviate some issues in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, this theory could create a balance between the practicality of the 
Fourth Amendment and law enforcement’s need to control crime.99 The Mosaic Theory refers to 
the notion that the aggregate collection of data from non-searches could invoke Fourth 
Amendment protections.100 After a careful analysis by law enforcement, the aggregate data from 
these non-searches could become a Fourth Amendment search. Moreover, Gatewood posited that 
the Mosaic Theory has a unique capacity to meet and protect the real world expectations of 
privacy as opposed to merely responding to and safeguarding the alternative of what a person 
exposes to the public, knowingly or otherwise. Additionally, according to Gatewood, this theory 
would help to shed some light on the subject of advanced technology and privacy rights.101 
Priscilla Smith argued that the Mosaic Theory was incomplete and further stated that the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test remains adequate, despite certain criticisms that the 
test is ill-equipped to respond to modern technological advances.102 Furthermore, the 
concurrences in the Jones decision viewed the warrantless GPS surveillance to be a violation of 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy based on the original notion of privacy protection 
and protections against abusive law enforcement tactics.103 
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 Daniel Pesciotta explained that the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test can still 
protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights in the post-Jones world.104 Lower courts appear to be 
applying Katz tests when considering Fourth Amendment matters dealing with video 
surveillance and e-mail searches.105 Furthermore, the courts seem to favor citizens’ privacy rights 
while keeping law enforcement from gaining easy access to advanced technology. Pesciotta 
further claimed that in a post-Jones world, the Katz test was not “dead;” it will endure so long as 
both society and the court system continue to rely on citizens’ reasonable privacy interests.106  
 William Kim argued that a “capability-based” warrant requirement would help alleviate 
some of the pitfalls with the Jones decision.107 Kim described the “capability-based” procedure 
as law enforcement detailing the capabilities of the technology they are using in the warrant. For 
example, if a GPS solely transmits the pin point location of a vehicle, then law enforcement need 
only specify such; on the other hand, if the GPS device has the ability to record conversations, 
then law enforcement must specify this capability during the application of the warrant.108 This 
would have many foreseeable advantages, including serving the dual purposes of safeguarding 
privacy protections without hindering the criminal investigations of the police.109 
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 Kathryn Horwath states that the use of location-based technological applications and 
services compromise an individual’s privacy.110 Moreover, as citizens become more 
interconnected, it has left an open question as to what this means in the context of Fourth 
Amendment protections. Horwath suggests that users of these location-based applications and 
other electronic communications need to receive Fourth Amendment protections.111 Overall, the 
Court in Jones had sidestepped the larger question of whether prolonged governmental electronic 
surveillance would violate individual privacy rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment.112  
Ryan Birss explained the Jones decision caused much turmoil for the FBI as they had to 
deactivate nearly 3000 GPS devices tracking the whereabouts of persons of interest.113 Birss 
explained in the post-Jones era, the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner best illustrates the vast 
limitations found in a property-based, trespass approach to Fourth Amendment searches by 
police involving electronic surveillance.114 For example, the Skinner court found a way around 
the implications of the physical trespass test by noting that police used cell phone location data to 
track the whereabouts of the suspect. Moreover, Birss stated based on Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion in Jones, courts would be able to protect privacy interests while also keeping more 
creative governmental intrusions in check.115  
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 David Gray, Danielle Citron, and Liz Rinehart claimed that the decision in Jones has 
great potential for protecting citizens from unwanted intrusions while also helping law 
enforcement fight cybercrimes and health fraud.116 Jones helps to guide, and at the same time 
place limits on, law enforcement as they attempt to use new types of surveillance technology. 
Moreover, the authors argued that law enforcement interests are at stake if police do not keep up 
with technological advances that are now at the disposal of those involved in cybercrimes. 
According to the authors, law enforcement officers must be allowed to use digital surveillance 
technology to prevent and prosecute various degrees of cybercrimes.117  
 Stephen Henderson further argued that the return of the property based approach in Jones 
along with the approach of Katz means that there is a higher likelihood courts will be able to 
more accurately determine the Fourth Amendment search question.118 However, Henderson 
admitted that the Jones decision does leave some important questions unanswered, and it will be 
interesting to witness how the lower courts react to this decision. Henderson stated that the 
critical question is what restraints or regulations should be placed on the government to survey 
and record information.119 This has been a gray area, which is why many scholars and critics 
were hopeful for Jones to establish some clear precedent. However, that did not necessarily 
happen. Henderson explained that the lack of guidance in the Jones decision is not surprising for 
a few reasons; first, the government did not raise certain issues such as the reasonableness of a 
police search using a GPS device and second, any precise guidance from the Supreme Court in 
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the area of electronic surveillance would be difficult to formulate.120 Furthermore, Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in Jones, as well as other critics and legal scholars, have repeatedly argued 
Congress would be more suited to providing guidance in this area.121  
 Elizabeth Elliot argued that warrantless tracking of cell-site location data and warrantless 
GPS surveillance were common practices in law enforcement, but the recent Jones decision has 
created a “new” test for courts to apply to Fourth Amendment cases involving the use of this 
technology.122 Furthermore, Elliot argued that the tracking of cell-site location data is vastly 
similar to GPS surveillance and thus, should also require law enforcement to obtain a warrant. 
Elliot concluded that law enforcement has too much power in being able to request this 
information acquired by technological devices on a whim, and that the Supreme Court needs to 
address the issue of the government or “Big Brother” being able to rather easily invade anyone’s 
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in light of recent technological 
advancements.123  
Ber-An Pan raised a similar issue in regards to information obtained from cell-phones.124 
Nearly everyone owns or has access to a cell-phone and a massive amount of information is 
stored on these phones using the various functions, such as GPS, texts, phone calls, and internet. 
The Jones Court determined that the government conducts a search when they attach a GPS 
device to track a suspect. However, Pan argued that the Court avoided addressing various 
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loopholes in Fourth Amendment protections caused by modern technology.125 Furthermore, the 
recent Jones decision also raised quite a few legal uncertainties for law enforcement in the area 
of technology and the application of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, Pan pointed to Justice 
Sotomayor and Alito’s concurring opinions, which disapproved of returning to the property 
rights approach to Fourth Amendment searches.126 It was reasoned that in this modern age, a 
substantial amount of information is no longer viewed as part of a “physical document,” but 
instead consists of “intangible” data. Pan criticized Jones for sidestepping the Fourth 
Amendment issues related to this electronic data and thereby creating a degree of vagueness and 
uncertainty in this area.  
Similarly, George Dery III and Ryan Evaro discussed how the Court in Jones missed an 
opportunity to drastically change the landscape of Fourth Amendment searches and instead 
returned to an outdated physical intrusion test for these searches.127 Moreover, the authors argued 
that the Court in Jones appeared to forget that the Katz Court found that a search occurred 
because of the electronic interception of a conversation, not from the actual attachment of an 
electronic device to the outside of a telephone booth to obtain the information.128 Hence, the 
Jones Court missed the opportunity to answer how far the government can go with advanced 
technology, such as a GPS device, before it invades an individual’s expectation of privacy. 
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Kyle Robbins points out the major pitfall of the Jones decision in that it did not explain if 
warrantless GPS data obtained by police prior to this decision is admissible.129 As a result, lower 
courts are forced to struggle with this decision, and must rely on available, appellant precedent. 
Furthermore, any evidence obtained by officers who acted reasonably under the circumstances 
prior to Jones, is generally protected from the exclusionary rule (i.e., under the good-faith 
exception).130 Also, courts remain resistant in applying the exclusionary rule in this context 
because it would fail to meet its intended purpose of deterring corrupt police investigations 
infringing upon a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Susan Freiwald described Jones as “anything but definitive” because it lacked a rule on 
how to govern cases which did not implicate a physical trespass element.131 According to 
Freiwald, the Court in Jones left many questions unanswered, and it is up to the lower courts to 
interpret this new test and identify solutions. However, this process may take longer because of 
the Davis good-faith exception.132 The Court in Davis v. United States held that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply if law enforcement were acting on governing appellate precedent at the time. 
Tamara Lave pointed out that many scholars have criticized the rationale in Jones and its 
adoption of the trespass doctrine for Fourth Amendment search inquiries.133 Only Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion in Jones was willing to question whether reasonable expectation of privacy 
has a place in the digital age where information is constantly voluntarily disclosed to third 
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parties.134 Furthermore, the Jones decision has caused a great deal of confusion in the realm of 
law enforcement; for instance, many agencies do not know what degree of electronic tracking is 
allowed, if any, before this tracking  encroaches upon a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 
As a result, the FBI had taken the drastic step of completely deactivating thousands of GPS 
devices across the nation. Lave further argued that the United States Supreme Court’s history 
regarding technology appeared to reflect the protection of the interests of wealthy “elites,” as 
binoculars and other forms of permissible police technology could be blocked with a house or 
taller fences.136 However, with the recent advances in technology, both the privileged and 
disadvantaged have reason to fear the eye of “Big Brother” as society becomes more inter- 
connected with technology. 
Thomas Clancy argued that the opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, did not 
offer any novel approaches to Fourth Amendment search questions; thus, according to Clancy, 
Jones lacks significant precedential value.137 Clancy explains that trespass is a Fourth 
Amendment concept from an earlier time which really never completely faded away. 
Additionally, the concurrences did not offer any specific guidance, but instead made vague 
observations regarding advanced technologies and Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Clancy 
argued these concurring opinions will only add to the confusion in this area rather than being a 
guide for lower courts in the post-Jones world.138 Clancy concluded by stating that “Jones is but 
the most recent failure” and reasoned the United States Supreme Court in Jones did not develop 
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any framework for new technologies and Fourth Amendment rights.139 However, Jones does 
provide a method regarding how lower courts should evaluate physical intrusions (i.e., 
trespasses). 
Erin Murphy explained that Jones had forced the United States Supreme Court to answer 
a difficult question, one on which they have avoided confrontation for a period of time. The 
Supreme Court had a decision to make, one where they would decide where the line is to be 
drawn for Fourth Amendment protections.140 However, Murphy claimed the majority of the 
justices fell short in their analysis which failed to address the critical question concerning the use 
of technology by law enforcement. Instead, the majority provided lower courts with a specific 
rule and returned to the trespass doctrine to govern Fourth Amendment search inquiries. But the 
issue of electronic surveillance which doesn’t implicate a physical trespass was largely 
overlooked in Jones. Justice Sotomayor was the only justice who made any genuine attempt at 
tackling this difficult question.141 Murphy concluded, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion may be held 
in similar regard to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz, in that it could be held as a set 
standard.142 
Benjamin Priester claimed that the Jones decision lacked clarity in its reasoning as three 
different rationales emerged from the various opinions in the case.143 Additionally, Priester stated 
that the various opinions managed to avoid clarifying how Fourth Amendment rights apply in an 
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“Internet-interconnected age.”144 Although the United States Supreme Court in Jones managed to 
avoid this clarification, Priester claimed it is inevitable that the Court will be confronted with this 
question again, and the justices at that time will have to make significant changes to Fourth 
Amendment law in this area.145 
Jace Gatewood compared the Jones decision to a child waking up on Christmas morning 
and expecting gifts under the tree from Santa, but instead finding that Santa had forgotten all the 
good stuff.146 This feeling can be characterized as disappointment. This disappointment stems 
from the hope that the United States Supreme Court in Jones would have provided more 
direction and guidance in the area of Fourth Amendment rights and technologies used by law 
enforcement in the digital age.147 Moreover, a plethora of data is constantly being stored about an 
individual (i.e., on Facebook, Twitter, etc.), and the possibility of law enforcement being able to 
access this information without any form of physical intrusion makes the Jones decision appear 
“illusionary.”148 Gatewood concluded by remarking that the Court in Jones missed a 
considerable opportunity to address the many questions regarding how the government is 
permitted to use advanced technology under the Fourth Amendment.149 
Mary Leary claimed the opinion in Jones failed to yield any meaningful results in the 
area of technology and privacy expectations, but it did manage to expand the definition of a 
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Fourth Amendment search.150 Leary also argued that due to “commercial conditioning,” society 
no longer possess a true subjective expectation of privacy.151 This “commercial conditioning” 
has come in the form of society being presented with devices and tools which allow it to easily 
exchange information with third-party businesses, including Facebook and Twitter, without any 
expectation of privacy. Cell-phones with GPS devices enabled are constantly gathering and 
aggregating massive amounts of data on a single individual and as a result of these forms of 
advanced technology, Leary claimed society has relinquished any opportunity it may have had to 
demonstrate an expectation of privacy.152 
Angelique Romero argued that after the decision in Jones, the inquiry for courts to 
determine if a violation of Fourth Amendment rights has occurred has become more blurred.153 
This vagueness stems from Jones’ adoption of two inquiries, or tests, to decide Fourth 
Amendment search questions: the common law trespass test and the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test. Although it failed to answer some of the more pressing questions within Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, Romero explained the trespass test may in fact have a place in the 
overall Fourth Amendment inquiry in the modern era. For example, if police obtain a suspect’s 
DNA without a warrant or consent, the courts could easily rely on the trespass test to evaluate 
whether a violation of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights had occurred.154 
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The Honorable Kevin Emas and Tamara Pallas questioned whether the Jones decision 
may have been the death of Katz.155 Based on the opinion of the Court as written by Justice 
Scalia, Emas and Pallas claimed that once the application of the trespass test does not result in a 
finding of a Fourth Amendment search, then courts are able to resort to the Katz test.156 
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s opinion required using the Katz test to assess the “reasonability” of 
the search, not necessarily for whether the search had occurred. Emas and Pallas both agreed that 
the Jones trespass test is but the first step in a paradigm shift away from the Katz test in Fourth 
Amendment analysis.157  
Michael Snyder mentioned that the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones left a number of 
questions unanswered. One such question left unaddressed is whether police use of a GPS device 
to track the whereabouts of a suspect constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment when 
there is no physical trespass present.158 Additionally, the reasoning of the majority and 
concurring opinions in Jones does not address whether the police conduct in the case constitutes 
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Because of these lingering questions, critics and skeptics 
wonder if the Court’s holding is extremely limited in both its applicability and utility.159 Snyder 
concluded by claiming that due to the limited holding of Jones, there is no assurance of Fourth 
Amendment protection to individuals who carry cell-phone devices. 
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Ebony Morris explained the holding in Jones failed to answer a crucial question: when 
the government uses a warrantless GPS device without accomplishing a physical trespass, does 
the person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained (from the 
device)?160 This is a critical question because in the modern age, physical intrusions are much 
less likely, and conversely, electronic or digital intrusions are much more common. Thus, the 
Jones Court missed an opportunity to help guide future cases involving advanced technology. 
However, as Justice Alito pointed out in his concurrence, Congress is fully capable of remedying 
this grey area.161 
Brittany Boatman argued that the Jones decision was a disappointing one as the United 
States Supreme Court’s revival of common law trespass will further complicate Fourth 
Amendment cases.162 Boatman explained that while the Court’s holding reflected societal 
changes, the Court nonetheless revived an outdated system instead of making the necessary, 
groundbreaking alterations to Fourth Amendment law. This approach is seen as especially 
foolish by Boatman because society is rapidly becoming more connected through advanced 
technologies.  These technologies, according to Boatman, will only further blur the lines between 
the notions of privacy expectations and physical trespasses. 
Kevin Bankston and Ashkan Soltani explained that the Jones decision produced three 
separate opinions; furthermore, as reflected in these opinions, four United States Supreme Court 
justices rejected the majority’s notion of a trespass and argued that the prolonged electronic, 
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GPA monitoring of defendant Jones’ vehicle violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.163 
Bankston and Soltani proposed a new supplementary tool, which they named “order-of-
magnitude,” to help courts decide if a privacy expectation exists in cases involving surveillance 
technologies.164 This system uses cost as a metric to determine the privacy expectation of 
individuals under electronic surveillance. Bankston and Soltani explained one limitation of their 
tool includes how it might apply above and beyond tracking types of electronic surveillance. In 
addition, if their tool does gain acceptance, it will require much discussion and debate on the 
exact cost calculus.165 
Dana Raigrodski explained that with the recent Jones decision it is time to rethink Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.166 Raigrodski introduced a feminist argument that Fourth 
Amendment is not about privacy or property interests, but instead about the power and control 
inherent in police searches and seizures. Furthermore, according to Raigrodski, the Fourth 
Amendment was construed to protect the interests of white privileged men in order to perpetuate 
male ideology. Raigrodski concluded by stating that feminist jurisprudence is not limited by 
privacy or property, but instead re-conceptualizes the idea of power and offers multiple new 
perspectives.167 
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David Twombly examined how in a post-Jones world the Davis good-faith exception 
applied to certain federal cases and circuits with clear binding precedent.168 Additionally, some 
lower courts appear to have extended the Davis good-faith exception in circuits without clear 
binding precedent, relying on nearby circuits’ then-binding precedent. Twombly concluded 
lower courts appeared to have disagreed on the application of Davis to police conduct prior to 
Jones related to G.P.S. devices, where some courts use the good-faith exception more narrowly 
based on a close reliance to the facts and holding of then-binding precedent; meanwhile, other 
courts apply the exception more broadly to cover all relevant police conduct prior to Jones.169 
Nancy Forster claimed that the Jones decision is a significant change in Fourth 
Amendment law.170 Moreover, Forster’s main argument is that society has lost its objective 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This is mainly due to the fact that so many individuals give 
away so much information through their cell-phones and various social media websites. This 
information is often viewed as voluntarily given, and thus, third parties through cell-phones and 
other social media platforms gain access to this information.171 Furthermore, advanced 
technology could reach a point where society no longer has an expectation of privacy. Forster 
concluded with an example of law enforcement using x-ray glasses and being freely able to 
examine the contents of a purse out in public. Forster posited the question of privacy will 
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ultimately depend on the type of technology available to law enforcement which will cause the 
Courts to drastically shift society’s perceptions of Fourth Amendment law.172 
The final article which appeared in the citator list based on the specific criteria did not 
actually have “Jones” in the title. The citator appears to have inadvertently and incorrectly 
included the article in the list of articles with “Jones” in the title.173 As can be seen from the 
literature, academics are split on whether the Jones decision was beneficial in further developing 
Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence or not. Those in favor of Jones being a significant and 
productive change explain that the resurgence of the trespass doctrine is an important milestone 
as society moves into a digital age. More specifically, the Jones decision has vastly changed the 
scope of what constitutes a police search. Additionally, the trespass doctrine has the ability to 
work alongside Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. Those against the Jones decision 
generally describe it as a “missed” opportunity. These academics describe that returning to the 
trespass doctrine solves nothing, namely because the law moved away from the trespass doctrine 
to the Katz test in the wake of modern technology developed in the 1960s (i.e., wire taps). This 
has left many to wonder why the current United States Supreme Court felt it was reasonable to 
return to the trespass doctrine. Some academics believe that Katz or the Mosaic theory is enough 
to ensure the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, with some deliberation on specific 
instances. Others mentioned Jones is too specific or narrow to be widely applied. The United 
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States Supreme Court has come under much criticism as some argue that it dodged crucial 
questions with regards to modern technology and Fourth Amendment search inquiries.  
This study will help to fill the gap in literature by carefully examining and interpreting 
federal appellate cases to see how these courts are applying the Fourth Amendment search 
inquiry as it was developed by the United State Supreme Court in Jones. The primary purpose of 
this study is to examine, in the aftermath of Jones, which test - the Katz privacy test and/ or the 
Jones property/ trespass test - the courts are using and whether they found a search occurred (i.e., 
if a search was found, then it would invoke the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to all 
under the Constitution). The secondary purpose is to compare the period prior to Jones and 
following Jones in terms of the rate of “search” findings by the federal appellate courts. This has 
led to two overall hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that, in the wake of Jones, the majority of 
the federal appellate courts would be relying on the trespass doctrine to determine Fourth 
Amendment search inquiries (i.e., since Jones itself recently resurrected this doctrine). The 
second hypothesis is that the majority of the federal appellate courts after Jones would find that 
no police search occurred (i.e., if no search was found then the citizen would not receive the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment). The first hypothesis is theorized as such because Jones is 
one of the most recent cases to address Fourth Amendment search law, and, as such, it is 
expected that more courts will want to weigh in and utilize this new precedent. The second 
hypothesis is theorized as such because of the post-9/11 crime control era that the American 
criminal justice system is currently experiencing. Historically, during these crime-control leaning 




Chapter 3 - Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to get a better understanding of how certain courts are 
interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones. Therefore, a 
qualitative approach was employed for this research project to analyze large amounts of case 
information. The type of analysis chosen for this study was a directed content analysis. This type 
of analysis was employed because of its efficiency in analyzing large amounts of text data. More 
specifically, this technique was used to help analyze and interpret the numerous amount of 
federal appellate cases chosen for this study. A directed content analysis is defined as an analysis 
whereby the researchers use existing theory or prior research to develop a coding scheme prior to 
the start of the project.174 This type of analysis is most often thought of as an inductive research 
technique, which makes educated predictions among the relationships between the variables. As 
the research becomes more developed, the coding scheme becomes more refined.175  
For this study, it was decided to create a coding scheme of specific groupings based on 
the type of test the federal appellate courts used to decide a particular case. This coding scheme 
originally was broken up into three sections: “Jones,” “Katz,” or a combination of the two tests 
referred to as “Both.” This study examined the relevant facts, holding and rationale of the court 
cases in order to determine which test was used. For example, if the court mentioned the trespass 
concept from Jones and relied substantially on the United States Supreme Court’s rationale in 
Jones to decide if a search had occurred under the facts of the case, then this case was 
categorized under the “Jones” grouping. Conversely, if the court mentioned the reasonable 
expectation of privacy concept from Katz and relied substantially on the United States Supreme 
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Court’s reasoning in Katz to determine whether a search had occurred under the facts of the case, 
then this case was categorized under the “Katz” grouping. Finally, if the court mentioned both 
the Jones and Katz concepts, or tests, and examined the search question  using the reasoning 
from both of these cases,  then this  case was categorized under the “Both” group. 
Additionally, the analysis included whether the particular federal appellate court found a 
search had occurred under the applicable legal test (Jones, Katz or Both) and facts of the case. 
This part of the analysis consisted of a simple dichotomy of the court cases into “search” or “no 
search” categories, or groupings.  For example, if a court relied on the Jones common-law 
trespass test to hold that a search had occurred under the facts of the case, then that case would 
be categorized under the “search” grouping.  
The cases used for this project were obtained through the use of legal citators provided by 
Westlaw and/or LexisNexis. The purpose of a citator is to catalog cases, secondary sources, and 
any other forms of authority by analyzing what they say about the sources they cite.176 Citators 
are maintained and constantly updated by editors at LexisNexis or Westlaw who are trained in 
the law. In sum, citators are an essential tool for legal scholars and practitioners to determine if 
certain authority is still “good law,” which generally means that the law has not been changed or 
overturned.  
Westlaw provides a citator called KeyCite.177 KeyCiting refers to a process or technique 
to identify cases or other sources which have been cataloged based on the sources they cite. In 
Westlaw, a KeyCite entry for a case has three sections: full history, direct history, and citing 
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references.178 The full history option in the KeyCite provides information on (1) the direct 
history of the case; (2) any negative indirect history; (3) and any procedural phrases.179 The 
direct history option provides an illustration of the procedural history of the case. This chart is 
also known as “Graphical KeyCite” under Westlaw.180 Lastly, the citing references option shows 
the complete indirect history of the original case and various types of citing sources attached to 
the case.181 This option allows the user to change the parameters of the criteria for finding cases 
which cite the original case depending on the goals of the researcher (i.e., cases associated with a 
certain jurisdiction, level of court, treatment depth, etc.).182  For example, if the researcher was 
interested in accessing all or certain cases which cited Jones, then using the citing references 
option would obtain these cases.  
Accessing the citator is relatively straightforward. Once you arrive at the Westlaw home 
page, there is an option at the top of the page called “KEYCITE.183” Accessing that option brings 
the user to another page which reads “KeyCite this citation” above a search bar on the left. This 
is where the user may type in the legal citation to have access to the case and the various sections 
in Keycite for that case.184 The Jones legal citation for purposes of Keycite is “132 S.Ct. 945” 
and once entered, it brings up the Jones decision under the “Full History” view option. Since the 
current research project is interested in how federal appellate cases are deciding Fourth 
Amendment search law, accessing those cases which reference Jones is accomplished by using 
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the “Citing References” option on the left of the page185. This will bring the user to a page which 
shows all materials that reference Jones, a total of approximately 3083 various documents.  
Since the focus of the research is to interpret federal appellate court cases, the search can 
be narrowed using the “Limit KeyCite Display” option at the bottom of the screen.186 After 
accessing this option, another webpage appears with additional options for narrowing the search 
criteria. The Limit KeyCite Display may limit the search depending on the (1) document type; 
(2) headnotes used in the case; (3) location; (4) jurisdiction; (5) date; and (6) depth of 
treatment.187 For this project, the search parameters were first narrowed by document type (i.e., 
federal appellate cases).   This document type was chosen since the federal appellate courts 
would offer insight on how the higher, precedential courts are interpreting searches following the 
Jones decision. Accordingly, “highest court” and “other courts” options were selected for this 
specific search criteria. This would allow the citator to narrow the search to only include federal 
appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court.188 
Second, under the Limit KeyCite Display option, the depth of treatment was used to 
narrow further the list of citing cases for the Jones decision.189 This was done to focus on the 
cases which gave “significant treatment” to Jones, meaning that Jones was examined or 
discussed in the citing case.190 This limit was applied to eliminate cases which merely cited or 
briefly mentioned Jones rather than discuss the impact of the case. Westlaw’s KeyCite uses a 
                                                          
185 Id. at 158. 
186 Id. at 160. 
187 Id. at 160. 
188 Id. at 161. “Highest Court” and “Other Court” were needed to be checked off under document type when using 
the KeyCite Limits in order to produce the cases which cited Jones under the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal 
Appellate Courts. If “Other Court” was not checked then (all other parameters the same) it would only produce 2 
cases instead of 58.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 160. 
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system of star categories which range from one star to four stars, where one star is the lowest 
amount of treatment a citing case can provide and four stars are the highest amount of 
treatment.191 Accordingly, the search was narrowed to only include citing cases identified with 
three or four stars.  
Finally, under the Limit KeyCite Display option, jurisdiction was used to narrow the 
search.192 This option allows the user to include or exclude citing cases associated with Jones 
from certain jurisdictions. For this research project, the jurisdiction was narrowed to United 
States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts, the United States Circuit Court 
for the District of Columbia, and the Federal Circuit Court.  
After applying all of these search criteria within the Limit KeyCite Display option of the 
citator by selecting the “apply” button on the left side of the screen, the list of citing cases was 
narrowed to 58 cases that fit the specific criteria. The total number of cases which cited Jones 
was reduced to 53 after eliminating cases that were overturned or did not sufficiently answer the 
Fourth Amendment search question.193 The search results for the citing cases include cases from 
the date of the Jones decision (January 23, 2012) through May 31 of 2015. 
As the research became more refined, the original groupings had to be expanded to 
include two initially unforeseen groups. The first newly established category included cases 
wherein the factual events of the case occurred prior to the Jones decision; however, the case 
was actually heard at the federal circuit level after Jones. Since the facts occurred prior to Jones, 
                                                          
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 161. 
193 These cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned by a future case or did not sufficiently 
address the Fourth Amendment search question. The four withdrawn/ vacated or reversed/ overturned cases are:  (1) 
United States v. Wahchumwah, 704 F.3d 606 (9th Cir.  2013); (2) United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187 (2014 ); (3) 
United States v. Davis 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014); (4) Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.3d 1085 (2012 ). The 
one case that did not address the Fourth Amendment search question is American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 
785 F.3d 787 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
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federal circuit courts were turning to their previous, pre-Jones circuit decisions (i.e., precedent) 
to help analyze the Fourth Amendment search question (e.g., whether a search had occurred 
through police use of a GPS device). The category created for these court cases was titled “then-
binding precedent.”194 Though their existence is mentioned in the findings section, these cases, 
which reflect a reliance by circuit courts on relevant pre-Jones binding precedent, were 
ultimately excluded from the study’s reported findings since they failed to answer the intended, 
applicable research question (i.e., how federal appellate courts are interpreting Jones following 
its decisional date and application).195 For example, in these cases, federal appellate courts are 
relying on pre-Jones search laws and rationales underlying the application of those laws. This 
approach by these courts is somewhat expected due to how recent the Jones decision is. 
The second, new category was titled “procedural error.” The cases categorized under this 
grouping included federal appellate court cases which contained some form of procedural error 
which prevented the courts from deciding on the merits whether a search under the Fourth 
Amendment had occurred. An example of these types of cases included the defendant’s failure to 
raise a timely motion in court objecting to the admission of evidence obtained through the police 
search.196 Thus, the lack of the court’s analysis on the search question in these cases warranted a 
new category. This category was kept for classification purposes, but the category did not offer 
any answers to the study’s substantive research questions and therefore the cases in this category 
                                                          
194 This title, or label, was chosen as a majority of circuits were turning to their previously binding precedent as 
courts could not hold law enforcement or attorneys guiding them accountable under Jones for conduct occurring 
prior to Jones (i.e., since Jones was not explicitly stated as being retroactive). 
195 Five (5) cases were exempt from exclusion and instead categorized as Jones since the courts made an in depth 
Fourth Amendment search analysis which led to the courts concluding a search had occurred under Jones; 
however, these courts ultimately turned to binding appellate precedent and applied Davis good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. These cases include U.S. v. Sellers, 512 Fed.Appx. 319 (4th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 
200 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 
2013); U.S. v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014) 
196 See the Appendix A section to review all the Binding Precedent “BP” or Procedural Error “PE” cases. 
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were omitted from the reported findings. Overall, the omission of the cases falling into these two 
categories reduced the original sample of fifty three (53) citing cases for Jones to thirty three 
(33) cases.   
To ensure a more complete analysis of Fourth Amendment search law following Jones , 
the citator was also used to search for any cases which cited Katz during this period (i.e., from 
the date of Jones through May 31, 2015). This approach was undertaken because Jones retained 
the Katz test as a possible, single lens through which lower courts may examine the search 
question. This would also produce the most accurate view of how courts are determining Fourth 
Amendment search questions by capturing all cases which either cited Jones or Katz in the 
citator.  
To use the citator for Katz, the same steps were followed as with Jones (above) with one 
more additional step. First, the “KEYCITE” option was accessed at the top of the Westlaw page. 
The legal citation for Katz was entered into the search bar --- “389 U.S. 347” --- and the citator 
results appeared. Clicking on the citing references at this point brought up a webpage with over 
32,000 citing documents.  
Next, the search parameters were reduced by using the “Limit KeyCite Display” option at 
the bottom of the screen. Following the same search parameters used for Jones, under document 
type, both the “Highest court” and “Other courts” were the only options selected. Jurisdiction 
was limited to United States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts of 
appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia. Depth of treatment was maintained at three stars and four stars so as to 
only include cases which examined and discussed Katz. Finally, the date limitation was used to 
further narrow the search. This option was used to only include cases which cited Katz after 
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Jones was decided. After applying these search limitations, the citator produced twenty three 
(23) cases which referenced Katz after the decisional date of Jones. Cross referencing the list 
produced from the citator of Jones with the citator of Katz, there was an overlap of eighteen (18) 
cases. This left five (5) cases which needed to be evaluated and incorporated into the findings. 
These five (5) cases from the Katz citator were added to the thirty three (33) cases from the Jones 
citator, which totaled thirty eight (38) cases for the post-Jones findings. 
 To compare and contrast how Fourth Amendment search law has changed since Jones, 
the citator was used to examine Fourth Amendment search determinations under Katz during the 
ten (10) years prior to the Jones decision. To accomplish this, the “Limit KeyCite Display” 
option was again applied in the citator (for Katz). The date option was selected and January 22, 
2002 was inserted into the “AFTER” box. Next, the date January 22, 2012 was inputted into the 
“BEFORE” box. A ten (10) year timeframe was selected  so as to acquire a sufficient number of 
federal appellate cases providing significant treatment to Katz to substantially equal, or match, 
the number of Jones cases previously obtained (i.e., thirty nine cases). The treatment limitations 
selected were the same as those selected for the Jones cases, (i.e., “discussed” and “examined”). 
Additionally, the jurisdiction parameter was set to the same search criteria as in the Jones 
analysis --- United States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts of appeal, 
and the United State Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Lastly, “higher court” 
and “other court” options were chosen for the document type parameter. This search using the 
citator obtained thirty nine (39) citing cases for Katz.  
 These thirty nine (39) citing cases from the federal appellate courts were used to examine 
whether they found a search had occurred under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
This determination left two groupings of cases in which one group concluded a search had 
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occurred and another group found a search had not occurred. However, the original thirty nine 
(39) citing cases were reduced due to the case later being overturned or overruled.197 The final 
working sample of Katz cases decided prior to Jones consisted of thirty four (34) cases. Five (5) 
cases were eliminated for various reasons. First, a lower court case within the Jones litigation 
was eliminated because it had been overturned (i.e., by the United States Supreme Court in Jones 
itself).198  Second, United States v. Maynard was eliminated because both its holding and 
reasoning focused upon the reasonableness of a police search as opposed to whether a search had 
initially occurred.  In addition, this case was related to the Jones litigation since defendants 
Maynard and Jones were co-defendants (i.e., in United States v. Maynard).199 Third, cases were 
eliminated because they were overruled or overturned by another case which appeared in the 
citator or on other grounds unrelated to a Fourth Amendment search question.200 Fourth, cases 
were eliminated because they did not reference Katz in the majority opinion, but instead 
discussed or examined Katz in their dissenting or concurring opinions.201  Because these latter 
opinions do not constitute the law, these cases were removed from the study’s findings. Finally, a 
case was eliminated because it was more focused on a procedural question, and not on the 
determination of whether a search had occurred under the Katz privacy test.202 
                                                          
197 Cases which were eliminated, included Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008); 
U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Circ. 2010); U.S. v. Crawford, 372 
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004); Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009). 
198 The case denied the government’s petition to have Maynard decision reviewed again. 
199 Jones case by Supreme Court essentially agreed with Maynard court’s finding that a search had occurred when 
police attached a GPS device to Jones’ vehicle, but disagreed on the basis for this --- Maynard case said search 
occurred because Jones’ privacy rights were violated while Jones case said a search occurred because Jones’ 
property rights violated at the time of GPS attachment/ monitoring. In sum, Jones Supreme Court case essentially 
overrules Maynard court (i.e., at the very least its rationale). 
200 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008) was overruled by City of Ontario, Cal. v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, (2010); U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) overruled U.S. v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700 
(9th Cir. 2003) on grounds outside of Fourth Amendment search law. 
201 The citator found Katz referenced in the concurring and dissenting opinion. U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 
1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
202 Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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The literature review was created by accessing law review articles through the database 
LexisNexis Academic.203 LexisNexis Academic and its widely known and accepted legal citator, 
“Shepard’s,” allowed for a more specific focus on only those law reviews which cited Jones in 
their title (i.e., law review articles that provided substantial treatment of Jones).204 
To access the LexisNexis Acadmic database of legal periodicals first, log onto the site 
and click on the dropdown box above the search bar. This box should be titled “Search By 
Content Type” and then click on law reviews. Next, enter the legal case citation for Jones into 
the search bar. The Shepard’s produced 999 law reviews and other legal journals which cited 
Jones. In order to focus more on only those law review and legal journals which provided 
substantial treatment of Jones, the “Advanced Options” feature in Shepard’s was applied. Using 
the Advanced Options, the search was narrowed to law reviews and journals whose titles 
included the word “Jones.” To produce this restriction, one possibility is to type in the space 
provided for restrictions the following phrase ---“TITLE (JONES).” Another possibility is to 
select “TITLE” from the available dropdown box, and then type in “JONES” in the space 
provided.  The search bar should read “132 S.Ct. 945 AND TITLE (JONES).”  To finalize this 
restriction, the “apply” button is selected, and then the “search” button. This search produced 
fifty (50) law reviews and journals which both cited Jones and had the word “Jones” somewhere 
in their title. The literature review also included historical United States Supreme Court “search” 
cases decided prior to Katz v. United States, such as On Lee v. United States (1952) and 
                                                          
203 Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research 47 (5th ed. 2012). Law reviews are legal periodicals written by legal scholars, 
judges and practitioners, and students studying the law.  
204 Id. at 145. 
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Olmstead v United States (1928). These cases were included to provide historical context on the 
development of Fourth Amendment search law in the United States over time.205   
 
 
                                                          




Chapter 4 - Findings 
 Overall, the findings consists of two sections. The first section (part I) consists of the 
summary of the findings. This includes all relevant findings related to the post-Jones and pre-
Jones data. At the end of this section there are tables which represent the findings. The second 
section (part II) consists of the detailed findings. This section begins with the detailed post-Jones 
findings which includes all cases that cited Jones or Katz after the Jones decision and then ends 
with the pre-Jones findings which cited Katz prior to the Jones decision. 
I. Summary of the Findings 
The post-Jones working sample totaled thirty eight (38) cases which gave significant 
treatment to Jones and Katz from the date Jones was decided until May 31, 2015.206 The 
breakdown of the cases are as followed. First, eleven (11) cases strictly used the Jones trespass 
test to decide Fourth Amendment search question.207 All eleven (11) of these cases found a 
search had occurred under the Jones trespass doctrine. Second, eleven (11) cases strictly used the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Of these cases, three (3) found a search had occurred 
and eight (8) found no search had occurred. Finally, sixteen (16) cases fell under the “Both” 
category. This means that these cases used both the Jones trespass doctrine and the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to answer the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. Of 
these cases, six (6) found a search had occurred, meanwhile ten (10) had found a search had not 
                                                          
206 Cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned by a future case which appeared within citator. 
Refer to the Methodology section for a detailed explanation of the cases which were eliminated in this research 
study. 
207 There are five (5) cases which were categorized as Jones since the courts made an in depth Fourth Amendment 
search analysis which led to the courts concluding a search had occurred under Jones; however, these courts 
ultimately turned to binding appellate precedent and applied Davis good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
These cases include U.S. v. Sellers, 512 Fed.Appx. 319 (4th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S. 
v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Stephens, 764 
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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occurred. Lastly, fourteen (14) cases were classified as “Binding Appellate Precedent” and six 
(6) fell under “Procedural Error.”208 
The second section of pre-Jones findings includes all cases which cited Katz during the 
ten (10) years prior to the Jones decision (January 22, 2002-January 22, 2012). The pre-Jones 
working sample totaled thirty four (34) cases.209 Of the thirty four (34) cases, sixteen (16) found 
a search had occurred and eighteen (18) found a search had not occurred. 
 
 Figure 1 represents all cases which cited Jones or Katz after the Jones decision. This is all 
thirty eight (38) cases. First, eleven (29%) cases solely relied on the Jones trespass test to find if 
a search had occurred. Second, eleven (29%) cases exclusively used the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to find if a search had occurred. Finally, the last category includes the 
                                                          
208 Refer to the Appendix A for a detailed summary of the cases which fell under “Binding Appellate Precedent” or 
“Procedural Error”. These cases were not included in the analysis since they failed to answer the Fourth 
Amendment search questions. 
209 Cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned or overruled. Refer to the Methodology section 
for a detailed explanation of the cases which were eliminated. These cases included Quon v. Arch Wireless 
Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. v. 
Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Circ. 2010); Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 
577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009).  
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remaining sixteen cases (42%) which used both the Jones trespass test and Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to find if a search had occurred. 
 
Figure 2 represents all post-Jones findings and whether the courts found a search or not a 
search. Of the eleven (11) cases which used Jones, 100% (11) found a search had occurred. Of 
the 11 cases using Katz, 27.2% (3) were found to have decided a police search transpired and 
72.8% (8) found no search occurred. Finally, of the remaining 16 cases which used both tests, 




 Figure 3 represents all cases spanning 10 years prior to the Jones decision. Of the 34 
cases which cited Katz, 47% (16) cases found a search had occurred and 53% (18) cases found a 
search had not occurred. 
II. Detailed Findings 
Post-Jones  
Key: K=Katz, J=Jones, B=Both (i.e., Jones and Katz tests); S=Search; NS=No search 
 
1. U.S. v. Mathias (B-NS)  
Officer Murray received an anonymous tip that Richard Mathias was growing marijuana 
plants in his back yard which was enclosed by a fence.210 Officer Murray inspected the fence and 
on the north side was able to peek inside the area where he saw marijuana plants. During his 
inspection of the fence, Officer Murray did not manipulate or disturb the fence to make these 
observations. Based on what he had observed, Officer Murray obtained a warrant and arrested 
Mathias. In court, Mathias claimed that officer Murray physically intruded into his area when 
looking through the fence.211 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained that in order to establish “a Jones 
trespassory search …requires the challenged intrusion to be into a constitutionally protected area 
enumerated within the text of the Fourth Amendment.”212 The Court reasoned that Officer 
Murray’s precise location was within an “open field” when he merely looked through Mathias’ 
fence, without any manipulation. Thus, Officer Murray’s actions did not constitute a search 
                                                          
210 U.S. v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 2013). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 956. 
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under the Jones trespass doctrine.213 The Court then turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test. Taking into consideration that officer Murray had a right to be in a public vantage 
point and the fact that Mathias’ fence had small gaps; the Court ruled that Mathias had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy and ultimately had no Fourth Amendment protection. 
Therefore, no law enforcement search occurred under Jones or Katz. 
2. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (B-NS) 
In October 2010, the United States filed three applications under § 2703(d) of the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.214 The purpose of this order was to 
seek evidence relevant to three separate criminal investigations. The applications requested “the 
cell phone service provider to produce sixty days of historical cell site data and other subscriber 
information for that particular phone.”215 Furthermore, the Government requested the same cell 
site data in each application: specifically requesting “the antenna tower and sector to which the 
cell phone sends its signal.”216  
This information was requested during times when the phone was both actively sending a 
signal to a tower to obtain service and when the phone was turned off.217 The ACLU argued that 
under certain conditions, individuals “have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location 
information when they are tracked.”218 The ACLU depended on the concurrences of Justice 
Alito, who was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in Jones, “which concluded that 
                                                          
213 Id. at 955-956. 




218 Id. at 608. 
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lengthy GPS surveillance of a vehicle could constitute a search.”219 It was further argued by the 
ACLU that individuals are only in their vehicles for various amounts of time, but most people 
have a cell phone on or near their person at all times.  
The Court of Appeals ruled that cell site data are similar to that of business records and this 
significantly alters the district court’s decision by applying a different legal standard.220 Since a 
third party was recording the data and not the government, there was no physical intrusion.221 
Furthermore, the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy test does not apply to what “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office” and therefore, “is not subject 
of Fourth Amendment protections.”222  The Court concluded that there are indeed changes in 
society’s reasonable expectations of privacy with technological advances; however, the Congress 
is the best governmental body to address any privacy concerns.223 As a result, the cell site data 
should be analyzed under a different legal standard. The Court concluded that “the SCA’s 
authorization of § 2703(d) allowing orders for historical cell site information if an application 
meets the lesser ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause standard, is not unconstitutional.”224 Thus, the court ultimately concluded that no 
search occurred under Jones or Katz. 
3. U.S. v. Castellanos (B-NS)  
                                                          
219 Id. (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 964 (2012)). 
220 Id. at 611-612. 
221 Id. at 610 (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 964 (2012)). 
222 Id. at 612 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)). 
223 Id. at 614. 
224 Id. at 615. 
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On September 2010, Reeves County Sheriff, Captain Roberts was conducting patrol at a 
truck stop.225 Captain Roberts suspicion was raised when a commercial car carrier [Direct Auto 
Shippers (DAS)] transporting a vehicle bore a dealership placard on the Ford Explorer. Captain 
Roberts questioned the driver of the car carrier about the Explorer oddity, namely the vehicle not 
having a “normal” license plate. The driver provided Roberts with the shipping documents which 
identified the owner of the vehicle as Wilmer Castenada.226  
The officer asked the driver of the DAS car carrier for permission to search the Explorer after 
being unable to contact Wilmer Castenada. The driver consented and Captain Roberts found 
fresh tool marks near the rear of the seats, a strong odor of Bondo, and when he pounded on the 
rear floorboard, he noticed inconsistent sounds above the gas tank.227 Next, Roberts used a fiber 
optic scope to examine the inside of the gas tank and saw several blue bags floating in the tank 
which later turned out to be 23 kilogram-sized bricks of cocaine.228 Captain Roberts falsely 
informed Castenada that the DAS driver had been arrested and his cargo seized. A few days 
later, Roberts learned that someone had arrived and was attempting to claim the Explorer, but 
was identified as Arturo Castellanos.229 Police located and detained Castellanos.230 He stated he 
knew of Castenada and was there to pick up the vehicle. Police also seized two duffle bags.231  
Castellanos denied that they were his bags. Officers searched the bags and found a cell phone 
which matched the number provided by the DAS driver, earlier. Castellanos was later indicted on 
                                                          









one count of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.232 Castellanos moved to 
suppress the items contained in the duffle bag and cocaine found in the gas tank as his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated.  
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis. The 
Court used both the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the Jones trespass test in 
their analysis.233 The Court stated that parties may have a possessory interest in the vehicle; 
however, Castellanos had not established ownership of the vehicle or raised he was the 
“exclusive driver.”234 Thus, the Court reasoned based on the facts of this case, Castellanos had 
not properly established a “close connection to the vehicle” and therefore, Castellanos does not 
have any reasonable expectation of privacy during the police search.235 
Also, Castellanos lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy for a package that was searched 
and addressed to someone else, even though later it turned out to be an alias or fictitious name.236 
Originally, Castellanos position at the suppression hearing demonstrated that the name “Wilmer 
Castenada” was another individual engaged in a sale transaction.237 The Court stated, 
“Castellanos lacks standing because he failed to carry his burden to show that he had a 
constitutionally sufficient connection to the Explorer to demonstrate an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”238 In sum, the Court found that defendant was not entitled to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment under Jones or Katz. 
4. U.S. v. Anderson-Bagshaw (B-NS) 
                                                          
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 832-833. 
234 Id. (citing Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949) 
235 Id. at 834. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 835. 
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Karen Bagshaw worked at a mail carrier in 1998 in the city of Wickliffe, Ohio.239 
Approximately a year later, she was diagnosed with thoracic degenerative disc disorder and 
underwent a failed spinal fusion surgery. The Department of Labor Office of Workers 
Compensation awarded her disability payments from June, 2002 until July, 2011.240 She was 
required to report any earnings from employment or other business involvement during that time. 
However, in 2008, a claim examiner had notified Special Agent Stephanie Morgano of the 
United States Postal Service Office the Inspector General of possible business activities with 
Bagshaw and an alpaca farm.241  
Following the investigation of the alpaca farm, agents conducted extensive surveillance on 
Bagshaw. This included monitoring her on a Caribbean cruise which included recording her 
“sunbathing, moving … luggage, walking, and playing bingo.”242 To further complete the 
surveillance, the agents installed a pole camera in 2009. It had the ability to “pan as well as 
zoom” but did not have the capability to examine the interiors of the house.243 Karen Bagshaw 
argued that the use of the pole camera violated the Fourth Amendment due to her backyard being 
within the curtilage of her home, and she therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
that area.244 Furthermore, she argued that the sheer quantity of constant video surveillance 
footage for twenty-four days invaded her reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded Jones does not apply to the events in 
this case because GPS tracking is considered a much greater trespass than a fixed camera, 
                                                          
239 U.S. v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 Fed.Appx 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2012). 
240 Id. at 399. 
241 Id. at 400. 
242 Id. at 401. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 403. 
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capable of surveillance from a fixed position.245 This form of surveillance only revealed 
Bagshaw’s activities outside in her yard, which was already open to public view. The Court 
stated, it did not “‘generate [] a precise record of [her] public movements that reflect[ed] a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’ like 
a GPS would have done.”246  
The Court also examined this case from a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Due to 
the “backyard” being easily visible from various public locations, the government agents were 
constitutionally permitted to view inside the “curtilage” area.  With reference to Katz, the Court 
mentioned, “what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”247 The Court held that any further Fourth 
Amendment violations in this case would be harmless and declined to resolve whether long-term 
video surveillance of curtilage would require a warrant.248 The length of surveillance from the 
fixed camera lasted from June 16 until July 10, 2009.249 Furthermore, the Court ruled that these 
clips of Bagshaw in the backyard were “utterly insignificant” and thus, harmless to use against 
Bagshaw during trial.250  The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny her suppression 
motion. In sum, the court found no search occurred under either Jones or Katz. 
5. Grady v. North Carolina (J-S) 
                                                          
245 Id. at 406. 
246 Id. at 405 (citing Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 955). 
247 Id. at 405 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
248 Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 Fed.Appx at 405. 
249 Id at 401. 
250 Id. at 406. 
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The facts of this case start by describing that the petitioner, Torrey Grady was convicted of 
various sexual offenses in 1997 and 2006.251 Grady was ordered to appear in superior court after 
having finished his sentence. The New Hanover County Superior Court would be responsible for 
determining whether Grady should be placed under satellite-based monitoring as a recidivist sex 
offender. Grady argued against the monitoring program because it violates his Fourth 
Amendment rights.252 The trial court declined his argument and ordered him to be enrolled in the 
lifelong monitoring program. Grady appealed and relied heavily on the Court’s decision in 
United States v. Jones. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this argument, relying on 
State v. Jones.253 The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and 
dismissed Grady’s appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court rejected the North Carolina Court of Appeals analysis.254 
The Court turned to its prior decision in United States v. Jones stating that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”255 Moreover, the Court explained the importance of 
the Government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information” 
being tantamount to a search.256 Furthermore, the monitoring system set forth by North Carolina 
included: 1) continuous tracking with time stamps and 2) reported subject’s violations and 
proscriptive locations.257 Thus, the Court concluded such monitoring was intended to obtain 
specific information on the individual and because “it does so [by] physically intruding on a 
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subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search.”258 However, the Court declined to decide 
on the constitutionality of the program, as it was not previously examined by the lower courts. 
The Court vacated the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s judgment. The Court found that the 
satellite-based monitoring system is tantamount to a search based on the Jones trespass test. 
6. U.S. v. Wahchumwah (K-NS) 
The defendant, Ricky Wahchumwah, appealed his jury conviction for offenses related to the 
illegal exchange of eagle parts. He contended that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when an undercover agent used a concealed audio-video device to record an illegal transaction 
Wahchumwah conducted in his home.259 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument because the Fourth Amendment's protection does not extend to information that a 
person “voluntarily exposes” to a government agent, including an undercover agent.260 
Furthermore, the Court held that an undercover agent’s warrantless use of the hidden recording 
device inside the home, which he has been invited to enter, does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. When examining from the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court 
determined that Wahchumwah “forfeited his expectation of privacy when he invited the 
undercover agent and knowingly exposed incriminating evidence.”261 As a result, Wahchumwah 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the encounter taking place between the 
undercover agent and himself. In sum, the Court determined that no search occurred under the 
Katz test.262 
7. U.S. v. Skinner (B-NS).  
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In May and June 2006, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were tracking drug 
courier Melvin Skinner, AKA “Big Foot,” through cell information data, “ping” data, and GPS 
real-time location from his phone.263 These actions were certified by a federal magistrate judge. 
By continuously “pinging” the phone, agents tracked the whereabouts of Melvin Skinner from 
Arizona to Texas. More specifically, agents tracked Melvin Skinner to a truck stop in Texas 
where they located a motorhome.264 An officer approached the motorhome and Skinner 
answered the door. Skinner denied the officer’s request to search the vehicle. Then, a K-9 officer 
and his dog arrived at the scene and conducted a perimeter dog sniff around the motorhome.265  
The trained K-9 alerted officers that there was a presence of narcotics. Subsequently, officers 
entered the motorhome and found marijuana and handguns.266 Skinner and his son were placed 
under arrest.267 Skinner appealed and argued that the use of the GPS information from his cell 
phone violated his Fourth Amendment.268 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated for 
Jones to apply to a Fourth Amendment analysis, “when the Government does engage in physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”269 The Court concluded that no physical 
intrusion occurred in this case due to Skinner voluntarily using the cell phone for the intended 
purposes of communication. The agents who used the cell-phone GPS technology were merely a 
byproduct of the intended use.270  
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Moreover, Jones does not apply to Skinner because, “the majority opinion’s trespassory test” 
provides little guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not 
depend upon a physical invasion on property.”271 Furthermore, this form of tracking does not 
implicate Justice Alito’s concern he expressed in his concurrence opinion.272 In Jones, Justice 
Alito explained, “constant monitoring of [Jones’] vehicle for four weeks…would have required a 
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance.”273 However, this is a 
different set of circumstances in the current case of Skinner. The surveillance on Skinner was for 
three days and therefore does not give rise to the concern of Justice Alito. In fact, the Court 
mentioned that Justice Alito stated, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements 
on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as 
reasonable.”274  
Due to authorities tracking a known number that was voluntarily used while traveling on 
public thoroughfares, Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data 
and location of his cell phone. Accordingly, the Court found under either the Jones trespass 
doctrine or Katz reasonable expectation of privacy criteria, no search occurred.  Therefore, 
suppression is not warranted and the district court correctly denied Skinner’s motion to suppress. 
8. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General of U.S. (B-S) 
 This case involved a collection of individuals and entities who are a part of various aspects 
of the adult media industry who had brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 18 
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U.S.C. §§ 2257 and 2257A.275 These statutes are “criminal laws which imposed recordkeeping, 
labeling, and inspection requirements on producers of sexually explicit depictions.”276 The same 
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of certain regulations.277 Plaintiffs claim that the 
statutes and regulations encroach upon various provisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments to the Constitution. With regard to the Fourth Amendment claim, the statute states 
that producers make their records “available to the Attorney General for inspection at all 
reasonable times.”278 More specifically, these statutes “authorize investigators, at any reasonable 
time and without delay or advance notice, to enter any premises where a producer maintains its 
records to determine compliance with the recordkeeping requirements or other provisions of the 
Statutes.”279 Additionally, “[p]roducers must make these records available for inspection for at 
least twenty hours per week, and the records may be inspected only once during any four-month 
period unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation has occurred.”280  
When deciding whether a search had occurred the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
found it was not clear due to the lack of specific information, such as “which specific members 
of the Free Speech Coalition, Inc. (FSC) were searched, when and where the search took place 
(i.e., offices or homes), and the conduct of the government during the alleged search.”281 The 
Court stated this type of information is required when attempting to analyze the government’s 
actions. According to the Court, “[t]his factual context is necessary for determining whether the 
government's conduct was a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to either the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test set forth in Katz or the common-law-trespass test 
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described in Jones.”282 Accordingly, the Court “vacate[ed] the District Court's order [dismissing] 
Plaintiffs claims under the Fourth Amendment, and remand[ed] for development of the record. In 
particular, remand will permit the District Court to consider the impact, if any, of the recent 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones.”283 On remand, the District Court found a 
search had occurred under both the Katz and Jones test upon reexamination, which was later 
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.284 In sum, this case found a search had 
occurred and that the District Court correctly used both tests.285 
9. U.S. v. Cowan (B-NS)  
Information from a confidential informant led officers to conduct surveillance on the 
apartment owned by Johnny Booth.286 The tip included information on Johnny Booth receiving a 
shipment of crack cocaine to later be sold. During the surveillance of the apartment, officers 
observed two individuals in vehicles who they believed to be involved in a drug trafficking 
scheme. The officers obtained a warrant to search the apartment, the persons inside the 
apartment, and the parking areas for controlled substances, including keys.287 A squad of seven 
officers broke down the exterior door of the building and administered the search. 
Officers executing the warrant discovered eight adults, including Cowan, inside the 
apartment.288 Detective Canas conducted a frisk of Cowan’s clothing and found a set of keys in 
his front pocket. The Detective questioned Cowan about how he got there and suspected Cowan 
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was lying.289 After finding crack cocaine in several locations, Detective Canas removed the 
handcuffs from Cowan and explained “he could leave if the keys did not match any of the parked 
vehicles.”290 The Detective walked outside with Cowan and continued to press the key fob until 
it set off an alarm of a car in front of the apartment.291 An accompanying officer re-handcuffed 
Cowan and brought a drug dog near the scene who alerted officers of the presence of drugs in 
Cowan’s vehicle.  The subsequent search of Cowan’s car revealed crack cocaine inside the 
vehicle.292 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied both “search” tests to this case. 
Accordingly, the Court stated, “[a]n individual may challenge a search if it violated the 
individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area.’”293  First, the Court determined that Cowan “did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his vehicle.”294 Even if Detective Canas’ use 
of the key fob to locate the car did constitute a search, it would be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment’s automobile exception. Second, applying Jones to this case, Detective Canas did 
not “trespass on the key fob itself because [Detective Canas] lawfully seized it” (i.e., under the 
warrant and as part of the pat-down).295 Therefore, under both the Katz and Jones tests, the Court 
concluded that no search had occurred.  
10. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles (J-S) 
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The facts involve the Appellees, who are homeless people living on the streets of Skid 
Row.296 These individuals store their personal possessions, including personal identification and 
other important documents, in containers provided by social service organizations. In this case, 
the Appellees kept their possessions in distinctive carts provided by a soup kitchen, hosted by 
Los Angeles Catholic group.297 On multiple occasions between February 6, 2011 and March 17, 
2011, Appellees stepped away and left their personal property on the sidewalks. They had not 
“abandoned their property;” however, City of Los Angeles (City) employees seized and 
immediately destroyed their property. This was in accordance with “a policy and practice of 
seizing and destroying homeless persons’ un-abandoned possessions.”298  
The City’s only argument on appeal is that its seizure and destruction of Appellee’s un-
abandoned property implicates neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendment.299 The City 
based its argument on the Appellees having no legitimate expectation of privacy in unattended 
property. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated due to the facts of this case, it is 
unnecessary to focus on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard.300 Instead, the 
Court focused on the Jones test for this analysis. Consequently, as stated in Jones, the Katz test 
“did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope, but added to not substituted for, the common-
law trespassory test.”301  
The Court concluded in this case, from the immediate seizure and destruction of Appellee’s 
un-abandoned property, that the “City meaningfully interfered with Appellee’s possessory 
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interests in that property.”302 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that un-abandoned property by the 
homeless are still protected by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Court concluded “once the 
City destroyed the property, it rendered the seizure unreasonable.”303 In sum, the Court found 
that a seizure did occur under Jones, and it violated the Appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights.304   
11. Patel v. City of Los Angeles (B-S)  
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.49 “requires hotel and motel staff to keep records with 
specified information about their guests.”305 These records must contain the guest’s name, 
address, the number of people in the party, vehicle, license plate number, etc. This case is 
focused on the constitutionality of the warrantless inspection requirement. This states that hotel 
guest records “shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for 
inspection,” provided that, “[w]henever possible, the inspection shall be conducted at a time and 
in a manner that minimizes any interference with the business.”306  
The City of Los Angeles argued that a police officer’s non-consensual inspection of hotel 
guest records does constitute a Fourth Amendment search.307 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that the business records are the hotel’s private property, and the hotel therefore 
has both a possessory and an ownership interest in the records. The Supreme Court in Jones 
established that a search occurs when “the government physically intrudes upon one of these 
enumerated areas, or invades protected privacy interest, for the purpose of obtaining 
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information.”308 The Court in Patel held that a police officer’s non-consensual inspection of 
hotel guest records plainly constitutes a “search” under both the property-based approach of 
Jones and the privacy-based approach of Katz.309 These types of “inspections involve both a 
physical intrusion upon the hotel’s private papers and an invasion of hotel’s protected privacy 
interest in those papers for the purpose of obtaining information.”310 These types of inspections 
upon hotel records do in fact involve a physical trespass into the hotel’s protected privacy 
interest.  
The Court stated that these “papers” are classified as business records, which means that they 
are the hotel’s private property and the hotel shares a possessory interest in the matter. The Court 
found that the § 41.49 requirement concerning hotel guest records being made available upon an 
officer’s request is “facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment” because it authorizes 
inspections of records without affording an opportunity to “obtain judicial review of the 
reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.”311 
12. Florida v. Jardines (J-S)  
In 2006, Detective Pedraja received an “unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the 
home of Jardines.”312 After watching his home for approximately 15 minutes, Detective Pedraja 
and Officer Bartelt, a canine handler, approached Jardines’ residence. After Officer Bartelt’s 
trained canine conducted the dog sniff of the front door, it sat which signaled to Officer Bartelt 
that he discovered an odor of drugs.313 The officers returned to the vehicle and Detective Pedraja 
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applied for and received a search warrant for the residence based on the dog sniff. The warrant 
was executed that day and Jardines was arrested for the trafficking of cannabis, which the 
officers had discovered during their search.314  
The Supreme Court held “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically 
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”315 Additionally, the Jones Court reasoned that 
property rights “are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,” in reference to Katz 
still having a place in Fourth Amendment analyses.316 The Court in Jones stated, a person’s 
“Fourth Amendment rights dot not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”317 The Court held that 
“the use of a trained police dog to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings does 
constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because the officers had 
initially trespassed on Jardines’ property (i.e., when they approached the area immediately 
surrounding the property with the canine).318 Moreover, the Supreme Court held it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the officers violated Jardines’ expectation of privacy under the 
Katz test.319  Accordingly, through the single lens of Jones, the Supreme Court found a search 
did occur.  
13. U.S. v. Jackson (B-NS)  
On May 26, 2011, Virginia police officers pulled two bags of trash from a trash can.320  
These trash cans were located directly behind the apartment of Sierra Cox. The officers had 
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received a tip from a confidential informant that Dana Jackson was selling drugs from the 
apartment. Jackson was Sierra Cox’s boyfriend. During the trash pull, officers recovered items 
from the bags that were consistent with drug trafficking.321 Subsequently, the police officers 
obtained a warrant to search the apartment. The officers found evidence of drug trafficking. 
Jackson argued that the trash pull violated his Fourth Amendment right as the police “physically 
intruded upon a constitutionally protected area” to obtain evidence found inside the trash.322 
Additionally, Jackson argued his reasonable expectation of privacy was violated during the trash 
pull. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated, under Jardines (an extension of Jones) 
this would be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if it occurred 
within the curtilage of Cox’s apartment.323 A further analysis of what constitutes the curtilage of 
Cox’s residence, under Dunn, revealed that the trash cans were located outside the apartment’s 
curtilage. As a result, under the Jones trespass test, officers did not physically intrude upon a 
constitutionally protected area.324 Next, the Court decided whether Jackson had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under Katz in the trash can’s contents as the “property rights are not the 
sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations” and “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test has 
been added to .. the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”325 The 
Court held that the trash can was “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, 
and other members of the public” and as a result, the owner of the contents had a diminished 
expectation of privacy.326 Therefore, the Court concluded that the trash pull was a lawful 
investigatory procedure due to the trash can sitting in the common area of the apartment complex 
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courtyard. Additionally, the Court concluded that no search had occurred after applying both 
Jones and Katz tests to the circumstances of this case. 
14. U.S. v. Davis (B-S)  
On August 29, 2000, Davis arrived at Howard County General Hospital with a gunshot 
wound to his leg.327 He claimed he was a victim of an unfortunate robbery which went terribly 
wrong. As part of Maryland law, the hospital staff called the police. Officer King found Davis in 
the emergency room. He was conscious, sitting up, and able to communicate with Officer King. 
As per procedure of the hospital, the clothing of Davis was removed, placed in plastic baggies, 
and then placed under the bed by the hospital staff.328 After arriving on the scene, Officer King 
observed Davis’ gunshot wound. He then secured Davis’ clothes as evidence of the 
shooting/robbery and without the permission of Davis or a warrant. Police and forensic 
specialists were able to extract DNA from the blood stains on Davis’ pants, without a warrant, 
and created a “DNA profile” from the results.329 This “DNA profile” was later used to compare 
with samples found at the scene of an unrelated murder of Michael Neal; however, these profiles 
were not a match. Nevertheless, the “DNA profile” was kept in police databases and used against 
Davis in the robbery and the murder of Mr. Schwindler.330 This was a “cold hit” which resulted 
in law enforcement being able to obtain a warrant and extract direct a DNA sample from Davis, 
which subsequently matched the samples from the Schwindler murder scene. This evidence was 
used against Davis at trial.331  
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Davis argued to suppress the DNA evidence due to officers violating his Fourth Amendment 
rights.332 Davis explained that the contents of the hospital bags (clothes) were not in plain view 
and thus, law enforcement seized and searched the bag illegally.333 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that the plain view doctrine justified both the warrantless seizure and the 
subsequent search of the plastic bag which contained the clothes of Davis.334 The Court’s 
rationale behind their decision was due to the years of experience of Officer King, the normal 
procedures of the hospital placing patient’s clothing under the bed, and the appearance of the 
“victim” when Officer King had spoken with him.335 Furthermore, the Court explained that 
Davis did have an expectation of privacy in the bags and clothing; however, the evidence was in 
plain sight of the officer and thus, was legally obtained under the plain view doctrine. Next, the 
Court examined whether the creation and retention of the “DNA profile” was lawful.  
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.336 
Protections of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are in effect when there is a 
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy;” however, when there is a lack of 
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Fourth Amendment protections do not occur. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently found a search can occur when the “Government 
                                                          
332 Id. 
333 Id.at 234. 
334 Id. at 238. 
335 Id. at 236. 
336 Id. at 241 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). 
76 
 
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.337 The Court 
concluded that though Davis may not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
clothing, the extraction of DNA and the retention of the “DNA profile” are subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry.338 Furthermore, the Court held that Davis retained his 
privacy interests in the DNA on the material and therefore, the DNA sample extraction and the 
creation of the “DNA profile” constituted a search.339 Additionally, once officers had lawfully 
obtained Davis’ clothing, there was no intrusion upon his property.340  
The Court held that the retention of Davis’ “DNA profile” in police database was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.341 
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the good-faith exception applied to law enforcement extraction 
and tests of Davis’ DNA. The officers “had no reason to question that Davis’ blood was lawfully 
within HCPD custody and indeed, we have concluded that the clothing was properly in police 
custody.342 Furthermore, the Court stated though Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his DNA, that does not necessarily mean the police and lab technicians were not acting in 
good faith. The Court explained the actions of the police classified as “isolated negligence 
attenuated from the arrest” and not the actions motivated by reckless law enforcement.343 The 
Court concluded for these reasons, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to 
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this case.”344 In sum, the Court found a search under the Katz test, but it did not find a search 
under the Jones’ trespass test. 
15. U.S. v. Patel (B-S)  
Dr. Patel was a cardiologist in Louisiana.345 A grand jury indicted Dr. Patel on 91 counts of 
health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. In February 2002, Neil Kinn, a nurse who 
worked alongside Dr. Patel, contacted the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) with concerns of Dr. Patel’s illegal behavior. Nurse Kinn provided documents 
from a mobile laboratory that Dr. Patel leased several days each week at his office. After meeting 
with HHS Agent Alleman, the nurse gathered additional records from the lab.346 On Mach 26, 
2002, the nurse mailed agent Alleman a letter with additional information. Toward the end of 
2003, agent Alleman obtained a search warrant “for documents and electronic storage media” in 
Dr. Patel’s permanent and mobile offices.347  
Dr. Patel argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the warrant was based on 
the fruits of an earlier warrantless search, which lacked probable cause to permit a lawful 
seizure.348 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated when the Supreme Court had decided 
Jones, it gave new guidance as to what constitutes a search. In Jones, the Supreme Court 
explained that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test.”349 The Court, however, found that they did not need to 
squarely address how Jones would affect the holding, and essentially left intact the finding of the 
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lower, district court that a search had occurred. The Court stated if Dr. Patel had sufficient 
privacy or possessory interest in the mobile lab to implicate the Fourth Amendment, as the 
district court had found, it would be irrelevant because evidence gathered by Nurse Kinn does 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment before March 15 as Nurse Kinn was acting as an 
independent source (i.e., private, non-state actor).350 In this vein, the Court stated, “Even if Dr. 
Patel had a sufficient privacy or possessory interest in the mobile lab to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and render Nurse Kinn's post-March 15 evidence gathering a violation, because 
there was an independent source for it [i.e., the warrant based on information handed over 
initially and voluntarily to the government by the Nurse], the evidence was properly 
admitted.”351  Furthermore, the Court concluded that the warrant was not defective as officers 
relied on statements from informants which were in good-faith.352 The additional information 
supplied after the meeting with HSS Agent Alleman also does not matter as that information was 
not used as part of the warrant’s probable cause. Thus, the Court a search had occurred under 
both the Jones or Katz criteria.   
16. U.S. v. Flores-Lopez (B-S)  
Law enforcement officers had reason to believe that the Flores-Lopez was a supplier of 
illegal drugs.353 Officers received information about a drug deal between Flores-Lopez and 
another dealer, Alberto Santana-Cabrera, from a paid informant. Police listened to a phone 
conversation between Cabrera and Flores-Lopez, who stated a delivery of meth had been ordered 
to a garage. Police immediately arrested both Flores-Lopez and Santana-Cabrera.354 Flores-
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Lopez had driven a truck containing the drugs and officers found a cell phone on Flores-Lopez 
and two other cell phones. Flores-Lopez admitted that the cell phone found on his person 
belonged to him. Flores-Lopez argued that the search of his cell phone violated his rights as it 
was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.355 Flores-Lopez argued that “[t]he [cell] phone number 
itself was not incriminating evidence, but it enabled the government to obtain such evidence 
from the phone company, and that evidence … was the fruit of an illegal search [of his phone] 
and was therefore inadmissible.”356 More specifically this evidence includes the call history, 
including the overheard phone conversation and calls made between him and his associates.  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the Fourth Amendment search 
around the reasonableness of the search of the cell phone. The Court stated that a modern cell 
phone is similar in one aspect to a diary. Moreover, a warrantless search of a cell phone, is 
justified by police officers’ reasonable concerns for their safety.357 The Court elaborated that 
some types of “stun guns” have been made to look like cell phones and as a result, officers may 
reasonably believe there is a safety concern. However, once the officer has the cell phone, they 
are able to distinguish it from a weapon. As a result, there would be no reason to go further and 
manipulate it since safety is no longer an issue.358 The Court stated that opening the diary found 
on the suspect whom the police have arrested, to verify his name and address and discover 
whether the diary contains information relevant to the crime for which he has been arrested, is 
permissible. The Court mentioned that Jones held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle is a 
search because “the Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
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obtaining information.”359 The Jones Court thus breathed new life into the trespass doctrine. 
Also, the Court in United States v. Concepcion, found that testing the keys of a person that law 
enforcement had in custody was said to be a “search.”360 However, the Court held in Concepcion 
that a minimally invasive search may be lawful in the absence of a warrant, even if the usual 
reasons for excusing the failure to obtain a warrant are absent. Since the officers in the case-at-
hand did not thoroughly search the contents of the phone, and only obtained the cell phone’s 
phone number, this type of search was minimally invasive and thus did not require a warrant.361 
The search did technically occur under both the Jones and Katz criteria; however, the Court of 
Appeals found it was minimally invasive. 
17. U.S. v. Duenas (B-NS)  
On April 19, 2007, Guam Police Department (GPD) officers, DEA, and ATF agents executed 
a search warrant at the home of the Duenas family for narcotics trafficking.362 Ray and Lou 
Duenas were asleep and when the officers entered the residence the scene was described as 
“chaotic.” No single officer was clearly in charge of managing the scene even though 
approximately forty officers were at the scene. As a result, civilians and journalists were able to 
go on Duenas’ property. Law enforcement instructed media to remain in the front yard and to not 
pass a certain shipping container.363 The media was permitted to film and photograph the scene 
and Officer Wade was dedicated to escorting the media members around the scene. During the 
execution of the warrant, which lasted two days, police found drugs, drug paraphernalia, stolen 
property, and weapons. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially stated it was difficult 
                                                          
359 Id. at 807. 
360 Id. (citing U.S. v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (1991)). 
361 Id. at 809. 
362 U.S. v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012). 
363 Id. at 1076. 
81 
 
to determine if the Duenas’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated based on the factual record, 
namely due to the uncertainty of whether any members of the media actually entered the Duenas’ 
residence or its surrounding curtilage.364 In Katz, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places” in which citizens are entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.365 Conversely, the Supreme Court in Jones “reaffirmed that the home and 
its curtilage are sacrosanct, and that nothing in Katz requires courts to apply reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, 
houses, papers, [or] effects.”366 The Court determined that the curtilage warrants the “same” 
Fourth Amendment protection as the home. Thus, the Court turned to Dunn to determine whether 
the area is considered curtilage.367  
The Court found that only the first of the four Dunn factors suggested the front yard was 
considered curtilage. In this case, the federal circuit court agreed with the assessment made by 
the district court in which the front yard was not considered curtilage and therefore, does not 
receive Fourth Amendment protections.368 This is important because the majority of journalists 
and other media members were confined to the front yard. However, some journalists were 
escorted throughout the property, beyond the front yard. The Court concluded these facts 
(including the inadequate management of the search scene by GPD), are in agreement with the 
district court’s analysis, in that the media presence did not violate the Fourth Amendment.369 In 
sum, the Court found a search had not occurred under Jones or Katz tests. 
18. U.S. v. Perea-Rey (J-S)  
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On April 19, 2010, border patrol agents watched a man “hop” the Mexico-United States 
border fence.370 Border patrol agent Trujillo followed the individual, later identified as Pedro 
Garcia, to Perea-Rey’s home. Agent Trujillo witnessed Garcia enter the front yard through the 
gate, knock on the door, and speak to Perea-Rey briefly before being signaled to the carport of 
his residence.371 Agent Trujillo was unable to see into the carport and therefore proceeded to 
follow both individuals. Agent Trujillo found them standing right inside the carport. The agent 
announced his presence and detained both of them. Perea-Rey refused to allow border patrol 
agents to enter his house. As a result, the agent Trujillo waited for back up and once back up 
arrived, they ordered everyone to exit the home.372 The individuals who exited the home were 
later found to be undocumented illegal immigrants. Perea-Rey argued in court that the evidence 
of the “aliens” was “fruit” of a warrantless search and seizure and should be excluded from 
court.373  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined if the curtilage of the home was 
protected by Fourth Amendment search. In Jones, the Supreme Court held, “where the 
government physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” 
that is a “‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”374 Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals turned to the decision Payton v. New York which held that “[s]earches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”375  Additionally, the Court 
stated that searches and seizures in the curtilage of a home are presumptively unreasonable, 
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absent a warrant.376 Based on the Dunn factors, the Court determined the agents searched the 
curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home when they entered the carport.377 Since the carport is classified as 
curtilage, then it is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. As a result, the Court stated that 
this warrantless trespass by government agents into the home or its curtilage does constitute a 
search. As the Supreme Court found in Jones “[w]here …the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, … a search has undoubtedly 
occurred.”378 However, Jones did not remove the possibility of the application of the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
Indeed, the Court in Jones stated “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, 
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.379  
The Court concluded that the agents could observe the curtilage from the sidewalk and these 
observations, in turn, could serve as a basis for a warrant application; however, they were unable 
to commit a warrantless entry into the carport.380 This occurred when the border patrol agents 
“physically occupied” the carport, which was part of the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home. The 
Court in Perea-Rey concluded that the “warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s 
home by border patrol agents resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure, which violated 
Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights.”381 
19. U.S. v. Wilfong (B-NS) 
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On January, 15, 2011, Wilfong arrived at his mother’s house and got into a dispute with his 
brother, Eric.382 Wilfong pulled out a gun and fired a shot at Eric’s feet, hitting the floor. 
Wilfong took the keys to the pickup belonging to his mother and drove away. Eric reported the 
events to the police. Wilfong had an outstanding arrest warrant for violating his supervised 
release. Local officers and United States Marshal Albright learned of the whereabouts of the 
pickup and set up surveillance, but Wilfong never returned.383 Deputy Albright received 
permission from Eric to place a GPS device on the vehicle. The next morning, the GPS signaled 
the movements of the pickup and law enforcement were able to track the vehicle to another 
apartment complex. A car chase ensued.384 Eventually, Wilfong decided to abandon his weapon 
by throwing it out of the vehicle.  A postman found the gun and immediately called 911. Wilfong 
was later arrested. Wilfong stated that the placement of the GPS on the pickup was not 
authorized which would mean the gun was the fruit of an illegal search.385 Recently, the Supreme 
Court had held in Jones that a GPS tracking device attached to a vehicle by law enforcement 
does constitute a search.386 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained that Wilfong 
lacked standing to raise the claim to suppress the gun as he had no privacy interest in the stolen 
vehicle. Furthermore, the Court reasoned even if Wilfong had standing, the attempted 
suppression of the weapon would prove unsuccessful. In particular, the court focused on the fact 
that an exception to the warrant requirement exists in the form of “voluntary consent by a third 
party.”387 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the “totality-of-the-circumstances” would cause a 
“reasonable officer” such as Deputy Albright to believe Eric had the authority to consent to 
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placing the GPS on the stolen vehicle.388 If the search was a Fourth Amendment violation under 
Jones, the exclusionary rule would not apply due to the application of one of the three 
exceptions: independent source, attenuated basis, or inevitable discovery. Finally, the Court 
mentioned how Jones may not be applicable here because the presence of exigent circumstances 
of a fleeing, armed felon.389 The Court elaborated by stating that Wilfong had a pre-existing 
arrest warrant and thus the placement of the GPS device was purely to locate Wilfong, not to 
obtain incriminating information. Thus, the Court stated, it could be argued that Jones may not 
necessarily be applicable in this case. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found no search had 
occurred after it applied both tests. 
20. U.S. v. Gibson (K-NS)  
Drug Enforcement Administration agent Greg Millard suspected James Gibson and his 
associates of drug trafficking.390 As a result, DEA placed a tracking device on the vehicle of 
James Gibson. The device was installed on the vehicle without a warrant on January 27, 2009. 
On February 18, 2009, Agent Millard received information which suggested that James Gibson 
would be traveling. Between February 18 and February 20, DEA used the tracking device to 
locate the whereabouts of James Gibson and his accomplices.391 Agent Millard notified Deputy 
Sheriff Haskell of Gibson’s estimated location. Agent Millard instructed Haskell to search the 
vehicle if the deputy was able to establish probable cause for the search. Deputy Haskell stopped 
the vehicle, smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle, was given consent to search the 
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vehicle, and found 2 kilograms of cocaine inside the vehicle.392 The driver was an individual 
named Burton and Gibson was not in the vehicle. 
James Gibson argued that all evidence obtained from the tracking device placed on the 
vehicle should be suppressed because the installation and use of a GPS device constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.393 Conversely, the government also argued that the 
evidence obtained from the tracking device was admissible under the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule because agents attached the GPS device on the vehicle in reliance on then-
binding circuit precedent.394 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the 
notion of “standing” in the vehicle to determine the Fourth Amendment search question. This 
was a two part question; first, does Gibson have privacy interest on the day it was searched; 
second, does Gibson have privacy interest on the other times (February 18-19) the vehicle wasn’t 
searched.  
First, the Court reasoned that Gibson had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he 
was neither the driver nor the passenger of the vehicle when the vehicle was searched.395 
Additionally, due to Gibson not being present, he had neither control nor custody of the vehicle 
during the search. Second, the Court stated that Gibson does have privacy interests in the vehicle 
on the other days of February 18-19 while the vehicle was in his possession. However, he could 
not challenge the tracking device because it was used while he was traveling public roads.396 
Furthermore, the Court stated that even if Gibson had standing to challenge the search of the 
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vehicle when it was in his possession and control, the admission of any GPS-related evidence 
from this time-frame into court was harmless.397   
21. U.S. v. Davis (J-S) 
 Police were alerted of a robbery that had occurred at a Radio Shack on March 3, 2011.398 
Soon after, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents stopped a vehicle which matched the 
description of the Radio Shack robbers’ vehicle, a gray Nissan Sentra. The vehicle was driven by 
Asabi Baker and Mark Davis was the passenger. The vehicle was registered to neither Baker nor 
Davis, but to Baker’s girlfriend. Inside the vehicle police found evidence of clothes, tools, and 
weapons which matched the robbers’ description. Baker and Davis were charged and convicted 
of armed robbery.399 Prior to the events on March 3, police were investigating a string of 
robberies occurring in the Kansas City area. As a result, officers began to suspect that Baker’s 
girlfriend’s vehicle was used at multiple scenes. Accordingly, on March 2, 2011, a warrantless 
global positioning device (GPS) was placed on the vehicle.400 Prior to March 2, officers had 
obtained a warrant to place a GPS device on Mr. Baker’s phone. During the events of the 
robbery, police coordinated and tracked the whereabouts of the vehicle using a combination of 
vehicle GPS tracking, cell phone GPS tracking, and visual tracking.401  
Davis moved to suppress the evidence of the robbery in district court because he claimed 
attaching a warrantless GPS device under Jones violated his Fourth Amendment rights.402 The 
district court failed to grant Davis’ motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
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focused on whether defendant Davis had “standing” to challenge police use of the GPS device on 
the vehicle, although it did address the search issue as part of the standing analysis.403 For 
example, as part of its standing analysis, the Court essentially noted the basic holding of Jones, 
and then proceeded to refer to the warrantless attachment and monitoring of the GPS device by 
police in the case as a “search” and a “Fourth Amendment violation.”404 However, because the 
Court found that defendant lacked standing to challenge police use of the GPS device on another 
individual’s vehicle, it ultimately held the evidence discovered by police in the vehicle 
admissible against Davis.405 
The Court reasoned that Davis’ lacked standing was due to the fact that Davis did not 
have “possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy” in the vehicle which belonged to 
Baker’s girlfriend; hence, the “poisonous tree was planted in someone else’s orchard.”406 
Therefore, Davis lacked standing to challenge any tainted fruits. The Court stated that the 
officers obtained the information on which they tracked the vehicle through a variety of means, 
where only one appeared to be unconstitutional. Although, it may appear that it violated 
someone’s rights, those rights were not those of Davis. The Court affirmed the district court 
decision. In sum, the Court stated that police “trespassed” onto Davis’ property by attaching a 
warrantless GPS device to his vehicle; however, Davis lacked a possessory interest in said 
vehicle and therefore, lacked standing to gain Fourth Amendment protections. In other words, a 
search did occur.  
22. U.S. v. Gutierrez (K-NS) 
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In November 2012, Indianapolis police received a tip that Oscar Gutierrez may be involved 
in drug trafficking.407 A joint task force consisting of local law enforcement officers, detectives, 
and a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent and a drug dog (Fletch) went to the home of 
Oscar Gutierrez to investigate the tip. Officers approached the residence, knocked on the door, 
but no one answered; however, they did notice movement inside the residence. Detective 
Sergeant Cline obtained Fletch and had him examine the front door, whereupon Fletch positively 
alerted the handler of the presence of narcotics.408 Again, the officers knocked on the door and 
received no response. After consulting with the Marion County Prosecutor, officers forcibly 
entered the home and conducted a sweep. Meanwhile, Detective Sergeant Cline left the scene to 
obtain a warrant based on the informant tip, attempt to enter the residence, and Fletch’s positive 
alert.409 Detective Sergeant Cline was given the warrant. In the meantime, officers at the scene 
found Gutierrez and another tenant, Cota, and immediately arrested them. Officers did not 
conduct an official search until Detective Sergeant Cline arrived with the warrant. Once the 
search began, DEA Agent Schmidt found a duffel bag containing 11.3 pounds of 
methamphetamines.410 
The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held that the methamphetamines discovered 
during the search under warrant based on the drug dog’s positive alert did not need to be 
suppressed, even though it was later determined that the actions of the drug dog constituted a 
search.411 The Court of Appeals reasoned that normally a case such as this would be governed by 
the precedent of United States v. Jardines, which held that the use of the drug dog to sniff the 
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premises constitutes a search and therefore implicates all protections under the Fourth 
Amendment.412  However, Jardines was decided after the facts of this case; as a result, the Court 
had to decide between United States v. Jones (with defendant Gutierrez claiming that the basic 
rule from Jardines was already in effect at the time of Jones), or its binding circuit precedent of 
U.S. v. Brock.413 The Court concluded that Brock remained good law after Jones and had not 
been overruled until the United States Supreme Court decided Jardines.414 Thus, before Jardines 
and according to the Brock precedent, police were allowed to conduct dog sniffs at residences 
without a warrant. Finally, the Court stated because officers’ actions falls under the binding 
appellate precedent of Brock, the officers are afforded the Davis’ good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.415 The Court concluded that no search had occurred under Brock because 
police did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy by conducting the residential 
dog sniff. In sum, this case used the specific language of privacy when analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment search question involving facts occurring after the decisional date of Jones. As a 
result, this was categorized as a case which used the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
23. U.S. v. Wheelock  (K-NS) 
Minneapolis Police Officer Dale Hanson discovered child pornography was being 
downloaded from a certain Internet Protocol (IP) address.416 This information resulted in Officer 
Hanson obtaining an administrative subpoena which ordered the Internet Service Provider (ISP), 
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Comcast Communications, to produce specific subscriber information linked to the IP address.417 
Comcast provided Wheelock’s name and address which were associated with the IP address. A 
criminal history check on Wheelock revealed he had previously been charged and convicted for 
the possession of child pornography. Officer Hanson used this information to obtain a search 
warrant of Wheelock’s house, specifically searching for hard drives, DVDs, and CDs which 
contained child pornography. Wheelock was later charged and pled guilty to possessing, 
receiving, and attempting to distribute child pornography.418 Wheelock argued that Officer 
Hanson’s use of the administrative subpoena violated his privacy rights.419 More specifically, 
Wheelock contended that such rights were violated due to Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion in United States v. Jones.420  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated for Fourth Amendment protections to be 
bestowed to defendant Wheelock, it must be proven that “he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and that “society is prepared to accept this privacy expectation as objectively 
reasonable.”421 The Court in Wheelock found that defendant had no Fourth Amendment 
protections because of the third party doctrine. The Court stated that normally, the Fourth 
Amendment does not forbid the Government from obtaining information from third parties.422  
Additionally, the Court responded to Wheelock’s reliance upon Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
by describing that “she did not advocate the abandonment of the third-party disclosure doctrine,” 
and until such time as the Supreme Court revises the third-party doctrine, courts across the 
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country are bound by existing precedent.423 The Court held that the officers were not required to 
have a warrant as Wheelock had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information 
obtained from Comcast.424 This case distinguished itself from Jones and instead relied upon the 
Katz test, which the Court finding no search had occurred because Wheelock lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine by disclosing information to the ISP (i.e., 
his name, address, etc.).  
24. U.S. v. Stephens (J-S) 
The defendant, Henry Stephens, was suspected of being connected to possible drug and 
firearms crimes in Baltimore after federal and state law enforcement received information from a 
confidential informant.425 As part of a joint task force consisting of federal and local law 
enforcement commanded by Officer Paul Geare, Geare himself attached a battery-powered GPS 
device to the underside of Stephens’ vehicle without a warrant on May 13, 2011.426 The vehicle 
happened to be parked in a public parking lot in Maryland at the time of the installation. Officer 
Geare discovered that Stephens worked at a nightclub called “Club Unite” and that he was 
scheduled to work there on May 16. He also found out that Stephens typically carried his firearm 
with him at work, even though he is a convicted felon.427 Three days later, the GPS device was 
used to locate Stephens’ vehicle at a school. Officer Geare and Sergeant Johnson then physically 
followed Stephens to his residence where they saw him reach around to the back of his 
waistband. The officers interpreted this motion as a check for a weapon and notified fellow 
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officers they had reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed.428 Next, Officer Geare followed 
Stephens, using a combination of visual observations and GPS monitoring. When Stephens 
arrived at “Club Unite,” officers approached Stephens, conducted a pat down, and found an 
empty holster located in the middle of his back. Soon after, a k-9 unit arrived on the scene and 
alerted officers of the presence of drugs from the exterior of the vehicle. At this point, officers 
searched the vehicle and found a loaded pistol.429 Shortly after discovering the pistol, the officers 
arrested Stephens for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that the GPS device used without a 
warrant to locate and monitor Stephens in May 2011 constituted an unreasonable search 
according to Fourth Amendment guidelines.  In so holding, the Court essentially endorsed the 
district court’s earlier finding that a search had occurred under Jones.430 However, as of May 
2011, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit had given a clear decision 
on the use of warrantless GPS devices. As a result, the Court of Appeals turned to the earlier 
Supreme Court case of Knotts, which had found that the use of beepers to track vehicle on public 
roadways does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.431 The Court of Appeals 
ruled that under Davis, the exclusionary rule was not applicable as the officers were acting in 
good-faith by relying upon binding precedent which allowed officers to attach a GPS device 
without a warrant.432 
25. U.S. v. Davis (B-NS) 
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The government obtained an order from the district court to obtain “cell site location 
information” on defendant Davis. This information also included a call list made by Davis. 
Although it was possible to obtain more generalized location information, it was not possible to 
pinpoint an individual’s precise location from the information.433 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that cell site location data does not fall within one’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy and therefore, the government did not violate Davis’ Fourth Amendment rights.434 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined this Fourth Amendment issue using a 
combination of the trespass and privacy test. More specifically, the Court acknowledged that 
since there was no trespass because police neither placed or used a GPS device or conducted a 
physical trespass, then Jones did not apply to provide Fourth Amendment protections.435 
The Court instead viewed the cell site location data as being held by a private telephone 
company and obtained by the government through a court order.436 In addition, the United States 
Supreme Court in Jones concluded that “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of 
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to [the] Katz [privacy] analysis.”437 
Accordingly, the court in Davis turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
analyze the Fourth Amendment “search” issue. The Court relied on former precedent cases of 
Miller and Smith and found Davis was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections as he has 
not subjective or objective reasonable expectations of privacy in MetroPCS’s business records.438 
Finally, the Court turned to the third-party doctrine and reasoned that individuals who use cell 
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phones “voluntarily convey” the cell information to their respective telephone companies.439 
These users are aware of voluntarily exposing information to a third-party service provider. As 
such, the Court concluded that the government’s order did not constitute a search when it 
acquired the historical cell tower data from MetroPCS. In sum, the Court found a search had not 
occurred. 
26. U.S. v. Ganias (B-S) 
During the 1980s, Ganias started his own business after working for the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) for fourteen years.440 In 1998, Ganias had contracted services to James McCarthy 
and his businesses, American Boiler and Industrial Property Management (IMP). IMP had been 
later contracted by the Army to maintain and keep secure a vacant facility in Stratford, 
Connecticut. On August 2003, a confidential source came forward and tipped off the Criminal 
Investigative Command of the Army that some individuals within IMP were engaging in stealing 
copper wire and other valuable items, while simultaneously billing the Army for work.441 This 
information led to the start of an investigation. Over the course of the investigation, the Army 
investigators obtained numerous search warrants, including one for Ganias’ accounting offices. 
This particular warrant was issued on November 17, 2003, and executed two days later. The 
investigators were accompanied by computer specialists who made identical copies of the 
contents of all hard drives at the offices.  
As evidence was being reviewed, the Army investigators discovered that payments were 
being made by IMP to an unregistered business.442 As a result, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
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joined the investigation. By December 2004, the Army and IRS investigators uncovered data 
relevant to their investigation and were careful to review only data pertinent to the November 
2003 warrant. However, investigators failed to purge any unrelated data. Accounting 
irregularities were discovered in the data entries. The IRS case agent wanted to review the data 
obtained on the hard drive, but was aware that the data was beyond the scope of the initial 
warrant.443 In February 2006, Ganias was asked permission if the United States government 
could access the files that were beyond the scope of the initial warrant. Ganias did not answer; 
thus, the government obtained another warrant to search the copies of the hard drives that was in 
its possession for two and a half years.444  
Ganias argued that the government’s seizure and long-term retention of his business records 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.445 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on 
both Katz and Jones tests to analyze this case. The Court explained that Fourth Amendment 
protections apply if there is a search by government officials and is accompanied by either a 
physical intrusion by those officials or a violation by them of defendant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy.446 Furthermore, the Court explained that Fourth Amendment protections 
do apply to the government’s examination of a suspect’s computer files. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Ganias concluded that the government failed to demonstrate any legal 
basis for the prolonged retention of the copied electronic data; therefore, it violated Ganias’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.447 The Court’s analysis encompasses the limited question of whether 
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the Fourth Amendment permits the indefinite retention of every computer file obtained 
subsequent to the execution of a warrant.448 The Ganias Court concluded in the negative. 
27. U.S. v. Gomez (K-NS) 
In 2009, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) suspected defendant Axel 
Gomez of distributing drugs and organized an operation to have a government informant 
purchase 20 grams of heroin from Gomez.449 The informant also provided the DEA with 
Gomez’s cell phone. The DEA obtained a court order and monitored Gomez’s calls through a 
“pen register” and “trap and trace” device from July 9, 2009 until August 18, 2009. The DEA 
was able to access phone numbers who called and were called by Gomez, have time stamps for 
when individuals called, and recorded multiple drug purchases.450 This call data, along with other 
evidence uncovered by undercover officers, was used to obtain a wiretap for Gomez’s cell phone 
on August 24, 2009. At one point, Gomez swapped phones and the DEA was able to get access 
to the new phone through a confidential informant.  
The DEA obtained a search warrant for Gomez’s apartment based on the conglomeration of 
evidence obtained.451 The search of the apartment uncovered $6,000 in cash, a firearm, a digital 
scale, and materials for packing drugs. Gomez was immediately indicted and found guilty on 
drug distribution, conspiracy, and possession of a firearm with drug trafficking. Gomez argued 
the DEA’s initial “pen register” and “trap and trace” violated his Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights. Additionally, Gomez argued that the concurring opinions in Jones joined by five United 
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States Supreme Court justices effectively restrict the application of the third party doctrine as 
enunciated in Smith v. Maryland.452  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gomez  held that defendant Gomez’s rights 
were not violated because, “Gomez provided a third party-in this case, Sprint-with all the data 
and the DEA obtained [it] through the use of the pen register and trap and trace device.”453 The 
Court further explained once this occurred, Gomez had relinquished any privacy interest in the 
data. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the concurring opinions in Jones had 
effectively revised Smith. According to the Court, no search had occurred because Gomez did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third-party, in this case 
Sprint. With the mention of reasonable expectation of privacy, this case falls more in line with 
the inquiry used in Katz for Fourth Amendment searches. 
28. U.S. v. Sellers (J-S)  
Drug Enforcement Administration agents and Orangeburg County officers conducted 
surveillance of various persons of interest, including: Sellers, Matthews, and James from January 
19, 2008 until July, 2008.454 Accordingly, DEA agents attached a warrantless GPS device to the 
vehicle owned by James, and monitored the whereabouts of the vehicle. In February, the device 
malfunctioned and stopped transmitting information. In March, the officers removed the device 
and subsequently began wiretapping James phone.455 A total of seven wiretaps were issued from 
January until July of 2008. On August 14, 2008, Sellers was stopped for improper lane change 
and subsequently arrested after police found drugs, a pistol, and approximately $3,000. The 
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plethora of evidence obtained from various surveillance methods were used against James, 
Sellers, and Matthews for drug conspiracy charges, including the wiretaps and GPS data.456 
The appellants argued under Jones that the district court erred by admitting evidence 
obtained from the installation of the GPS device.457 James further contended the GPS tracking 
data and the resulted wiretaps should be suppressed as they are fruits of the poisonous tree. In 
Jones, the Supreme Court noted, “[t]respass alone does not qualify [as a search], but there must 
be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain 
information.”458   
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on Jones to ultimately find that the police 
use of a warrantless GPS device on James’ vehicle did constitute a search.459 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the search in this case violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court 
did mention the good faith exception, but decided against it as the Court explained this evidence 
was never introduced in trial. In sum, the Court found that a search occurred under the Jones test. 
29. U.S. v. Fisher (J-S)  
In May 2010, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and law enforcement officials 
received confidential information that Brian Fisher was involved in selling drugs in various 
locations within Michigan and Illinois.460 In May 28, 2010, law enforcement officers attached a 
GPS device to Fisher’s vehicle. In June, 2010, the informant told officers about a possible drug 
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run to Chicago, Illinois.461 The police followed Fisher’s movements using 10-12 vehicles and the 
GPS information. Police stopped Fisher once he entered Michigan, used a narcotics dog who 
alerted the officers that drugs were near the vehicle, and subsequently found three ounces of 
cocaine.462 Fisher was arrested and convicted of possession and trafficking drugs.463  
Fisher argued that the warrantless installation of the GPS device and subsequent tracking by 
law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights.464 During the course of the litigation, 
Jones was decided, and both the lower (district court) and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit stated under Jones police searched defendant Fisher’s vehicle when they installed the 
GPS device and used it to monitor the vehicle’s movements.465 These types of actions require a 
warrant. However, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals 
ultimately deemed the actions undertaken by the officers were to be justifiable under Sixth 
Circuit binding precedent. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence was 
denied.466  
30. U.S. v. Martin (J-S) 
Matthew Martin was suspected of taking part in multiple robberies in Burlington, Iowa in 
2009.467 Police officers received a tip regarding Martin’s involvement in the robberies and 
subsequently attached a warrantless global positioning system on Martin’s vehicle.468  Through 
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several tips, detectives were able to contact the accomplice, Jackson.469 After interviewing 
Jackson, detectives contacted law enforcement in Indiana with information about Martin. Indiana 
law enforcement got a tip from a Super 8 motel clerk that Martin had checked in. Law 
enforcement attached a GPS tracking device to his vehicle on the 19th of November. A few days 
later, the GPS device malfunctioned for a short amount of time and then resumed proper 
functions.470 
Detectives followed Martin and eventually contacted Illinois law enforcement for support. 
Law enforcement officers had stopped the vehicle and conducted a search of the vehicle. The 
officers discovered marijuana, cocaine, and a revolver. Martin was subsequently arrested.471 
Martin pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm, which is against the law as he was a convicted 
felon.472 On appeal, Martin cited Jones and argued that the evidence should be suppressed as his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to the warrantless GPS device. The trial court 
concluded that the evidence should not be suppressed because of Davis v. United States.473  
In this case, the good-faith exception applied due to heavy reliance on then-existing 
precedent, which allowed law enforcement to attach a warrantless GPS device to the 
undercarriage of a suspect’s vehicle. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument because there was no binding precedent.474 Conversely, the court concluded that the 
evidence Martin sought to suppress had little to do with the fact that a GPS device had been 
used. This information was “significantly ‘attenuated’ from the inappropriate installation of the 
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GPS device” (i.e., without a warrant under Jones). 475  The Court affirmed the district court’s 
initial ruling, “there was probable cause for Martin’s arrest [and] it was reasonable for the 
officers to believe Martin’s vehicle contained evidence of the bank robbery.”476  
The GPS data only aided law enforcement in tracking down Martin. In Jones, a search occurs 
when “[t]he Government physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.”477 This is an essential component as in the current case of Martin the GPS data was 
used primarily to locate him. The court further explained that if Martin had further developed the 
argument at district court they would be able to touch on the subject more in depth; however, that 
was not the case.478 This case resulted in a finding that a police search did occur under Jones, but 
it did not violate the defendant’s rights due to attenuation. 
31. U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno (J-S) 
In 2007, Drug Enforcement Administration agents suspected Juan Pineda-Moreno of 
growing marijuana in southern Oregon.479 The DEA began investigating the men and monitored 
the movements of Pineda-Moreno. The agents attached a mobile tracking device to Pineda-
Moreno’s jeep without a warrant. DEA used the device to pin-point the Jeep’s location and 
agents learned that it traveled to two suspected marijuana grow sites on July 6, August 14, 
August 16, and September 12.480 The Jeep traveled public thoroughfares for the majority of the 
recorded monitoring. Based on their surveillance, DEA and law enforcement officers stopped 
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Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep on September 12. A subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered 
marijuana within the Jeep.481  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a search had occurred based on the facts. 
The Court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision of Jones.482 The Court of Appeals found 
that in accordance with Jones the GPS surveillance of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle and subsequent 
monitoring constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, 
since these officers did not have a warrant, based on Jones, it would be unreasonable.483 
However, related to the admissibility of the evidence issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that since 
the events occurred prior to Jones, they needed to turn to binding appellate precedent from 
within the circuit for this purpose. The Court ultimately found that agents were acting in 
compliance with binding appellate precedent and therefore, under Davis, exclusion was not 
warranted.484 
32.  U.S. v. Smith (J-S)  
Law enforcement officers and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
suspected Smith had been transporting cocaine from Alabama to Florida.485 Special Agent Davis 
obtained driver records from Florida Driver and Vehicle Information Database regarding the 
vehicles Smith had obtained. Special Agent Davis installed GPS trackers on two of Smith’s 
vehicles.486 They did not obtain a warrant. Officers monitored the movements of the vehicle from 
January 6, 2011. However, on February 5th, 2011, Smith had discovered one of the trackers. On 
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April 12, 2011, the officers obtained a search warrant for Smith’s residence. Once the search 
warrant was executed, they discovered nearly ten thousand dollars in cash, a firearm, drugs, a 
disposable cell phone, and digital media seized from Smith’s computer and camera.487  
Smith was indicted on drug and firearms charges and found guilty in the trial court on these 
charges. Smith appealed and argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they 
searched his residence, which relied on some of the information which was obtained during the 
GPS surveillance.488 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that Jones applied to 
the actions of the law enforcement during their GPS monitoring.489 In Jones, the Supreme Court 
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that 
device to monitor a vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”490 However, the Court concluded that even though the police violated Smith’s 
Fourth Amendment rights with the warrantless GPS search, the evidence seized should still be 
admissible under the Davis good-faith exception. More specifically, the Court stated, “[e]ven if 
Jones would have rendered the warrantless searches in this case unreasonable [under the Fourth 
Amendment], the officers’ good-faith reliance upon [binding appellate precedent permitting 
these searches at the time they were conducted] renders exclusion inappropriate here.”491 The 
Court concluded to allow the evidence to be admissible since officers were acting in good-faith 
when they conducted the GPS search of Smith.492 In sum, a search did occur. 
33. U.S. v. Pope (K-S) 
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On August 16, 2009, Forest Law Enforcement Officer Ken Marcus responded to an incident 
of loud music in El Dorado National Forest.493 When the officer reached the scene, he discovered 
the music had gathered a large crowd. Officer Marcus was arresting an individual when he was 
approached by Travis Pope. During their conversation, Officer Marcus became suspicious of 
Pope being under the influence of marijuana. Officer Marcus asked Pope if he had been smoking 
marijuana and Pope stated he did.494 Pope was then asked if he had any marijuana on him. Pope 
denied having marijuana in his possession. Officer Marcus then asked him to empty his pockets; 
however, Pope did not comply with this request. Pope was asked by Officer Marcus if he had 
any marijuana on him a second time, and this time Pope said that he did.495 Pope took the 
marijuana out of his pockets and placed it on Officer Marcus’ vehicle. Officer Marcus cited Pope 
for possession and told him he could leave. Pope was charged with one count of misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana.496  
Pope argued that Officer Marcus’ initial command constituted a Fourth Amendment search, 
which was illegal unless accompanied by a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.497 Furthermore, he argued that the trial court erred in determining that the law 
enforcement officer had probable cause to conduct the search. Finally, Pope argued against the 
facts surrounding the incident falling under the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception as no 
arrest occurred during the search. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when 
“the government infringes on a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
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recognize as reasonable.”498 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently announced a “property-
based” approach in addition to the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” when analyzing 
Fourth Amendment search questions.499 The Court stated there was no question that Pope had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy inside his pockets, but whether the officer’s command was 
sufficient to intrude upon that expectation required further consideration. Although the Court 
reasoned Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy inside his pockets, the Court concluded 
the command was not sufficient to intrude upon Pope’s privacy expectation.500 The Court’s 
rationale focused around Pope’s initial denial.501 Because Pope refused to comply with Officer 
Marcus’ initial command, he did not produce any materials that were not already exposed to the 
public. Thus, the Court concluded the initial command does not constitute a search. Additionally, 
based on the Court’s initial analysis, it found no reason to address whether the search lacked 
proper justification in the form of probable cause since it did not qualify as a search.502 
Next, the Court examined the second command by Officer Marcus.503 The Court held that the 
second command by Officer Marcus to place marijuana on the vehicle did constitute a search 
because Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items located inside his pockets.504 
However, the warrantless search of Pope could be considered justified if it fell under an 
exception to the rule requiring searches under warrant, such as “probable cause already existed to 
arrest Pope, a high risk of destruction of evidence, or the search was commensurate with 
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circumstances necessitating the invasion.”505 The Court concluded Officer Marcus had probable 
cause to arrest Pope for possession of a controlled substance after Pope admitted he had 
marijuana in his possession. Furthermore, had Pope left with the marijuana in his possession 
there would be a high probability of destruction or concealment. Finally, the Court determined 
the search was “minimally intrusive” as Officer Marcus commanded Pope to place the marijuana 
on the hood of his vehicle. The Court concluded Officer Marcus’ warrantless search was 
justified.506 In sum, the Court found a search had occurred and it was justified as a warrantless 
search because Officer Marcus had established probable cause that Pope was engaged in a crime, 
had evidence which could be destroyed, and the search was “minimally intrusive.”507 
34. U.S. v. Scott (K-S) 
During August 2009, detectives arranged for a confidential informant to purchase drugs from 
Reynolds in Indiana.508 The detectives attached a listening device to the confidential informant 
and placed a second one inside his vehicle. When the confidential informant arrived at the motel, 
Reynolds arranged a meeting with the supplier.509 Together, the confidential informant and 
Reynolds left and drove to the gas station. The confidential informant exited his vehicle and 
Reynolds drove it to Scott’s residence (i.e., the supplier), alone. Scott met Reynolds outside of 
his garage and they began talking for about five minutes. During the course of the conversation, 
the police were still able to record their conversation as they were close enough to the vehicle.510 
Police had also followed the vehicle back to Scott’s home. Scott and Reynolds talked about the 
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price of heroin, “yay,” which police believed was code word for cocaine, “ball,” which 
detectives believed was an eighth of an ounce of cocaine, and “quarter,” which police believed to 
be a quarter of an ounce of cocaine. After their conversation ended, Scott returned to his home 
and Reynolds drove back to the gas station, still under police surveillance.  
Five days later, the same events occurred between the confidential informant, Reynolds, and 
Scott. They met in the motel, Reynolds then drove to the gas station and dropped off the 
confidential informant, and then Reynolds went to Scott’s house.511 This time, Reynolds entered 
Scott’s house for about five minutes and then left to pick up the confidential informant from the 
gas station. Two days later, detectives submitted an affidavit for a search warrant of Scott’s 
house. The affidavit explained that the confidential informant had been proven credible from 
corroborated information by police.512 The officers were awarded a search warrant and Scott’s 
house was searched. Police found a loaded handgun, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. On appeal, 
Scott argued that the recorded conversation between himself and Reynolds violated his Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy.513 Furthermore, Scott argued that without the 
conversation, the police would not have probable cause to apply for a search warrant. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined if Scott had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the conversation located on his driveway and if this evidence was 
illegally obtained then the police would no longer have enough probable cause to apply for the 
search warrant.514 The Court of Appeals turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
when deciding the first question. The Supreme Court stated that in Katz, “the Fourth Amendment 
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protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .. [b]ut what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”515 However, the Court held that it was not required to answer whether the 
conversation recorded by police was reasonable because, even if had been unreasonable, the 
search warrant was “sufficiently supported by facts separate and apart from the recording.”516 
Although the Court explicitly avoided answering the reasonableness question, the Court moved 
forward under the assumption that the recorded conversation was a search and illegally obtained. 
The Court concluded that even if the recording was illegally obtained, the affidavit itself had 
been filled with a plethora of other facts to support probable cause and therefore, the application 
and issuance of the search warrant was legal.517 In sum, although the Court analyzed the facts 
using the Katz test to determine   if Scott had both a subjective and objective reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the conversation in his driveway, the Court did not explicitly answer 
the question; however, the Court moved further with their analysis under the assumption the 
recording of the conversation  did constitute a search. 
35. American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez (K-NS) 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU) filed a suit against Alvarez seeking 
to barr her from enforcing the eavesdropping statute.518 The Illinois eavesdropping statue “makes 
it a felony to audio record ‘all or any part of any conversation’ unless all parties to the 
conversation gave their consent.”519 The eavesdropping statute exempts recordings made by 
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police for law-enforcement purposes from public disclosure. This is to ensure police have 
discretion over any “enforcement stop,” such as traffic violations, assistance given to civilians, 
pedestrian stops, requests for identifications, and any investigative purposes. Therefore, the 
ACLU argued that this statute is a violation of the First Amendment’s speech, press, and petition 
clauses. 
The Government argued that privacy of communication is an important interest which served 
First Amendment interests because “fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well 
have a chilling effect on private speech.”520 The Court stated that when analyzing privacy 
interests the Fourth Amendment is more directly implicated. Moreover, the Court held that these 
interests are not an issue in this particular case. The ACLU wants to openly audio record police 
officers performing their duties. This would entail officers speaking loud enough for witnesses to 
hear, and “communications of this sort lack any reasonable expectation of privacy.”521 
Furthermore, under Katz, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protections. Conversations in the open would not be protected against being 
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”522 In 
sum, the Court found that based on the circumstances posited by the ACLU, there would be no 
privacy interests implicated as the officers would have to speak loud enough for bystanders to 
hear, which means no Fourth Amendment protections would be given, and thus, a search would 
not occur.523  
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But this does not prevent the Illinois General Assembly from strengthening the First 
Amendment protections for conversational privacy. The Court concluded that the ACLU’s 
argument would be successful when focusing on the First Amendment.524 The eavesdropping 
statute “restricts” information and ideas and does not serve the government interest of protecting 
conversational privacy, and thus, is viewed as unconstitutional according to the First 
Amendment.525 
36. U.S. v. Wells (K-NS) 
FBI agents were informed by witnesses that Officer J.J. Gray had engaged in illegal acts 
while on duty.526 This included stealing money and drugs from suspects detained by Officer 
Gray. FBI Special Agent Joe McDoulett went undercover as a Mexican drug dealer known as 
Jason Lujan who adopted the moniker “Joker.” FBI attached recording equipment to a room 
rented at the Super 8 Motel. Agent McDoulett received $13,620 in cash from the government 
and placed part of it in a Crown Royal bag in a bedside table drawer. The remaining funds were 
under his pillow.527 Once the room was ready, FBI cooperating witness, Debra Clayton, 
informed Officer Gray that a drug dealer was in the room. Gray immediately contacted Officer 
Wells and together they surveyed the Super 8 Motel for some time. They re-contacted Debra 
Clayton and instructed her to go to “Joker’s” room. She reported back that she had successfully 
purchased the drugs.528 
“Joker” left the hotel room and entered the hotel lobby where he was detained and 
handcuffed by Officer Eric Hill. Wells approached “Joker” and obtained consent to search his 
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room. Through the use of the recording equipment in the room, it was learned that approximately 
$2,000 was stolen by Gray and Wells and an additional amount of money was allowed to be 
stolen by the other officers in the room. “Joker” explained the details of his “operation” in that he 
brought five pounds of methamphetamines and sold it all. 529 Wells and Gray agreed to not arrest 
him if he could help set up additional drug dealers.  
After the initial sting operation, the officers kept in contact with “Joker” by encouraging 
future trips; meanwhile, Gray introduced a new customer, Ryan Logsdon.530 As part of a second 
sting operation, another FBI agent was introduced as one of “Joker’s” customers. Wells and 
Joker met at a nearby restaurant. The meeting focused on the impending sale of a pound of 
methamphetamines to a customer Wells could arrest if he wanted to.531 The customer, who was a 
new undercover agent, arrived at “Joker’s” motel room and they engaged in a drug transaction. 
However, the customer did not have enough money to buy the pound and “Joker” notified Wells 
after the customer left. Eventually, Wells and other Tulsa Police Department officers were 
indicted on multiple counts of official corruption.  
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit started their analysis by first explaining that 
“Wells’ voluminous assertions on appeal” could be simply re-stated as the district court should 
have reviewed “Wells’ personal privacy expectation in the content of the conversation.”532 In 
other words, Wells claimed that a search had occurred when the government recorded his 
conversation and thus, required a search warrant. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Katz stated, 
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“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”533 The Court concluded that Wells did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his dealings with “Joker,” including in the motel 
room rented by “Joker,” with or without “Joker” physically being present.534 The Court reasoned 
that Wells had no “socially meaningful connection” to the motel room. At times, Wells was just 
merely legally present in the room for a short amount of time. Thus, the Court found Wells 
lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence of “Joker” and in the 
conversations which took place between them in Joker’s motel room.  In sum, the Court found 
no search had occurred. 
37. Gennusa v. Canova (K-S) 
In 2009, Detective Marmo investigated a possible misdemeanor violation of a domestic 
violence injunction by Mr. Studivant.535 Detective Marmo arranged a non-custodial interview of 
Mr. Studivant at the Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Studivant had his attorney, Ms. Gennusa, present at the 
interview. Unknown to either of them, Detective Marmo had a concealed camera in the room. 
During the course of the interview, Mr. Studivant agreed to prepare a written statement.536 
Detective Marmo left the room and closed the door. Ms. Gennusa and her client proceeded to 
discuss their matters in private and once their discussion was completed, Ms. Gennusa left the 
interview room and met with Detective Marmo.537 
When she returned to the interview room, she closed the door and informed Mr. Studivant he 
was going to be arrested by Detective Marmo.538 Mr. Studivant no longer wished to give a 
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written statement.539 The Detective demanded the written statement when he returned to the 
interview room. Both Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa refused after a heated discussion. The 
detective left the room to speak with his superior, Sgt. Canova. During their conversation, 
Detective Marmo and Sgt. Canova actively monitored Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa. Sgt. 
Canova instructed Detective Marmo to retrieve the statement.540 Detective Marmo forcibly 
grabbed the statement from Ms. Gennusa’s hands and then subsequently arrested Mr. Studivant. 
Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa filed suits against Sgt. Canova, claiming their Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated because of the warrantless recording of their privileged 
conversations and the ultimate seizure of the written statement.541 Furthermore, the district court 
found that Detective Marmo and Sgt. Canova did not qualify for immunity. Thus, these officers 
challenged the district court’s findings based on that neither Studivant nor Gennusa had a 
reasonable expectation that their conversation would be kept private.542 Additionally, they 
argued that it was not “obvious to a reasonable officer” that such monitoring violated the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Studivant and Ms. 
Gennusa did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy inside the interview room and that 
the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights when they recorded their attorney-client 
conversations.543 Furthermore, the Court held there was no exigency to justify the warrantless 
“search” and “seizure” of the written statement. Therefore, the officers do not qualify for 
immunity from their reckless behavior which resulted in an unlawful “search.”544 In sum, an 
                                                          
539 Id. at 1108. 
540 Id. 
541 Id. at 1109. 
542 Id. 
543 Gennusa v. Canova, 748 F.3d 1103, 1112 (11th Cir. 2014). 
544 Id at 1114. 
115 
 
unlawful search and seizure did occur through the recording of Mr. Studivant’s and Ms. 
Gennusa’s private conversation by law enforcement. 
38. U.S. v. Pirosko (K-NS) 
In March 2012, Nebraska Department of Justice Officer Edward Sexton detected a specific 
IP address sharing several files of child pornography.545 On this IP address, Officer Sexton was 
able to discern three Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs).546 Officer Sexton gave special 
attention to the third GUID and attempted to both connect and obtain any files of interest being 
shared over the network. Over the course of a few months, Officer Sexton was able to download 
several files and track the IP addresses from hotels across the nation. Officer Sexton acquired the 
guest list of the hotels and was able to determine that Joseph Pirosko owned the GUID. On June 
4, 2012, Officer Sexton applied for a search warrant, which he was granted, and officers seized 
Pirosko’s computer and USB drive. The contents of Pirosko’s computer revealed child 
pornography and an online account with a share folder.547 Pirosko argued his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated because the Nebraska officers obtained the search warrant “using unreliable 
and unsupported information.”548 However, the district court rejected this argument.  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court properly denied 
Pirosko’s motions to suppress.549 In the first part of the analysis, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit found that the argument was meritless because Officer Sexton’s affidavit contained 
his experience, qualifications, the software used, and the files obtained from Pirosko’s computer. 
This came out to be more than 10 pages of work. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
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Circuit reviewed the issue of unconstitutional warrantless tracking. Originally, Pirosko’s motion 
to suppress did not argue this point, nor did it refer to United States v. Jones.550 Furthermore, 
Pirosko voluntarily agreed to plea, and therefore, waived the majority of his rights to appeal, 
except for review of the Court’s denial of his suppression motion. With that in mind, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed this portion of the case for plain error.551  
The Court concluded that Pirosko’s reliance on United States v. Jones is misplaced, as his 
main argument is for the adoption of the theory put forth by the concurrence in that case.552 The 
Court explained adopting this theory would simultaneously disregard the Supreme Court 
precedent and “give a free pass to on-the-road downloaders of child pornography.”553 Therefore, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the adoption of Jones, and instead relied on 
other precedent which acknowledged an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy on non-
shareable data on his or her computer, but that does not extend to files which are accessible 
through a shared-online folder.554 The Court ruled that Pirosko lacked objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the data; therefore, no search had occurred prior to the warrant allowing 
the extraction of the data. 
Pre-Jones 
1. U.S. v. Titemore (K-NS) 
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On April 27, 2003, Vermont State Police were called to resolve a dispute between David 
Titemore and Kevin Lothian.555 Additionally, Titemore had assaulted one of Lothian’s 
employees. When police arrived, they had issued a citation to Titemore. The next evening, 
Lothian returned to a vandalized home. He called the police and reported the incident.556 
Amongst the destruction, a .22 Marlin rifle had been stolen. While waiting for police to get there, 
Lothian and a friend, Larry Tatro, witnessed Titemore come on to Lothian’s property and smash 
some lights, “play” with a propane tank, and try to enter the home. Lothian called police again 
and the dispatcher immediately connected Lothian’s distress call to Trooper Thad Baxter.557 The 
trooper and Lothian agreed to meet up on Main Street. After explaining the situation to Trooper 
Baxter, they decided (Trooper Baxter, Lothian, and Tatro) to meet back up at Tatro’s house. 
From there, the three men began walking towards Lothian’s residence, when Trooper Baxter 
decided to talk to Titemore before inspecting the damages of Lothian’s dwelling. At about 10:20 
p.m., they arrived at the edge of Titemore’s property, where Trooper Baxter ordered the other 
two men to stay near the house.558 Before the men left, they informed the trooper that Titemore 
might be drunk and may have the missing rifle. Furthermore, they advised Trooper Baxter to 
approach the door from the western side to activate the motion-sensing light so as to not be 
mistaken for Lothian or Tatro to Titemore.559  
When Trooper Baxter approached the residence, he saw a television on through a sliding-
glass door on the eastern side of the porch.560 “As the district court found, he chose this route for 
two principal reasons: (1) because the television was on in the room adjacent to the porch, he 
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thought that he was more likely to find Titemore if he knocked on the sliding-glass door next to 
that room; and (2) Baxter was concerned about approaching from the western side of the house 
because the motion-sensing light would permit Titemore to see him approach, but he would not 
be able to see Titemore.”561 Once at the door, Baxter noticed that the sliding door had been left 
open; however, the screen door was shut. Trooper Baxter peered through the screen and saw 
Titemore facing him watching television. The rifle was also lying within Titemore’s reach. 
Trooper Baxter immediately identified himself. Trooper Baxter had noted Titemore had been 
acting strangely, as if during their conversation Titemore was seeing “through” him.562 Trooper 
Baxter asked if he was David Titemore and Titemore acknowledged. Trooper Baxter asked 
Titemore if he could either come in or Titemore come outside and talk. Titemore decided to 
come outside and during the course of their conversation, Trooper Baxter had detected numerous 
indicators that Titemore may be intoxicated, such as the odor of alcohol on Titemore’s breath, 
slurred speech, and sluggish thought processes.563  
Trooper Baxter asked Titemore if he was a convicted felon, to which Titemore responded, “I 
may have been once.”564 Additionally, Trooper Baxter asked if he was supposed to have a gun. 
Titemore replied in the negative. Trooper Baxter asked the make and model of the gun and if it 
was loaded. Titemore replied the rifle was a loaded Marlin. Trooper Baxter asked if he could 
have permission to retrieve the rifle. Titemore replied in the affirmative. Trooper Baxter then 
opened the screen door, grabbed the rifle, and stepped back outside of Titemore’s residence.565 
Trooper Baxter was unfamiliar with this weapon and asked Titemore how to unload it. Titemore 
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explained and then Trooper Baxter successfully unloaded the weapon and removed the bullet 
from the chamber. Next, Trooper Baxter asked about Lothian’s home being vandalized. Titemore 
claimed he was in his house all day. Moreover, Titemore claimed Lothian had assaulted him 
during their previous altercation.566 Trooper Baxter issued a citation for unlawful mischief and 
trespass to Titemore. Titemore argued that Trooper Baxter violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
by effecting a “warrantless entry on his protected property” because the lawn and deck of his 
home were associated with the home itself and therefore, should be considered protected 
curtilage of the home.567 
Titemore argued that Trooper Baxter violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a 
“warrantless entry onto [his] protected property.”568 Furthermore, Titemore argued that the lawn 
and deck of his residence should be considered falling under the protection of curtilage of his 
dwelling. When examining a Fourth Amendment search question, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit turned to Katz, which adopted the concept of “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”569 However, Katz did not eliminate all Fourth Amendment inquiries related 
to a particular place. This case corresponded more closely with Hester v. United States, which 
dealt with the concepts of the curtilage of a home and open fields.570 Hester was historically 
important because it was the Court’s first acceptance of a distinction between open fields and the 
curtilage of a home. To complete the analysis, the current court in Titemore turned to United 
States v. Dunn.571 The Court in Dunn recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy existed 
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within the curtilage of a home. Furthermore, the Court provided indications as to how future 
courts should determine curtilage and its boundaries.  
However, the court in Titemore ultimately concluded Titemore had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy.572 Their rationale focused around the sliding-glass door.573 The Court held that 
although normally it would be considered part of the curtilage, the sliding-glass door had a 
diminished expectation of privacy as it was the principal entranceway. Next, the lawn and porch 
area were not enclosed or fenced off in an attempt to “separate” or delineate public from and 
private space. Lastly, there were no steps taken to “shield” the contents behind the sliding-glass 
door or the porch. It is for these reasons that the court concluded Titemore had no expectation of 
privacy.574 “Thus, there was no offense to the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Baxter 
approached the sliding-glass door to talk to Titemore about the vandalism that took place on the 
Lothian property.”575 As a result, the rifle seized and the statements made by Titemore were 
lawfully obtained and therefore, admissible in trial. A search had not occurred under Katz due to 
the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
2. Taylor v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources (K-NS) 
On February 20, 2003, Paul Rose, a conservation officer, approached Alan Taylor’s 240-acre 
fenced property.576 The officer was called to investigate a complaint regarding a fencing 
problem. Under Michigan law, it is viewed as a misdemeanor to “unlawfully erect a barrier 
denying ingress or egress to an area where the lawful taking of animals may occur.”577 There was 
no violation; however, Officer Rose did notice tire tracks and footprints continuing onto the 
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property towards a house. These tracks went right through two “NO Trespassing” signs. Officer 
Rose shouted and asked if anyone was home and then proceeded toward the house. He peered 
inside the windows of the home and garage, but he could not see anyone. After about five 
minutes, Officer Rose left his business card in the door.578 Officer Rose claimed he did these 
“checks” in case a trespasser might be on the property. Another suspicious observation made by 
Rose was the curtains being left open. Based on his years of experience, most residents would 
close their curtains upon leaving.579  
Alan Taylor found the card when he returned home and called the officer as was requested by 
Officer Rose.580 Officer Rose explained the fence complaint and offered assistance in the event 
of future trespassing problems, but he did not mention the property check he had conducted. 
Alan Taylor reviewed his home security tape and immediately contacted the Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) to report the illegal check conducted by Officer 
Rose.581 The director stated that the conduct of Officer Rose fell within departmental policy. 
Alan Taylor filed a complaint in federal district court. He argued that Officer Rose’s conduct did 
constitute a search, and that his conduct was not protected by qualified immunity.582 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit started its analysis with an examination of 
whether the conduct of Officer Rose constituted a search.583 A search is defined in terms of 
whether a person had a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”584 The 
Court agreed with the analysis of the district court in that “Officer Rose’s conduct does not 
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constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”585 The rationale behind its 
decision focused on the second prong of Katz.586 The Court agreed with the district court’s 
decision in that the methods and purposes for the observations made by Officer Rose constituted 
a low level of intrusion. Furthermore, due to Officer Rose’s twenty-plus years of experience, he 
had reason to believe that the situation could lend itself to a wintertime break-in and thus, 
warranted a protective check.587  
The Court stated that “without physically intruding upon the home or employing any 
technology to substitute for a physical intrusion, Officer Rose observed the home in an effort to 
ensure the integrity of the property for the homeowner.”588 Thus, the Court found Officer Rose’s 
protective check did not constitute a search. Furthermore, the Court need not answer if Officer 
Rose was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate the constitutional rights of 
Alan Taylor.589 
3. Warshak v. U.S. (K-S) 
In March 2005, Steven Warshak and his company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc., 
were being investigated on allegations of various types of fraud and money laundering.590 The 
government obtained an order from a magistrate judge which requested Warshak’s internet 
service provider (ISP), NuVox Communications, to supply information regarding Warshak’s e-
mail. The order was based on “specific and articulable facts” and prohibited NuVox from 
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“disclosing” the order to the customer, Warshak. The judge ordered that the notification by the 
government of the search request to Warshak may be delayed for ninety days. On September 12, 
2005, the government obtained a similar order directed at Yahoo; however, it added another 
individual, Ron Fricke, to the order. On May 31, 2006, over a year later after investigators 
obtained the initial order, Warshak was notified of both orders.591 Warshak filed suit on June 12, 
2006, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the government. Warshak claimed his 
Fourth Amendment right was violated when the government compelled the disclosure of e-mails 
without a warrant.592  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the contents of the e-mail are meant to be 
private and thus, it is reasonable to have an expectation of privacy.593 The Court reasoned that, 
“like telephone conversations, simply because the phone company or the ISP could access the 
content of e-mails and phone calls, the privacy expectation in the content of either is not 
diminished, because there is a societal expectation that the ISP or the phone company will not do 
so as a matter of course.”594 According to the Court, a government search did occur, and it 
violated Warshak’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his email.595 
4. Rehberg v. Paulk (K-NS) 
Anonymous harassing faxes were sent by Charles Rehberg to the management of Phoebe 
Putney Memorial Hospital.596 Then District Attorney Hodges and Chief Investigator Paulk had 
investigated Rehberg’s actions. From October 2003 to February 2004, Hodges and Paulk 
subpoenaed BellSouth, Alltel, and Sprint for Rehberg’s telephone records. Additionally, Chief 
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Investigator Paulk subpoenaed Rehberg’s email accounts from his internet service provider. 
Rehberg’s case was presented to a grand jury on December 14, 2005.597 During the course of the 
investigation, media coverage revealed a furtive relationship between Hodges and the hospital. 
As a result, Hodges recused himself from the prosecution; however, he still gave “support” to the 
prosecution team and was in contact with Paulk.598  
Throughout the history of this case, the prosecution attempted to indict Rehberg for various 
charges. The first indictment was for charges of aggravated assault, burglary, and “harassing 
phone calls” to Dr. James Hotz.599 A closer investigation revealed that Reherg had never been at 
Dr. Hotz’s residence nor had Dr. Hotz reported an assault or burglary to police. The second 
indictment charged Rehberg for simple assault charges and harassment (via telephone) to Dr. 
Hotz on August 22, 2004. However, it was later dismissed due to a lack of evidence. Finally, the 
third indictment on March 1, 2006 charged Rehberg for simple assault and telephone harassment. 
On May 1, 2006, the trial court dismissed the charges.600  
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined the subpoenas during the 
investigation through a Fourth Amendment lens. The Court held that Rehberg “lacked a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone and fax numbers he dialed.”601 Moreover, the 
Court reasoned once Rehberg made a phone call through a third party, the dialing-related 
information he provided to Bellsouth, Alltel, and Spring could be turned over to law enforcement 
officers as Rehberg lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. When the 
Court analyzed Paulk’s subpoena of the e-mail contents, the Court found there was a lack of 
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jurisprudence in this area of law regarding defendants’ privacy rights in e-mail and the contents 
voluntarily transmitted over the Internet.602 Thus, the Court found “Paulk could not have known 
the scope of the privacy rights, if any, that Rehberg had in email content stored at his third party 
ISP.”603 The Court concluded that due to federal law not being clearly established, Paulk 
qualified for immunity. Therefore, a search did not occur. 
5. Georgia v. Randolph (K-S) 
In May 2001, Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, separated due to marital difficulties.604 
After their separation, Janet left their home in Americus, Georgia, and took their son to live with 
her parents in Canada. Janet and her son returned to Americus, Georgia a few months later. On 
July 6th, Janet called police and explained after a heated dispute between her and her former 
husband, Scott had taken her son. When police arrived at the house, they were informed by Janet 
that her husband was a habitual cocaine user.605 Janet further explained to police their previous 
marital problems and that she had recently returned from being with her parents in Canada. Soon 
after, Scott Randolph returned home and explained he had left their son at a neighbor’s house 
because he was fearful of his wife taking him out of the country. When police questioned Scott 
about his cocaine usage, he declined ever using the drug and stated that his wife was an alcoholic 
and drug user.606  
Sergeant Murray had taken lead role at the scene and took Janet Randolph to find the missing 
child from the neighbor’s residence.607 When the child was found and Janet returned to the 
scene, she repeated her initial complaints about Scott’s drug problems and also explained that 
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there were “items of drug evidence” inside their residence. Sergeant Murray asked Scott for 
consent to search the house, but he declined. Next, Sergeant Murray turned to Janet and asked 
for consent, which she eagerly granted. Janet led Sergeant Murray upstairs to Scott’s bedroom 
and Sergeant Murray observed straws with a powdery substance, which he suspected was 
cocaine.608 After finding this evidence, Sergeant Murray exited the house to retrieve an evidence 
bag and simultaneously called the district attorney (“DA”) to check on the validity of the search. 
The DA immediately instructed him to stop the search and obtain a warrant. Subsequently, Janet 
withdrew her consent when Sergeant Murray returned. The police seized the straws found 
previously, and then took both Scott and Janet to the police station. Afterwards, officers obtained 
a valid search warrant and returned to the Randolph’s house to seize more drug evidence.609  
In court, Scott argued the evidence should be suppressed as it was obtained from a 
warrantless search of his house in the absence of his expressed consent.610 The trial court denied 
the motion, ruling that Janet had common authority to consent to the search. The Court of 
Appeals of Georgia reversed the decision and the State Supreme Court affirmed on the principle 
that “the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not 
valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to 
permit a warrantless search.”611 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and was in 
agreement with the Court of Appeals and State Supreme Court decisions. After establishing no 
exceptions were present to permit entry into the dwelling at the time (i.e., exigent circumstances 
or the possibility of evidence being destroyed) the United States Supreme Court applied the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. The United States Supreme Court stated, “Since the 
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co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social 
practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, 
gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in 
the absence of any consent at all.”612  In short, the United States Supreme Court held an 
unreasonable search had occurred.   
6. Groh v. Ramirez (K-S) 
Special Agent Jeff Groh of the Bureau of Alcohol and Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had been 
notified by a “concerned citizen” that they had seen a small armory of weaponry on the ranch 
owned by Joseph Ramirez and his family.613 The citizen had explained to Special Agent Groh he 
had previously visited the Ramirez ranch and observed the family owning automatic rifles, 
grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher.614 Special Agent Groh applied for a search 
warrant to obtain “any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive device to 
include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts 
pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or 
launchers.”615 Although the warrant elucidated the expected illegal items to be found as well as 
the physical location to be searched, it failed to enumerate the items to be seized. In the section 
detailing the “person or property” to be seized, it described the Ramirez house, but not the supply 
of firearms. Nevertheless, the Magistrate issued the warrant and the following day, Special Agent 
Groh executed the warrant with a team of officers. Joseph Ramirez was absent during the 
execution of the warrant; however, other members of his family were present (i.e., his wife and 
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children).616 Special Agent Groh explained the items of the search to Mrs. Ramirez, and to Mr. 
Ramirez over the phone. The search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Special Agent 
Groh left a copy of the search warrant, but not a copy of the application. The following day, 
Special Agent Groh faxed a copy of the application in response to a request from Ramirez’s 
attorney.617  
Joseph Ramirez sued Special Agent Groh and other officers with claims related to violations 
of the Fourth Amendment. The district court found no Fourth Amendment violations and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, with one exception against Special Agent Groh.618 The 
Court of Appeals held that the warrant was invalid since it did not specify the places to be 
searched and the items to be seized. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held 
both that a search did occur, and that it was “unreasonable.”619 Moreover, the Court reasoned 
even though the Magistrate issued the warrant, it did not mean that he agreed to the scope of the 
search. Therefore, according to the Court, “even though the petitioner acted with restraint in 
conducting the search, the inescapable fact is that his restraint was imposed by the agents 
themselves, not by a judicial officer.”620 Consequently, the Court concluded a search did occur 
and that it violated the constitutional rights of Ramirez. 
7. U.S. v. Amanuel (K-S) 
On March 19, 2002, police obtained an eavesdropping warrant which authorized the 
interception of digital papers which belonged to Joseph Amanuel.621 Contrary to the 
specifications of the warrant, police did not record the interception of digital communications. 
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Instead, a written log was kept. On May 30, 2002, police obtained a wiretap based on the 
information acquired previously, and later renewed it on June 7, 2002. The wiretaps were used to 
support the application for a search warrant which, in turn, led to the discovery of incriminating 
physical evidence against the defendant.622 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the initial interception was a violation of Amanuel’s statutory rights. “The holding in Katz lead to 
the well-established conclusion that law enforcement authorities seeking to engage in electronic 
surveillance must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”623 However, this 
case required the evaluation of police compliance with a statute, which is not necessarily the 
same as a constitutional violation. As a result, the Court concluded that the failure to record the 
interception and seal does not meet the level of a constitutional violation and thus, found that 
suppression of the evidence would be unsuitable.624  In effect, the Court found that though a 
search did occur under the Fourth Amendment, there was no violation of defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights but rather a violation of his statutory rights. 
8. Cassidy v. Chertoff (K-S) 
On July 1, 2004, Lake Champlain Transportation Company (LCT) ferry workers searched 
passengers as part of protocol.625 This involved asking passengers to open carry-on items and to 
present other items for inspections. Car passengers had a visual inspection conducted on their 
vehicle which included the opening of their vehicle’s trunk or tailgate. Michael Cassidy, who 
commuted daily with ferry, had been asked to open the trunk of his vehicle, which he did. 
Another passenger, Cabin, had been asked to open his bike pack. These two individuals 
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explained in court that use of the ferry is necessary or the alternative route would take at least 
twice as long.626 The plaintiffs alleged that the ferry’s searches were unconstitutional and 
violated their Fourth Amendment rights.627  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the LCT ferry passengers did not 
suffer a diminished privacy interests in their carry-on luggage.628 The Court reasoned that even 
though airline pre-boarding searches were reasonable, airline commuting differs from traveling 
by ferry.629 The Court explained for air travel, society had accepted the increased security 
measures and intrusion on their privacy since the 9/11 attack. However, the Court found that the 
pre-emptive checks of the carry-on luggage and vehicle trunks of ferry passengers were 
minimally intrusive.630 Finally, the Court agreed with the government’s argument in that the 
prevention of terrorist attacks (via searches on only the nation’s largest ferries) supported their 
searches under the special needs doctrine. The Court explained, “Indeed, given that both the 
intrusions on plaintiffs' privacy interests are minimal and the measures adopted by LCT are 
reasonably efficacious in serving the government's undisputedly important special need to 
protect ferry passengers and crew from terrorist acts, we find no constitutional violation.”631 In 
sum, the court concluded that the searches by LCT are reasonable under the special needs 
doctrine to protect ferry passengers and the crew from terrorist acts.632  
9. Caldarola v. County of Westchester (K-S) 
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An investigation of correctional officers suspected of receiving disability benefits on 
fraudulent job injury claims led to the arrest of Freeman and several other correctional staff.633 
Evidence was obtained through Department of Corrections (DOC) surveillance. On July 12, 
1999, correctional officers were summoned to DOC headquarters, placed in separate rooms, and 
eventually arrested. The same day correctional staff members were arrested, the County of 
Westchester held a press conference with the intent to publicize the investigation. During the 
associated arraignment, the media filmed Freeman and other correctional officers, which 
included when they were in the police vehicles until they walked into the courthouse.634 The 
media had shown the accused being led by police to the courthouse handcuffed, and this 
particular story continued to be featured in various newspapers and news stations for several 
decades to illustrate that police/correctional corruption is not tolerated.635  
Freeman argued that his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable search and 
seizure was violated when the County’s act of coordinating the arrests and videotaping the “perp 
walk” was made public.  The district court, however, rejected his claim.636 Freeman appealed and 
contended that the district court erred in its analysis. The Court of Appeals held that under the 
circumstances, the broadcasting of the videotape implicated Freeman’s privacy interests.637 
Moreover, while on DOC property, Freeman and other correctional officers had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; however, this interest was diminished.638 Ultimately, the court concluded 
that the privacy interest of Freeman and the other arrestees was “outweighed by the County’s 
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legitimate government purposes. Therefore, Freeman sustained no actionable Fourth Amendment 
injury.”639 A search occurred, but it was found to not have violated Freeman’s rights. 
10. Cressman v. Ellis (K-S) 
The plaintiffs alleged the state technical college officials violated their Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights.640 More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that state technical college officials 
began surveillance in squad rooms of the college police department for forty-five (45) days 
without obtaining a warrant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo the 
dismissal ruling by the district court. First, the Court began its analysis with a two-pronged test 
to determine if there had been a violation of privacy: (1) first, was there a subjective expectation 
of privacy and if so, (2) was it objectively reasonable.641 When reviewing de novo, the Court 
examined the original petition and concluded that “the plaintiffs could prove a set of facts in 
support of their claims which would entitle them to relief.”642 The Court claimed it was 
premature for the district court to deny their action as it is possible to provide both a subjective 
and objective expectation of privacy. The Court again rejected the district court’s final analysis 
in that, if law enforcement’s conduct was illegal that their actions would be protected under 
qualified immunity.643 Thus, a search occurred and it violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
11. Zaffuto v. City of Hammond (K-S) 
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In 1997, Sergeant Terry Zaffuto placed a call from his private office to his wife.644 The two 
talked about the police department’s impending re-structuring, which was to affect his superiors. 
His wife, Susan, stated that “those SOBs will finally get what they deserve.”645 Unbeknownst to 
them, the conversation was being recorded by Assistant Police Chief Kenneth Corkern and in 
1999 officer Zaffuto learned that Corkern had played the tape to two other police officers. 
Officer Zaffuto filed a complaint against Corkern, the police chief, Roddy Devall, and the City of 
Hammond. The Supreme Court held in Katz that recording private conversations without a valid 
warrant is a violation of the speaker’s reasonable expectation of privacy.646 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court stated in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of 
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any 
technical trespass under local property law.”647 Based on the evidence and jurisprudence of Katz, 
the court concluded that the recording policy of the police department was well understood by 
the officers, in that all incoming communications were being recorded.648 This did not include 
outgoing calls from private offices. As a result, the court concluded that Officer Zaffuto had 
reasonably believed that his outgoing call to his wife was private. A search and seizure did occur 
in violation of Zaffuto’s constitutional rights. 
12. U.S. v. Hardin (K-S) 
On August 29, 2005, Officer Kingsbury received a tip from a confidential informant on the 
whereabouts of Hardin.649 Officer Kingsbury and Officer Jason Tarwater went to the building 
described in the tip and saw the vehicle described by the confidential informant. The officers 
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talked to the manager of the building, which was an apartment complex, and found out Hardin 
had not leased an apartment or been seen on the property. After explaining that Hardin had been 
convicted of a shooting at a school and an armed robbery, the manager agreed to assist the police 
in their investigations. Accordingly, one of the officers explained that the manager could enter 
the apartment of a Germaine Reynolds, who they suspected had a relationship with Hardin, and 
investigate if Hardin was there, under the ruse of “maintenance.”650 The officers watched on 
CCTV and the manager entered the apartment with the use of his key and shouted out 
“Maintenance.”651 Hardin answered the door and asked the manager about the purpose of the 
visit. The manager explained there had been a leak and wondered if he could check the 
bathroom.652 Hardin relayed the information to Reynolds through his cell phone. Afterwards, the 
apartment manager confirmed to Kingsbury that Hardin was in the apartment. The officers called 
for backup and broke into the apartment and arrested Hardin. The officers also found three 
firearms, crack cocaine, marijuana, and $2,000 in cash.653 The court concluded in this case that 
the apartment manager acted as an agent of the government and that the officers’ remaining 
information based on the confidential informant did not establish either probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.654 The court held that the search of the apartment violated Hardin’s Fourth 
Amendment rights and all evidence were “tainted” fruits. 
13. U.S. v. Gooch (K-NS) 
In Nashville, Tennessee, there was a nightclub, Club Prizm, which frequently had visits from 
police in response to fights, loud music, shootings, and a murder.655 As a result of the rise in 
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crime emanating from the club, police frequently conducted sweeps in the parking lot. The 
owner of the nightclub, Fidanza, did not own the parking lot, but rather it was shared by all the 
surrounding businesses. Fidanza had arranged a valet service for his nightclub. On May 20, 
2004, police arrived to do a “sweep” and Officer Mark Anderson approached a Lincoln Town 
Car and shined his flashlight inside it.656 He saw a velvet Crown Royal whiskey bag underneath 
the driver side of the vehicle. He also observed what was to his knowledge a firearm handle 
sticking outside of the bag. Anderson pulled his car alongside the vehicle and ran the license 
plates to determine the vehicle’s owner. It was determined to be owned by defendant Gooch, 
who did not have either a valid gun permit or a valid driver’s license.657 Gooch also had an 
extensive criminal history. Later, Gooch left the nightclub with his wife, Seniqua King, and 
entered the Lincoln. Officer Anderson approached the car with his firearm drawn and demanded 
Gooch to place the vehicle in park, and exit the vehicle. Gooch complied with Officer 
Anderson’s commands, and Officer Anderson then placed Gooch under arrest.658 The officers 
conducted a search of the vehicle and found a firearm. In 2005, Gooch pled guilty, but 
“preserved the suppression issue for appellate review.”659  
The Court of Appeals in this case had to determine whether Gooch did in fact have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the “VIP” area of the parking lot. “In order to be afforded 
protection under the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of 
privacy and society must be willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable.”660 The Court 
held that Gooch had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court reasoned that “members of 
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the public and police officers had access to, and were able to walk through, the VIP area.”661 
Thus, the court found that no search had occurred. 
14. U.S. v. Ellison (K-NS) 
Officer Mark Keeley observed a male inside a white van parked in a “Fire Lane” and “No 
Parking” area.662 Instead of issuing a citation or requesting the male to move the vehicle, Officer 
Keeley parked in a spot and ran a check on the license plates. The database stated the vehicle 
belonged to Curtis Ellison, who also had an outstanding felony warrant. Officer Keeley called for 
back-up. After a few minutes, another male entered the vehicle and then the van drove off. 
Officer Keeley followed the van for a few moments, until his back-up was close.  He then 
stopped the van.663 Officer Keeley approached the driver and asked for registration and proof of 
insurance. The driver was identified as Edward Coleman, and Curtis Ellison was the passenger. 
Officer Keeley moved to the passenger side of the vehicle and notified him he had an 
outstanding warrant, and arrested him. During the routine pat-down, two firearms were 
discovered. Coleman was released with a warning for parking in a fire lane.664 
The district court found that the “van was not parked illegally, and thus, the officer did not 
have probable cause to run the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) check of Ellison’ 
license plate.”665  The government appealed. The government argued Ellison had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information contained on his plates. The Court of Appeals stated 
that the Fourth Amendment protects only what society intends to keep private. Moreover, the 
Court in Katz stated “What a person knowingly exposes to the public … is not a subject of 
                                                          
661 Gooch, 499 F.3d at 603. 
662 U.S. v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 2006). 
663 Id. 
664 Id. 
665 Id.  
137 
 
Fourth Amendment protections.”666 Thus, the court held in Ellison that “It is apparent that when 
a vehicle is parked on the street or in a lot or at some other location it is readily subject to 
observation by members of the public, it is no search for the police to look at the exterior of the 
vehicle.”667 The Court concluded that a privacy interest does not exist for motorists such as 
Ellison because they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information on the 
license plate.668 Moreover, the court reasoned as long as Officer Keeley was in a “position to 
observe” the plates, then he did not violate the Fourth Amendment.669 No search had occurred. 
15. Widgren v. Maple Grove Tp. (K-NS) 
Kenneth Widgren, Sr., owned a twenty acre tract of land, which was largely undeveloped.670 
His land was covered by trees, hills, and overgrowth. Over the course of about a year, from May 
of 2002 until the spring of 2003, Widgren had built a house on the property. There was no fence, 
but at the “mouth” of the driveway there were multiple signs posted, including “No Trespassing” 
signs. Widgren did not purchase a building permit. Three times, zoning administrators and 
Township tax assessors, Louis Lenz and H. Wayne Beldo, attempted to confront Widgren about 
zoning violations, and conduct some minor observations of the exterior of the house.671 Unable 
to get a hold of Widgren, they would post the civil infractions on the door of the house. When 
Widgren learned of the infractions, he and his son filed a claim in federal district court asserting 
various violations. The district court held that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred due 
to the “open fields” doctrine.672  
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The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s decision and held that all three separate 
visits did not constitute a search. The Court reasoned that regarding the first inspection, the 
“open field doctrine” applied and therefore, while it may be considered a trespass, it was not a 
search.673 The objective of the second inspection was to issue a citation and did not seek 
incriminating evidence against the Widgrens. Therefore, the Court held that the “intrusion” was 
minimal in nature and therefore did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.674 Finally, the 
last visit by a property assessor also did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Court 
reasoned the official did enter the curtilage, but for the sole purpose of “naked-eye” observations 
of the exterior of the house.675 Furthermore, it did not violate the Widgrens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights because the house was plainly visible. Concerning this final inspection, the Court 
concluded that the Widgrens’ “expectation of privacy in ‘the plainly visible attributes and 
dimensions of the exterior of their home’ is at the Fourth Amendment’s periphery, not its core, 
when compared to the hidden features of the house’s interior.”676 No search had occurred.  
16. Christensen v. County of Boone (K-NS) 
In 1998, Boone County police officer Robert Alty arrested a friend, Edward Krieger, for 
driving under the influence.677 Edward Krieger was also a Deputy Sheriff of Boone County. This 
led toward an animosity in their relationship, which later manifested into face-to-face 
altercations in 2001. Deputy Krieger would harass and intimidate Officer Alty and his girlfriend, 
Anita Christensen This included a series of events consisting of Deputy Krieger following the 
pair in Boone County, parking his squad car in front of the business in which Anita worked, and 
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other intimidation tactics.678 Numerous complaints were filed against Krieger to his superior, but 
no departmental actions were taken. Officer Alty and Anita Christensen claimed Deputy Krieger 
deprived them of their rights of privacy and further claimed this harassment was tantamount to 
an unreasonable search and seizure. The district court dismissed the claims.679  
The Court of Appeals stated “a search takes place when the state intrudes upon an 
individual’s legitimate interest in privacy.”680 In the present case, the Court concluded that the 
actions of Deputy Krieger did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.681 The Court 
reasoned that while driving on public streets, individuals do not ordinarily have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the district court appropriately dismissed the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.682 
17. U.S. v. Lucas (K-NS) 
In 2003, defendant Lucas escaped the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional 
Services.683 On October 22, Director of Correctional Services Harold Clarke issued an arrest 
warrant for Lucas. On January 4, 2004, a tip was given to Sergeant Timothy Carmody of Lucas’ 
location. Carmody passed the tip to Deputy Gerald Kellogg. Later that day Kellogg directed 
officers to travel to the residence of Theresa Scaife, which was the location described in the tip. 
When officers knocked on the door, they could hear a man and a woman inside. When Scaife 
opened the door, she was asked if Lucas was inside.684 She responded that he was not inside the 
residence. The officers explained to her that they had an arrest warrant for Lucas and based on 
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the warrant, they intended to enter and search for him. Shortly thereafter, Scaife admitted Lucas 
was inside and officers placed her in the squad car. Officers asked Lucas to come outside the 
residence; however, he did not respond to their request. At that point, officers entered the 
apartment and found Lucas in the basement dressed in boxer shorts. Due to department policy, 
those placed under arrest must be dressed appropriately during winter weather. Deputy Kellogg 
saw a pair of pants in a bedroom and asked Lucas if the pants belonged to him. Lucas 
acknowledged ownership of the pants, but requested to wear a different pair. After Deputy 
Kellogg picked up the pants and he discovered crack cocaine, marijuana, and $2,900 in cash 
inside the pants.685 After officers took Lucas away, Scaife was allowed to enter her apartment. 
She was asked by Sergeant Carmody for permission for the officers to search the apartment for 
contraband or weapons which may have belonged to Lucas. Scaife verbally agreed and signed a 
consent form. Officers found a firearm and another bag of marijuana.686 
The Court of Appeals stated that because Lucas had escaped lawful custody, he possessed a 
diminished expectation of privacy.687 The Court held that Director Clarke had met the standard 
required to draft an arrest warrant for a prison escapee; therefore, the officers’ entry into Scaife’s 
apartment was reasonable.688 Furthermore, the Court stated the dissent erred by failing to 
consider the status of Lucas. Because Lucas’ reasonable expectation of privacy was limited by 
his escapee status and in light of the fact officers had both a valid administrative warrant and 
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reasonable cause to believe Lucas was in the apartment, the Court concluded Lucas’ Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated.689 Thus, a valid search had occurred. 
18. Nelson v. National Aeronautics and Space Admin. (K-NS) 
This case dealt with the employees who worked on the jet propulsion laboratory for NASA. 
NASA had conducted routine National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI ) investigations of 
all employees since its inception, excluding contract employees.690 NASA had determined this 
exclusion posed a security risk and thus began requiring investigations into contract employees 
in 2005. However, these changes did not affect those who worked for California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech) until January 29, 2007. This team, in conjunction with NASA, were in 
charge of working on the jet propulsion laboratory. At this point, NASA had modified its 
contract with Caltech to require of all its (Caltech’s) contractual employees to undergo a 
thorough NACI investigation.691 Caltech initially opposed the new security measures, including 
the investigations, but ultimately conceded due to the nature of the contract they had previously 
signed. These investigations would be conducted through Form 42 inquiries and a SF 85 
questionnaire.692 Thus, on August 30, 2007, the appellants filed suits against NASA, Caltech, 
and the Department of Commerce.693 One of the primary suits alleged NASA’s forced 
investigations on contract employees constituted an unreasonable search.694 The district court 
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rejected the argument and held the investigations required by NASA were not a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment.695 
 The Court of Appeals stated for appellants’ Fourth Amendment claim to be successful, 
there must be evidence that the investigation conducted by NASA using Form 42 or the SF 85 
questionnaire violated appellants’ “reasonable expectation of privacy.”696 The Court held Form 
42 written inquiries did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment according to 
Miller’s bright-line rule.697 This bright-line rule states that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy to any information voluntarily given to the government.  Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that the investigations conducted using the SF 85 questionnaire did not constitute a 
search. The Court reasoned direct questioning was not a Fourth Amendment issue, but rather a 
Fifth Amendment concern.698 Thus, the Court concluded that neither Form 42 written inquiries 
nor the SF 85 questionnaire were considered “searches” under the Fourth Amendment.699 In sum, 
no search had occurred. 
19. U.S. v. Ziegler (K-NS) 
FBI Special Agent James Kennedy had received a tip that a Frontline Processing employee 
had accessed child pornography from a work computer.700 In response, Kennedy contacted the IT 
administrator of Frontline. The administrator, John Softich, explained to Kennedy that a firewall 
was placed on all work computers and internet activities were strictly monitored. During their 
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conversation, Softich confirmed the tip and explained he had personally viewed the sites. Based 
on the log, Softich said Jeffrey Ziegler’s office computer had accessed the site.701 Next, Agent 
Kennedy interviewed William Schneider, an employee for the IT department. Schneider 
confirmed Softich’s findings and reported he had “spot checked” the cache files on Ziegler’s 
computer and it revealed images of child pornography. Subsequent events, however, were 
disputed by the parties. Softich and Schneider claimed that Agent Kennedy instructed them to 
make a copy of Ziegler’s hard drive. Conversely, Agent Kennedy claimed he was told by Softich 
that the IT department had made a backup file and therefore, Agent Kennedy instructed them to 
ensure its protection.702 On January 20, 2001, Softich and Schneider obtained a key to Ziegler’s 
office, entered the office, and made two copies of the hard drive. Frontline’s counsel, Michael 
Freeman, contacted Agent Kennedy and stated they would cooperate with the FBI during their 
investigation and that a search warrant would be unnecessary. Agent Kennedy received Ziegler’s 
computer and one of the copies of the hard drive on February 5, 2001.703  
Ziegler argued that the evidence obtained from his workplace computer violated his Fourth 
Amendment freedom for unreasonable search and seizures.704 The Court of Appeals stated for 
Fourth Amendment protections to be applicable, “an expectation of privacy must be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”705 The Court concluded Ziegler had no 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy on his computer in the workplace; as a result, no 
search implicating the Fourth Amendment had occurred.706 The Court reasoned, “The workplace 
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computer was company-owned; Frontline’s computer policy included routine monitoring, a right 
of access by the employer, and a prohibition against private use by its employees.”707   
20. U.S. v. Scott (K-S) 
Raymond Scott was arrested for drug possession and then released.708 As part of his release, 
Scott was required to comply with random drug testing and allow his home to be randomly 
searched by a peace officer without a warrant. Sometime later, an informant tipped officers that 
Scott might have been using drugs. As a result, State officers went to Scott’s house and 
administered a urine test. The test concluded Scott was on methamphetamines. The officers 
arrested him and searched his house, which revealed an unregistered shotgun.709  
Scott moved to suppress the shotgun and any statements made at the scene.710 The district 
court granted Scott’s motion because officers needed probable cause to justify the warrantless 
search. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined if the searches were valid based on 
the consent given during his release. When considering Fourth Amendment search and seizures, 
the Court of Appeals turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy concept and further 
decided the searches are on valid if they were conducted reasonably.711 To determine 
reasonableness, the Court turned to whether the searches were supported by probable cause, 
special needs doctrine, or “totality of the circumstances” approach. Ultimately, the Court 
answered these various components in the negative. Thus, the Court agreed with the district 
court’s decision in that there is no evidence to support the search, which means the statements 
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made by Scott and the shotgun was correctly suppressed.712 In sum, the Court found an unlawful 
search had occurred. 
21. Johnson v. Hawe (K-NS) 
On January 28, 2000, Johnson videotaped his friends at Sequim’s skateboard park and an 
interaction they had with Chief Nelson.713 Chief Nelson arrived on the scene in his patrol car and 
was looking for a missing juvenile. Johnson approached the vehicle from the passenger side. 
Nelson rolled down the passenger window and asked what Johnson was doing. Johnson did not 
say anything, but continued to face the camera at Nelson. Unbeknownst to Nelson, Johnson had 
powered his camera down. Nelson told Johnson to stop because Johnson “did not have [ ] 
permission to record [him] and … it was a violation of the law to record conversations without 
consent.”714  Nelson then gave a second warning and then left the vehicle in order to retrieve the 
camera. There was a physical struggle, but with the help of Nelson’s back-up officer, they placed 
Johnson under arrest.  Johnson had spent three days in jail before being charged of violating the 
Washington Privacy Act of recording communication without permission and resisting arrest.715 
Johnson appealed and argued that the actions against him violated his First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.716 The Court of Appeals held that the conversation Chief Nelson was having 
with dispatch did not qualify for Fourth Amendment protection.717 The Court provided three 
reasons for this finding. First, the Washington’s Privacy Act does not prohibit or criminalize the 
public from recording police while they are on duty.718 Second, the Court reasoned that Chief 
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Nelson had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he was in a public area, with his 
vehicle window rolled down, and knew that Johnson had a camera when he approached the 
vehicle.719 Third, the Court stated Chief Nelson lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
communications with dispatch.720 The Court stated, “Because the communications over Chief 
Nelson’s police radio could be commonly monitored, overhead, and recorded by other officers 
and private citizens owning scanning devices, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
those communications.”721 Furthermore, the Court concluded Nelson’s arrest lacked probable 
cause which ultimately violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment right.722 In sum, no search had 
occurred. 
22. Callahan v. Millard County (K-S) 
Police raided the residence of defendant Callahan on March 19, 2002.723 Police had received 
a tip from a confidential informant (“CI”) that Callahan was selling and distributing 
methamphetamines. The “CI” had been invited to Mr. Callahan’s home to try a “test” sample. 
The officers learned that the “CI” had been drinking before heading over to the residence and 
was intoxicated. Despite his inebriated state, police attached a wire to the informant and gave 
him a marked $100 bill. When the “CI” was inside the house, he completed the transaction, and 
then gave the signal.724 The signal alerted officers to enter the house, and they ordered the 
residents to drop to the ground, including the informant. Mr. Callahan dropped a small plastic 
bag, which was later revealed to contain methamphetamines. A search of the house revealed 
evidence of drug sales, drug syringes, and methamphetamines. The police did not have a 
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warrant.725 The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Callahan’s rights were in fact violated.726 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned Mr. Callahan had not consented to the officers’ entry, and the 
consent given to the informant could not be interpreted to extend to the officers. As a result of a 
lack of a search warrant or exigent circumstances, the Court concluded the search and seizure 
was illegal. 
23. U.S. v. Hatfield (K-NS) 
On October 10, 2000, police received an anonymous tip that Hatfield had been growing 
marijuana.727 In response, Lieutenant Tim McCullum and Deputy Linda Sinclaire were sent to 
Hatfield’s residence. Once at the scene, they decided to split up. Deputy Sinclaire went to the 
front door on the north side of the house and McCullum walked to the parking pad located on the 
southern side of the house, near a pickup truck.728 McCullum waited in this area so that he could 
see individuals in case they exited the house through the backyard.729 When he heard Hatfield 
had answered the door, McCullum left his position and returned to the squad car.  
Sinclaire informed Hatfield of the tip they had received and asked permission to search the 
premises.730 Hatfield refused. McCullum and Sinclaire radioed in to their superior and explained 
the events which had transpired. In the meantime, Deputy Dale Harrold had overheard the 
conversation on the radio and met with the other two officers at the scene. Deputy Harrold 
reached Hatfield’s residence, and walked about fifty to sixty feet alongside the fenced property 
to get a vantage point.731 At this point, Deputy Harrold could look into Hatfield’s backyard and 
was able to make out marijuana being grown from inside a chicken coop and behind a tin shed. 
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To get a better view, Officer Harrold walked south along the fence, back toward Hatfield’s 
house, and from a particular vantage point he confirmed that marijuana was, in fact, being grown 
on Hatfield’s property.732 Hatfield also walked on the inside of the fence and noticed Deputy 
Harrold and began yelling at the officer for trespassing. Deputy Harrold placed Hatfield under 
arrest for growing marijuana. While police secured the premises, Deputy Harrold left and 
obtained a search warrant.733  
Hatfield claimed that Officer Harrold’s observation of Hatfield’s backyard was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.734 The Court of Appeals held that Officer Harrold’s observation 
into the backyard and discovery of the marijuana did not constitute a search.735 The Court 
reasoned Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to the home and its curtilage from 
“ordinary visual surveillance.”736 Therefore, the Court concluded Hatfield had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the observations made by Officer Harrold from the vantage point where 
he detected the marijuana in Hatfield’s backyard.737 
24. McClish v. Nugent (K-S) 
Deputies Shawn Terry and Clifford Groves responded to a complaint between neighbors 
Holmberg and Padzur.738 Furthermore, the complaint did not mention McClish, who was not at 
home when the deputies arrived at the scene. The argument started over a property dispute. 
McClish had reason to believe that the neighbors had encroached on his property line. When 
McClish arrived home, he was angry that deputies were on his property. After McClish shouted 
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profanities at the deputies, they stepped over to Padzur’s property.739 The Padzurs explained to 
the deputies that Holmberg and McClish had issued threats to harm their family, fire guns into 
the air, and shout profanities at them. McClish denied the accusations. During the deputies’ 
interview with the Padzurs, McClish got back into his car and drove past the property, and yelled 
some profane language out the window.740  
Deputy Terry reviewed the phone records at the Sheriff’s Office and in conjunction with the 
statements he had received from the neighbors and personal observations, Terry concluded he 
had probable cause to arrest McClish.741  Later than night, Deputies Terry, Calderone, and K-9 
handlers Martinez and Magnum, returned to arrest McClish. Vehicle access to McClish’s 
property was extremely limited because of an electronic gate. However, McClish did give an 
electronic “clicker” to a neighbor, Lanny Baum, with the instruction to never give the “clicker” 
to anyone. That night, Baum either left the gate open for the officers or lent them the “clicker” to 
gain access to the residence. According to Deputy Terry, he and Calderone went up to the 
residence, knocked on the door, and told McClish it was the Sherriff’s Office. McClish then 
stepped out, and Terry arrested him.742 Conversely, McClish stated in district court that Terry 
was standing directly in the front door and forcibly grabbed and pulled him out onto the porch. In 
any event, Holmberg was also arrested for resisting an officer without violence. McClish argued 
that Deputy Terry violated his Fourth Amendment rights during the arrest.  
The Court of Appeals held that the arrest was unlawful and violated McClish’s Fourth 
Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.743 The Court reasoned 
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“McClish did not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when 
he opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within his home from a 
warrantless arrest.”744 A Fourth Amendment search and seizure occurred. 
25. U.S. v. Young (K-NS) 
Raymond Young had applied and received a particular certificate known as a “637 
certificate” to buy and sell “off-road” fuel, which included fuel for marine use in the spring of 
1987.745 He had stated to an IRS agent that he owned a nautical vessel; however, Young sold his 
boat four months prior to obtaining his certificate. Young had begun the elaborate plan to 
purchase tax-free fuel and sell it to cash-only retailers and trucking companies. IRS Agent 
Sutherland interviewed Young on April 30, 1991. According to Sutherland, Young had hinted at 
bribing him. As a result, the IRS Inspection Service arranged for Agent Sutherland to wear a 
wire during the next interview with Young.746 During the second meeting, Sutherland found 
Young’s invoices to be very suspicious. At the third interview, Agent Sutherland revoked 
Young’s 637 certificate.  
Meanwhile, IRS Agent Ruka continued investigations against Young through a different 
approach.747 Agent Ruka had contacted Federal Express and asked the operational manager for 
assistance in permitting IRS and United States Customs to view packages sent for and by Young 
and Ahmed, the co-defendant in this case. They agreed and without a warrant, IRS x-rayed 
several packages. The x-rays revealed the packages contained large amounts of currency. This 
evidence was used to apply for a search warrant for a residence owned by Young.  
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Young argued that the search and seizure of the packages violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. The Court of Appeals held that the IRS’ actions and Federal Express’ handing over the 
packages for x-ray did not violate Young’s Fourth Amendment rights.748 The Court reasoned that 
“No reasonable person would expect to retain his or her privacy interest in a packaged shipment 
after signing an airbill containing an explicit, written warning that the carrier is authorized to act 
in direct contravention to that interest.”749 Furthermore, the Court explained Federal Express’ 
package policy, which states to not ship cash and the contents of packages may be inspected at 
any time. The Court reasoned based on their policy, this further “eliminated any expectation of 
privacy” from within the package.750 Accordingly, no search occurred by government officials in 
the first place. 
26. U.S. v. Lee (K-NS) 
Robert Lee was the president and co-founder of the International Boxing Federation (IBF) 
which is a credited organization responsible for publishing the ratings of various boxers and 
announcing the champion.751 These ratings are important because they determine who gets to 
fight for the championship. The FBI began an investigation into the Lee’s company for 
scamming and rigging the ratings. In May 1997, C. Douglas Beavers was questioned by the FBI 
and then agreed to cooperate. Beavers explained he had solicited and accepted various bribes 
while working for IBF. The FBI created a sting operation where they used Beavers to arrange a 
meeting with Lee at a hotel room that had both audio and visual recording equipment.752 The FBI 
relied heavily on Beavers’ consent and did not obtain a warrant for the operation. The FBI only 
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recorded when Beavers was present in the room and accordingly, shut off the equipment when 
Beavers left.753 Lee was later indicted, charged, and convicted of receiving bribes.  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the FBI’s use of restraint by only 
recording and surveying when Beavers was in the room aligned with Lee’s expectation of 
privacy and therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.754 The Court reasoned since 
Beavers was invited into the hotel by Lee, Lee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
Beavers was present in the room.755 Furthermore, the Court explained that the FBI solely used 
the recording equipment to monitor their conversation when Beavers was present.756 In sum, the 
Court found that the FBI did not violate Lee’s Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, no search 
occurred.   
27. U.S. v. Warshak (K-S) 
Steven Warshak owned various small businesses in 2001 classified as a “nutraceuticals” 
company.757 Later, the businesses were combined to create Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, 
Inc. This company was in charge of the product known as Enzyte, which was the male 
enhancement supplement. The product was advertised through various media outlets, including 
television commercials, radio, and eventually printed ads.758 The ads claimed a 96% satisfaction 
rating; however, this was later revealed by James Teegarden, the Chief Operating Officer, to be 
false.759 Teegarden stated he was asked to find 500 names in the database and then mark 475 of 
them as satisfied to create the fabricated statistic. Finally, the ads also purported that the product 
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was endorsed by a Dr. Fredrick Thomkins from Stanford and Dr. Michael Moore from 
Harvard.760 Later, investigations revealed these doctors’ names were also fabricated.761  
Berkeley also had its customers under an automatic shipping program, which continued to 
charge the customer and ship the products until the customer notified the company to stop.762 
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) contacted Berkeley due to the high volume of complaints 
about customers’ inability to cancel the automatic shipping program.763 As a response, Berkeley 
began recording and monitoring the interactions with the call center representatives and 
customers. However, this response proved to be ineffective because representatives failed to 
provide proper disclosure and customers continued ordering the product over the internet, which 
failed to notify them of the automatic shipping program.764  
In 2004, the President of the BBB mailed Warshak about the complaints. 765 Meanwhile, the 
Berkeley Company experienced an enormous amount of “chargebacks,” which caused the loss of 
Warshak’s merchant account.766 “Chargebacks” occur when customers dispute a charge. 
Berkeley was able to get other merchant accounts; however, this was successfully done after 
Warshak and his wife applied to numerous banks, and falsely stated they had never had a 
merchant account terminated.767 Because of the problem of chargebacks, Warshak devised a ruse 
to inflate the number of transactions through a process of diluting the transactions which would, 
in turn, reduce the “chargeback” ratio. One approach included splitting up a single charge into 
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two charges, also known as “double-dinging.”768 Another strategy involved employees making 
small credit transactions using Warshak’s personal credit card. As part of the investigation, the 
government requested Warshak’s ISP provider (NuVox) to maintain copies of his emails.769 
Additionally, this requested prevented NuVox from informing Warshak of the government’s 
actions. This request was submitted in October 2004, and in January 2005, NuVox received a 
subpoena to hand over the emails.770 An additional mandate from the court ordered NuVox to 
submit any supplementary emails. Warshak did not receive any notice until May 2006.771 
In court, Warshak argued that warrantless seizure of his private emails violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.772 The Court held that Warshak 
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails.773 The Court reasoned email was 
analogous to a letter or phone call, and therefore the government cannot compel an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) to turn over the emails without a warrant.774 Consequently, a search under 
the Fourth Amendment had occurred. However, the Court held that although the government 
violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment right through the warrantless seizure of his emails, the 
emails themselves were not subject to exclusion because the government acted in good-faith of 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA).775  
28. U.S. v. Cuevas-Perez (K-NS) 
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Juan Cuevas-Perez was being investigated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) of operating a drug distribution ring in 2008.776 ICE agents installed a pole camera 
outside the residence of Cuevas-Perez to easily monitor his movements. This footage revealed he 
owned a jeep. On February 6, 2009, Detective Shay attached a warrantless GPS tracking device 
onto the Jeep while it was in a public area.777 Cuevas-Perez traveled to New Mexico, Texas, 
Oklahoma, Missouri, and Illinois. During his time in Missouri, the GPS device began to run low 
on power.778 Shay contacted a regional ICE agent and asked them to continue visual surveillance. 
Once Cuevas-Perez entered Illinois, Illinois State Police (“ISP”) took over visual surveillance. 
ICE agents instructed ISP to find a reason to pull over Cuevas-Perez and after 40 miles of 
tracking him, ISP pulled him over for a minor traffic violation.779 A trained K-9 was sent to the 
scene and the dog motioned to the handler that there were drugs present. A search of the Jeep 
revealed heroin packed in secret compartments in the vehicle.780  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on Knotts precedent and held that the 
placement of the GPS device on Cuevas-Perez’s vehicle did not constitute a search and therefore, 
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.781 The Court explained the surveillance was not 
lengthy (60 hours total) and therefore did not expose various aspects of Cuevas-Perez’s life.782 
Additionally, this was all done during one continuous journey along public thoroughfares, which 
was found to not be a search in Knotts. Furthermore, the purpose of the GPS device was strictly 
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to track the defendant’s, Cuevas-Perez, movements as he travelled across the country.783 In sum, 
the actions of ICE agent did not constitute a search. 
29. U.S. v. Ward (K-NS) 
Ward had contacted his mother after escaping custody.784 Federal marshals learned of his 
whereabouts and notified two deputies of where his mother lived. When they arrived, they 
discovered that Ward’s car had departed. The Federal marshals and local law enforcement 
searched nearby motel parking lots for a maroon Buick. They found a vehicle that matched the 
description at a Days Inn parking lot. The clerk explained that Ward was not a registered 
guest.785 The marshals conducted a stake-out of the car and waited for Ward to reappear. When 
Ward returned to the scene, the marshals moved in, but he managed to enter his vehicle and take 
off. Marshals did not chase him because they feared he would cause an accident. They found his 
vehicle at another motel and the manager confirmed that Ward was staying there. They obtained 
a key to the room and knocked and announced their presence and entered the room. The 
marshals found a bag with a firearm, ammo, an address book, and a pharmacy card.786 Ward was 
eventually arrested in the nearby town of Midland. Ward pled guilty in district court, but retained 
his right to appeal. Ward argued the evidence found in his motel room should be suppressed.787 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the marshals’ warrantless search of his 
motel room and the bag did not violate Ward’s rights.788 The Court first stated the implications 
for the different, possible statuses of Ward. If Ward was considered to share the status of a 
probationer or parolee, then he would harbor a diminished expectation of privacy that “could be 
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outweighed by government interests.”789 Conversely, if the status of Ward is more aligned with 
that of a prisoner, then under Katz, “a prisoner cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment because 
society is not prepared to recognize a prisoner’s expectation of privacy in his prison cell.”790 
Finally, the court explained that since Ward’s status was that of an escaped prisoner, there was 
enough probable cause for police to arrest him, search his dwelling (i.e., the motel room), and the 
bag without a warrant.791 A search did not occur under the particular facts of this case. 
30. U.S. v. Ramirez (K-NS) 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Special Agent Hugas received a tip from a 
paid informant, Martin Delgado, that a white Chevy Cavalier would deliver a large quantity of 
marijuana.792 Delgado was an occupant of the Cavalier and he gave Agent Hugas the specific 
timeframe and course of travel. The ICE agents found the Cavalier and followed it to 420 
Esperanza. To get a better vantage, the agents drove past the property. Special Agent Hugas was 
able to see over the gate from the new position and he saw two men, Jose and Nelson Ramirez, 
allow access to the Cavalier onto their property.793 Delgado exited the vehicle, and began 
unloading the contents of the vehicle (i.e., marijuana bundles). After they had completed their 
task, Delgado and his cousin reentered their vehicle and exited the property. Next, a Southern 
Union Gas truck was seen entering the premises, driven by Jesus Ramirez. After thirty to forty 
minutes of surveillance, the agents approached the property.794 When they encountered Jose and 
Nelson, the ICE agents explained they had reason to believe there were narcotics on the 
premises. ICE agents presented a consent to search form to Jose. Jose signed the consent form 
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and the subsequent search revealed no marijuana on the ground floor of the house or the 
carport.795 The ICE agents then asked for consent to search the apartments located above the 
carport. The apartments were owned by Vanessa and Jose Garcia, who granted permission to the 
agents to search.  Agents found large rolls of shrink wrap which they believed to be used for 
drug paraphernalia. The agents then decided to examine the canal near the residence.796  
At the canal, agents discovered loose bundles of marijuana wrapped in cellophane and black 
plastic bags.797 When questioned about the marijuana, Jose denied ever knowing about it and 
accused the Garcias’ of handling it. Agent Hugas explained in court that because no one had seen 
either Jose or Nelson handle the marijuana the agents lacked probable cause to arrest, so they left 
the residence.798 Agent Martinez returned the next morning and seized an additional 182 pounds 
of marijuana from the canal. In July 2002, Agents Hugas interviewed Juan Cardenas and 
explained he (Juan) was seen helping unload the white Cavalier of marijuana. Before Cardenas 
agreed to aid the investigation against the Ramirez family, he was unfortunately deported. He did 
not return to the United States until October 2003.799 Cardenas was later arrested and his 
testimonial statements were used to indict Jose, Nelson, and Jesus of drug possession with intent 
to distribute. Jose and Nelson pled not guilty, while their brother, Jesus, pled guilty.800 They were 
convicted and Jose and Nelson appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Ramirez brothers had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the balcony of the carport.801 The Court reasoned this area was 
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accessible to anyone since it was the only way to enter the upstairs and there were no measures 
taken to restrict access. Also, the Court agreed with the district court’s analysis concluding that 
the canal was part of the “open fields” outside the curtilage of the home.802 Since Agent Hugas 
was standing on a lawful vantage point, the Ramirez family lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when Agent Hugas saw into the canal.803 Thus, the Court found that the Ramirez 
brothers also lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the canal area; accordingly, a search 
under the Fourth Amendment did not occur. 
31. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon (K-S) 
Jeff Quon was part of a Special Weapons and Tactics unit for the Ontario Police 
Department.804 In 2001, the City awarded the police department new pagers capable of sending 
and receiving text messages. As a result, the City put a limit on the number of characters sent or 
received per month. Before distributing the pagers, the City announced a new computer policy. 
Although the language of the policy did not appear to cover text messages, the City explicitly 
stated it would treat text messages the same as emails.805 During Quon’s first couple of billing 
cycles, Quon had exceeded his monthly text message allotment. Lieutenant Duke reminded Quon 
that the city treated the messages as emails and he could be audited. Quon wrote a check to 
reimburse the City for the fees. The next few months, Quon exceeded his limits again and each 
time he reimbursed the city. Duke notified Chief Scharf of what was going on and that he was 
“tired of being a bill collector.”806 To investigate if the monthly allotment was too low, he 
requested to the see the text message transcripts of officers who exceeded the limit. Arch 
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Wireless provided the transcripts. Duke reviewed the transcripts and discovered that Quon’s 
messages were not work related, and some were sexually explicit. Duke presented his findings to 
Chief Scharf, who referred the matter to internal affairs.807  
The United States Supreme Court held that regardless of the expectation of privacy that Quon 
may have had related to the text messages, the “search” did not violate his Fourth Amendment 
rights.808 The Court reasoned that the search was justified because there were “reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for [a] noninvestigatory work-related 
purpose.”809 Furthermore, the Court reasoned the scope of the search was also reasonable due to 
its efficiency and the purpose. It was also viewed as not “excessively intrusive.”810 A search 
occurred, but it was deemed reasonable and did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
32. U.S. v. Crawford (K-S) 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent David Bowdich was in charge of investigating 
a series of bank robberies in San Diego between 1997 and 1998.811  Approximately two years 
after receiving his assignment, Bowdich received a tip from an unnamed source that one of the 
participants in the most recent robber of the Bank of America on Ulrich Street went by the name 
of Ralphie Rabbit. Special Agent Bowdich later believed Ralphie Rabbit was an alias for 
Raphyal Crawford. Upon further investigations, Bowdich learned Crawford was on state parole 
with the special condition where Crawford had signed away his Fourth Amendment rights 
through a “Fourth Waiver.”812  
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Special Agent Bowdich explained the “Fourth Waiver” was a tool used against suspects to 
help them “talk” about crimes. As a result, Bowdich contacted Crawford’s parole agent, Carl 
Berner, explained the situations, and obtained his permission to conduct a parole search of 
Crawford’s residence.813 Bowdich conducted the parole search on July 27, 2000 with the 
assistance of four other law enforcement officers. Crawford’s sister, Abdullah, answered the 
door when the officers knocked on the door. They explained their intentions to Abdullah and she 
pointed them to the room where Crawford was asleep with his eighteen month old daughter.814  
Officers entered the room with weapons drawn, told Crawford they were conducting a parole 
search, removed him from the bedroom and escorted him to the couch, and the officers 
administered the search. The search lasted approximately 50 minutes long. As planned, no 
physical evidence was obtained from the search; however, this gave Bowdich the opportunity to 
converse with Crawford. Toward the end of their conversation, Bowdich suggested they move 
their chat to the FBI office so as to eliminate any distractions or the possibility of a creative 
defense attorney claiming coercive atmosphere with five officers.815 Crawford agreed. At the FBI 
office, Crawford was placed in an interview room, where he was free to leave at any time, but 
the door was closed so as to keep the setting private. Bowdich began to read the Miranda rights 
and Crawford interrupted. Bowdich assured Crawford he was not in custody and could leave at 
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any time, but Bowdich never completed stating the Miranda rights.816 Ultimately, Crawford 
admitted to being part of the robbery with a weapon.  
The Court held that “after examining the totality of the circumstances-including Crawford’s 
parole status, the parole condition, the location of the search, Crawford’s expectation of privacy 
in his own home, the state’s interest in rehabilitating parolees, and the interest of both the state 
and federal government in preventing and punishing recidivist crimes-we hold that a search of a 
parolee’s home pursuant to a parole condition is reasonable only if it supported by reasonable 
suspicion.”817 However, based on the information stated previously, the Court ruled that law 
enforcement officials did not have reasonable suspicion. The Court agreed with the district 
court’s analysis that there was an overall lack of reasonable suspicion to believe evidence of a 
criminal activity would have been present during the search, which consequently, made law 
enforcement not have the desired burden of proof to conduct the parole search, thus making the 
parole search illegal.818 
33. U.S. v. Scott (K-S) 
Scott was released on his own recognizance after being arrested for drug possession 
crimes.819 A condition of his release involved him consenting to the random drug tests, 
regardless of the time of day or night and by any peace officer with or without a warrant. 
Additionally, said peace officer may conduct a search of his home for drugs at any time of day or 
night, with or without a warrant.820 Officers received an anonymous tip that Scott may have had 
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some drugs. Officers went to his house and administered a drug test. Scott tested positive for 
methamphetamines, which the officers then searched his house and they found a shotgun.821 
The Court held that Scott’s drug test violated his Fourth Amendment rights.822 The Court 
explained that Scott’s consent to a search, as part of his release, is only lawful depending on the 
reasonableness of the search.823 The government needed probable cause to administer the drug 
test and therefore the search of the house and the seizure of the shotgun, which relied on the drug 
test being positive to establish probable cause, were illegal. The Court concluded searches did 
occur; however, they were invalid as they lacked probable cause.824 
34. Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare (K-NS) 
James Knott is the President of Riverdale Mills Corporation in charge of making steel wired 
related products.825 As part of the manufacturing process, alkaline and other toxic chemicals are 
created. Riverdale Mills Corporation has an agreement to dump the wastewater into the public 
sewer system as long as the company took the necessary steps to properly neutralize the harmful 
chemicals.826 These steps include using a testing area (Manhole 1) which is two feet deep and 
eventually flows into the public area (Manhole 2) which is 300 feet away. All parties consider 
Manhole 1 as the testing area for Riverdale Mills Corporation as it is located on street they claim 
to be on their property.827 Manhole 2 is not claimed and thus deemed as being the public. On 
July, 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received an anonymous tip that the 
plant may be dumping untreated wastewater due to a malfunction in the plant’s treatment 
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facility.828 The EPA sent Inspectors Pimpare and Granz to investigate the allegation on October, 
21, 1997. When they arrived at the factory, they did not have a warrant. Inspector Pimpare asked 
President Knott if they could investigate the wastewater treatment facility to which he replied 
yes, as long as they are with him or someone designated by him.829 Knott took the inspectors to 
the treatment plant where they conducted some testing. After the first round of testing was 
completed, Knott took the inspectors on a small tour of the facility.  
After finishing the tour, both parties dispute the events which occurred next. According 
to Pimpare and Granz, they asked to return to the treatment area to conduct more tests, and Knott 
allowed it.830 On the other hand, Knott claimed he did not give them consent to return to the 
treatment area. The second round of testing was later used to obtain a search warrant of the 
facility and eventually a criminal warrant.831 Knott moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
during the rounds of testing. The district court suppressed the evidence obtained in the second 
round of testing, claiming the inspectors went beyond the scope of consent given by Knott.832 In 
response, Knott brought a civil action law suit against the EPA for violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights. The district court denied Granz’s and Pimpare’s qualified immunity claim.833 
The defendants appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Riverdale Mills Corporation lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the wastewater was in the Manhole 1.834 The Court 
reasoned that the wastewater will “inevitably” and “irretrievably” flow into the public area (i.e. 
                                                          
828 Id. 
829 Id at 58. 
830 Id. 
831 Id. at 58-59. 
832 Id. at 59. 
833 Id. 
834 Id. at 64. 
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Manhole 2). The Court explained this is very similar to trash being left on the curb, where they 
have held in the past no one is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.835 Based on this, 
the Court reasoned “Riverdale had abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
wastewater by allowing it to flow irretrievably into a place where it will be ‘exposed’ … to the 
public.”836 Thus, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred and the 
actions by the inspectors were not a search. 





Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusion 
The Court in Jones in 2012 significantly renewed the old definition of a search under the 
Fourth Amendment by reintroducing the common law trespass test to the largely accepted and 
well-established reasonable expectation of privacy test laid out by the 1960s-era Katz decision. 
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court’s holding depended on the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment search law. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court and stated, “It is important 
to be clear what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for 
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”837 Justice Scalia 
went on to further describe a strong association between the written text of the Fourth 
Amendment and persons and property (i.e., houses, papers, and effects).838 This focused reading 
of the Fourth Amendment bolstered the majority’s opinion in returning to the trespass doctrine as 
a lens through which to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches. Thus, in Jones, the Court 
narrowly held that the warrantless installation of a GPS device to monitor a suspect is a search 
and, more broadly, revived the idea of the government physically intruding on private property 
as being considered a search.839  
In doing so, the Court added another level of protection associated with Fourth 
Amendment searches, which both the police and the courts must now consider. This addition has 
had the effect of strengthening individual rights as well as alerting law enforcement to newer 
constraints they must consider in respect to possible Fourth Amendment intrusion. The property-
based approach in Jones to considering Fourth Amendment searches  is in addition to the 
                                                          
837 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
838 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
839 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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aforementioned reasonable expectation of privacy lens from Katz through which police and 
courts must still continue to evaluate searches under the Fourth Amendment (i.e., Jones retained 
Katz the privacy notion as a criterion for determining if a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred).840 
In particular, prior to the Jones decision, the Katz test was used as the benchmark 
precedent to determine if a police search for Fourth Amendment purposes had occurred. It would 
only be found to be a search if the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy had been intruded 
upon.841 Considering the status of search inquiries prior to the Jones decision helps lay a 
foundation for studying the changes and trends in Fourth Amendment search law. Spanning 10 
years before the Jones case was decided, 34 cases were decided to be relevant to this study. Of 
these 34, the courts found no search had occurred in more cases than they found a search had 
occurred. In fact, only 47% of the cases studied (16) found that a search had occurred (and 
therefore the citizen’s rights were protected under the Fourth Amendment), and 53% of the cases 
studied (18) found that no search had occurred (thereby offering no protection for the citizens 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 The Jones case itself brought to light specifically police use of GPS technology without a 
warrant, and how this new technology may impact citizens’ rights through the collection of 
private information for possible future use in court. In terms of the balance between citizens’ 
privacy rights and increased availability of technological tools for police to detect and prevent 
crime, the United States Supreme Court, in Jones, appeared to “tilt” this balance towards 
citizens’ privacy and individual rights by determining that police placement of a GPS device on 
                                                          
840 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
841 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring). 
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the undercarriage of an individual’s vehicle constitutes a physical trespass and, hence, a search of 
that individual under the Fourth Amendment.842     
However, this finding by the Court in Jones does not represent a revolutionary new idea. 
In fact, originally, Fourth Amendment search questions under the Court’s jurisprudence had been 
governed by a trespass test until the late 1960s when the Katz test emerged, and with it, the 
apparent, official elimination of the trespass test.843 This elimination was partially due to the fact 
that the United States Supreme Court, at the time of the Katz decision, believed that the trespass 
test no longer had a place in Fourth Amendment search analyses with the growth and increased 
use by police of advanced technologies, including wiretaps. In particular, the United States 
Supreme Court in Katz decided that the trespass doctrine had no place in an era of intangible 
items, and, thus, created the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.844 
This maneuver effectively killed at the time the trespass doctrine as an analytical approach to 
determining Fourth Amendment searches.  
In today’s world, however, one possible benefit for reintroducing the trespass test to the 
Katz test, and using it as another lens through which to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches, 
would be so that the law could attempt to keep up with further advancements and changes in 
technology. In the modern era, society as a whole has become increasingly interconnected to the 
point that individuals within that society arguably have a diminished expectation of privacy. 
Thus, one possible benefit resulting from the modification of the Katz test could be increased 
protection of individuals’ Fourth Amendment interests; that is, even in those instances where 
                                                          
842 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
843 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928); On Lee v. United States, 747, 72 
S.Ct. 967 (1952); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
844 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, they may still retain Fourth Amendment 
protections as a result of intrusions by police onto their physical property.  
This fundamental change in Fourth Amendment search law as a result of Jones has been 
accompanied by not only certain, distinct advantages, but also several disadvantages or problems 
for courts, especially during the transition phase. For example, in terms of the advantages, lower 
courts (i.e., courts below the United States Supreme Court) now have a means of analyzing 
Fourth Amendment searches in situations where the Katz test could not reasonably apply.845 This 
is a unique opportunity for lower courts to have more flexibility of adapting and tailoring the 
Jones “trespass” test to apply to variety of unique factual situations. For example, in Lavan v. 
City of Los Angeles, the homeless Appellees had no reasonable expectation in the property they 
left on the curb; however, the Court ruled that the city’s actions were tantamount to search and 
seizure after the city’s employees “meaningfully interfered with the Appellees’s possessory 
interest in that property.”846 As another example, in Grady v. North Carolina, the United States 
Supreme Court explained the monitoring system set up to track sex offenders was tantamount to 
a search because the purpose was to obtain information “by physically intruding on a subject’s 
body.”847 This flexibility allows the Jones decision to be more widely applicable, as well as 
assist in offering more protection against the use of technology encroaching upon individual 
citizens’ rights. 
Conversely, the Jones decision has also created a certain level of ambiguity among lower 
courts, as well. The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Jones provided little clarity on 
                                                          
845 See U.S. v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080 (7th Circ. 2013); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Circ. 2012); 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013); U.S. v. Davis, 750 F.3d 1186 (10th Circ. 2014); Grady v. North Carolina, 132 
S.Ct. 1368 (2015). 
846 Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012). 
847 Grady v. North Carolina, 132 S.Ct. at 1371 (2015). 
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whether there were any circumstances to allow a warrantless GPS device or whether the decision 
would be applicable retroactively. Furthermore, Jones  did not elaborate on what lower courts 
should do in the situation where one test, such as Jones test, would find a search, but the other 
test, such as the Katz test, would not.848 Additionally, the previous use by police of now-largely 
obsolete technology, such as beeper technology, had previously been found by the Court to not 
constitute a search.849 If law enforcement were to strategically return to using these more 
outdated technological devices, in particular, without first obtaining a warrant, it is unclear 
whether this conduct would be allowed under Jones, as the Jones decision was specific to GPS 
devices and attaching those physically to a vehicle. These unanswered questions and gaps in the 
law have left the lower courts with little guidance until future cases are decided by the United 
States Supreme Court resolving these issues.  
Concerning specific problems arising from the Jones decision, the paradigm shift in 
Fourth Amendment search law reflected in Jones has led circuit courts to encounter certain cases 
during the transition phase. For example, certain circuit court cases included in this study 
consisted of facts which occurred before the Jones decision, but the case had not yet been heard 
or decided until after the Jones decision. Prior to Jones, the majority of circuit courts had ruled 
that the warrantless placement and use by police of a GPS device on the undercarriage of a 
vehicle did not constitute a search.850  
In particular, due to this retroactivity issue, many federal appellate court cases (14, 24%) 
in this study decided after Jones fell under the umbrella of “binding-appellate precedent,” which 
                                                          
848 See U.S. v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012). This was the only case which found a search under 1 test (i.e., 
Katz), but not the other test (i.e., Jones). 
849 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 
S.Ct. 3296, (1984). These cases held that law enforcement use of beeper technology to track a suspect traveling on 
public thoroughfares does not constitute a search. 
850 See cases labeled as “BP” or “Binding Precedent” in Appendix A. 
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reduced somewhat the overall amount of data for the study. After removing the “binding-
appellate precedent” cases, 38 cases from the federal appellate courts were left that cited either 
Jones, Katz, or both. Of the 38 cases reviewed, 11 used Jones and physical trespass as the 
requirements for a search, 11 used Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine as the 
requirements for a search, and 16 used both. Of the 11 cases using Jones, all were found to have 
determined a police search occurred. Of the 11 cases using Katz, 27.2% (3) were found to have 
decided a police search transpired and 72.8% (8) found no search occurred. Of the remaining 16 
cases, which used both tests, 37.5% (6) of the cases found searches and 62.5% (10) of the cases 
found no search.  
This research revealed that the category created by the study with the largest number of 
cases following Jones is “Both” (i.e., 16 cases). Courts were using a combination of both tests to 
solve various Fourth Amendment search inquiries instead of either solely Katz or Jones (i.e., 16 
Both “versus” 11 Jones “versus” 11 Katz). However, majority of the courts in the study in the 
aftermath of Jones are using a single test or “lens” to evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment 
search had occurred (i.e., 22 courts “versus” 16 courts). There is a possible explanation for why 
courts may be preferring a single “lens” versus the dual “lens”: Simplicity. Generally speaking, 
when the case involved a GPS device being used to monitor a suspect’s whereabouts or property 
rights, the Jones test was used.851 However, in other specific instances, such as involving a 
search of a defendant’s home, both tests were typically used.852 This proves to be promising, as 
these courts are not completely forgoing the former Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
                                                          
851 See, e.g., U.S. v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080 (9th Circ. 2013); U.S. v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (4th Circ. 2014); U.S. v. 
Sellers, 512 Fed.Appx. 319 (4th Circ. 2013); U.S. v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Circ. 2014); U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 
F.3d 1087 (9th Circ. 2012); U.S. v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Circ. 2013). 
852 See, e.g.,U.S. v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952 (8th Circ. 2013); U.S. v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 Fed.Appx. 396 (6th Circ. 
2012); U.S. v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367 (4th Circ. 2013). 
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but instead are doing as the United States Supreme Court in Jones appears to have wished in 
using both tests, either solely or in tandem, to solve Fourth Amendment search inquiries.  
Of the cases which used both types of tests, a majority (10 cases or 62.5%) found no 
search had occurred. This would suggest that the courts who considered both Jones and Katz 
together are leaning more to a pro-law enforcement, crime control model in the wake of Jones. 
When looking at the aggregate of decisions made post-Jones, though, another picture becomes 
clear. Overall, 20 (52.6%) of the cases post-Jones found that searches had occurred, thus 
suggesting a slight favoring of a due-process, rights-focused approach following Jones. This 
information is interesting as, previously mentioned, there was a majority of cases where no 
search had occurred when using solely Katz or a combination of both tests (i.e., 9 courts finding 
a search “versus” 18 courts finding no search). Additionally, when comparing the pre-Jones data, 
18 (53%) of the cases examined found that no search had occurred. This latter finding suggests 
that there was a significant change in the number of search determinations by federal appellate 
courts in the period examined prior to and following Jones. 
Herbert Packer explained that the viewpoint of the criminal justice systems swings, like a 
pendulum, between two different models: crime control and individual’s rights/due process. The 
crime control model generally forfeits the rights of the individual in the interest of catching and 
punishing as many offenders as possible. The due process model is focused around the protection 
of the rights of the accused, even if it means justice in the form of successful apprehensions and 
convictions is not being served in individual cases.853 In other words, during time periods 
associated more with the crime control model, one should expect that the courts are generally 
                                                          
 
853 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1-68 (1964). 
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more inclined to find no police search has occurred, and hence the accused does not gain Fourth 
Amendment protections and in fact may lose them. Conversely, in times more associated with 
the due process model, courts generally err on the side of individual protections and rights, and 
are more likely to find that a search has occurred, and that the individual’s rights are protected 
under the Fourth Amendment.  
This “pendulum” may explain pre-Jones findings (i.e. 18 (53%) cases found no search). 
After 9/11, the American criminal justice system moved swiftly into a phase where individual 
rights were more willingly given up in favor of safety and protection provided by the 
government, thereby encroaching further upon traditional citizen’s rights. At this time, courts 
moved to supporting police and crime control much more stringently than individual freedoms in 
an effort to protect the many (even if it meant intruding further on the rights of  the few). The 
pendulum, as explained by Packer, was strongly on the crime control side. The cases considered 
in this study tracked the decisions of the courts from after 9/11 until the decision of Jones (2002-
2012) as well as cases decided from Jones until May 31, 2015. Based on the post-Jones findings 
(i.e. 20 (52.6%) cases found a search), it appears the pendulum has swung away from the crime 
control model and toward the due process model (i.e. favoring rights of the individual over trying 
to control crime). This would also suggest that courts are following the intent behind the Jones 
decision and add another level of protections to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights.  
It is important to note that this pendulum model only suggests possible trends. Based on 
the data, this concept is not definitive of our courts grossly favoring crime control or due process. 
Moreover, the search rate has remained almost the same pre- and post- Jones (i.e., the percentage 
of determinations of searches being found to have occurred, remained similar in the period 
examined prior to Jones and the period examined after Jones). This finding could suggest that 
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the law may be less important to how judges determine case outcomes (i.e., privacy “versus” 
trespass test) than other forces. These forces could include philosophical beliefs, decisions 
favoring societal norms or policy trends, and the continued “balance” between due process and 
crime control. Nevertheless, this concept suggests that in the aftermath of Jones courts are 
leaning more toward a due process model.  
On a related note, the Katz privacy test is not as concretely defined as the Jones property 
test, and indeed privacy is much more of a nebulous idea or concept overall than property. The 
lack of concreteness with the Katz privacy test gives the courts flexibility to change the meaning 
of a search depending on the model which the criminal justice system is more influenced by at 
the time. In contrast, the Jones decision was so specific (e.g., trespass on property or absence 
thereof), that any cases that fell under the same factual parameters must be evaluated  in the same 
or at least fairly similar manner, as there are fairly clear delineations of what is and is not a 
search under Jones. Even in a time when crime control is the more favored view, that trend may 
be less likely to impact the application of the Jones decision. This may explain why all (100%) 
of cases using the Jones trespass test in the study found a police search occurred. That is the 
trespass test is more rigid than privacy test. For example, if there is a physical intrusion by police 
onto defendant’s property, there is less interpretive room for courts to find no search. Also, this 
finding could provide some evidence of a trend consisting of a “backlash” to the erosion of 
privacy rights following 9-11. In particular, this may go beyond the law in that it is a societal 
response rooted in concerns regarding an all-powerful, unrestrained, intrusive government in the 
wake of 9-11. 
In addition, in the wake of Jones, many of the federal appellate courts are still relying 
upon the Katz test, whether in combination with Jones or alone (71%). This may be because 
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there is more modern precedent available for these courts to rely upon for guidance that either 
uses or applies the Katz test (i.e., as opposed to the Jones trespass test), including relevant 
precedent from the Supreme Court itself.854  Indeed, Katz had been the sole lens to evaluate 
Fourth Amendment searches over the last forty years (i.e., from 1967 to 2012, the year Jones was 
decided). As a result, courts have had more recent exposure and familiarity with Katz and are, 
therefore, more likely to select its reasonable expectation of privacy test to apply to various 
factual scenarios involving police searches under the Fourth Amendment. In turn, given its long-
term existence as the sole criterion for evaluating Fourth Amendment search questions, police 
are also more familiar with applying the Katz test when they decide whether and how to conduct 
searches. If law enforcement is able to effectively understand and apply the law, then it is better 
able to work within the guidelines of those laws, including constitutional laws designed to 
protect citizens’ rights. To a degree, the federal appellate courts may be aware of these basic 
effects of their decisions on police behavior, and accordingly choose Katz as the criterion 
because they know police will be better able to apply it.  
In addition, the reliance on Katz may be explained by a concern among the federal circuit 
courts of avoiding possible findings of reversible error in light of the judicial uncertainties 
remaining under Jones.  Thus, this may have caused these courts to be somewhat more hesitant 
or reserved in their application of Jones, including taking further steps to broaden Jones’ 
application.855 For example, in U.S. v. Skinner, the Court explained Jones does not apply to the 
facts of Skinner because, “the majority opinion’s trespassory test [in Jones]” provides little 
guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a 
                                                          
854 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
104 S.Ct. 3296, (1984). 
855 See U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Circ. 2012). 
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physical invasion on property.856”  As future Supreme Court cases further interpret and apply 
Jones, more cases may emerge from the federal appellate courts using Jones as the sole criterion 
with which to decide Fourth Amendment search questions. Thus, any change in Fourth 
Amendment search law as a result of Jones appears likely to be slow and gradual, and notably 
not as revolutionary as one may have expected.  
Nonetheless, the effects of the change in Fourth Amendment search law following Jones 
are beginning to reveal themselves. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Jones 
originally applied the trespass doctrine to police use of GPS devices to track the whereabouts of 
a suspect’s vehicle. Since Jones, federal appellate court cases and United States Supreme Court 
cases have applied the Jones trespass test to cases involving dog sniffs, electronic mail, computer 
searches, and other forms of obtaining electronic data, such as cellular data.857 For example, in 
Florida v. Jardines, the United States Supreme Court found that police using a dog sniff 
technique at the front door of a residence constituted a search. The majority opinion agreed that 
this action constituted a search because the officer had trespassed onto Jardines’ property.858 In 
U.S. v. Skinner, DEA agents tracked Skinner through his cell phone as it was “pinging” off cell 
sites and through GPS technology installed on his cell phone. The Court concluded that no 
physical intrusion occurred in this case due to Skinner voluntarily using the cell phone for the 
intended purposes of communication. The agents who used the cell-phone GPS technology were 
merely taking advantage of technology the defendant chose to use.859 
                                                          
856 U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (2012)(citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955)). 
857 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.ct. 1409 (2013); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Circ. 2012); In re 
U.S. for Historical Cell Sit e Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Circ. 2013); U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Circ. 2012). 
858 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013). 
859 U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779 (2012). 
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On another note, scholars had some major concerns about the addition of the Jones test to 
evaluate Fourth Amendment search inquiries. First, scholars worried that the Katz test would 
become obsolete with the “new” search test.860 Second, scholars posited that the resurgence of 
the property test in Jones may reflect the slow realization by society as a whole that reasonable 
expectations of privacy are diminishing as a result of increasing technological 
interconnectedness.861 Though where society may be heading with regard to its views on privacy 
is beyond the scope of this study, this study’s findings clearly show that Katz has not been 
eliminated from Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence; to the contrary, in the wake of Jones, 
Katz was applied by many of the courts evaluated in this study either alone or in tandem with 
Jones (71%). Additionally, it is important to recognize that 71% of the examined cases used 
Jones trespass test in some manner either standalone or in combination with the Katz privacy 
test. 
This study was centered on two hypotheses to be explored through the effects of the 
Jones decision. First, it was hypothesized that in the wake of Jones, a majority of the federal 
appellate courts would be relying on the trespass doctrine to determine Fourth Amendment 
search inquiries. This hypothesis is only partially accurate, as it did not take into consideration 
the use, by federal appellate courts, of both the Jones and Katz tests to determine a search. As 
such, this hypothesis, as it was stated, is rejected. Secondly, it was hypothesized that a majority 
of the federal appellate courts after Jones was decided would find that no police search occurred. 
                                                          
860 Jason D. Medinger, Privacy Rights & Proactive Investigations: 2013 Symposium on Emerging Constitutional 
Issues in Law Enforcement: Article: Post-Jones: How District Courts are Answering the Myriad Questions Raised by 
the Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Jones, 42 U. Balt. L. Rev. 395, 395 (2013); Lauren Elena Smith, 
PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States v. Jones, 28 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1003, 1003 (2013). 
861 Nancy Forster, Privacy Rights & Proactive Investigations: 2013 Symposium On Emerging Constitutional Issues In 
Law Enforcement: Article: Back to the Future: United States v. Jones Resuscitates Property Law Concepts In Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 U. Balt. L. Rev. 445, 446 (2013); Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a 
Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1003 (2013). 
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This study found that 52.6% (20) of the reviewed cases decided after Jones determined a police 
search had occurred; therefore, this hypothesis is also rejected. 
There are many areas which are ripe for future research in dealing with Fourth 
Amendment search law, and specifically the impact which the Jones decision has had. One such 
area would be to further explore the “pendulum” idea set forth by Herbert Packer. Researching 
cases farther back than the ten years this study covered could help to identify a pattern in the 
shifting view between a crime control model and a due process model, and the relationship 
between the Katz test and the search determination. Expanding upon the cases reviewed in the 
wake of Jones by including lower court decisions would also add another layer of insight into 
Fourth Amendment search law. Not only including the variance among different jurisdictions  in 
the study, but also considering the political atmosphere of each jurisdiction  in accordance with 
their decisions would be yet another angle for future  exploration (e.g., is a more conservative 
state or region responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of cases in which a search is 
not found, and/ or  are states which are more liberal consistently siding with the due process 
model of thought and finding a search occurs? ). Lastly, as more time passes, there will be a 
clearer picture of Jones and its impact on Fourth Amendment search law, as this study’s largest 
limitation was the lack of available cases to review in light of the Jones case decision being so 
recent. As time moves forward, fewer cases will fall under the “binding-appellate precedent” 




1. U.S. v. Baez (BP)  
In August 2009, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agents attached a 
warrantless global positioning system (GPS) device to Jose Baez 1989 Chevrolet Caprice.862 
ATF suspected Baez after a result of two fires that occurred earlier that year. At the scenes, 
Baez’s vehicle was captured on camera, which ATF used to identify Baez as the owner. ATF 
agents tracked Baez from August 2009 and continued to monitor and track his movements for 
347 days.863 Baez drove his vehicle infrequently during the year of surveillance. However, 
during the week leading up to his arrest, Baez drove his vehicle six times. During this week, the 
Caprice had left the perimeter during the start of a fire.864 Following the reported fire, local 
police located Baez inside his vehicle and arrested him. A search of his residence revealed 
evidence which linked him to the two previous fires.865  
Baez argued to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the GPS monitoring as it violated 
his Fourth Amendment Rights.866 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that Jones 
explained that majority of circuit courts had been misinterpreting Knotts and other prior cases 
dealing with electronic surveillance.867 In Jones, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
“the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to 
                                                          
862 U.S. v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 2014). This case is an example of what is known as “then-binding 
precedent”. This occurs when searches are being conducted by law enforcement in “objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding appellate precedent” and thus the exclusionary rule is deemed not to apply.  In essence, law 
enforcement are protected by a good-faith-type exception to the exclusionary rule, namely because the officers 
are acting in a reasonable manner in accordance with prevailing precedent at the time of the events (i.e., in this 
instance, prior to the date Jones was decided). 
863 Id. 
864 Id. at 32. 
865 Id. 
866 Id. 
867 Id. at 35. 
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monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’”868 In reference to Knotts, as stated by 
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence, “[that case] reserved the question whether ‘different 
constitutional principles may be applicable’ to ‘dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ of the 
type that GPS tracking made possible here.”869 However, ATF agents involved in Baez’s case 
did not have the “benefit” of Jones. As a result, the Court turned to Sparks, which relied heavily 
on Knotts and Davis.  
Thus, the Court reasoned that according to Sparks, the applicable language is that officers are 
responsible for complying with “precedent that is clear and well-settled”870 The court in Sparks 
held that the warrantless installation of a global positioning system (GPS) device and subsequent 
data retrieved from the eleven days of monitoring did not warrant exclusion because that 
monitoring had occurred prior to Jones.871 ATF agents acted reasonably within the rules laid out 
at the time by both their circuit and Knotts; in particular, Knotts had found that “[a] person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his movements from one place to another.”872  
This case represents pre-Jones warrantless GPS tracking by police, but of a significantly 
longer duration. Nonetheless, the Court concluded under Davis that suppression would not serve 
the purpose of the exclusionary rule because of good-faith reliance by the officers on then-
applicable or binding precedent.873  
2. U.S. v. Sparks (BP) 
                                                          
868 Id. at 32 (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
869 Id. at 31 (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 956 (2012)). 
870 Id. at 33 (citing U.S. v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013)). 
871 Id. at 31. 
872 Id. at 35 (citing U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).  
873 U.S. v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 35 (2014)(citing Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011)). 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had reason to believe Craig Sparks was 
responsible for three bank robberies in 2009.874 As a result, FBI agents placed a GPS tracker on a 
car owned by Sparks’ mother without a warrant in December of 2009. On January 4, 2010, the 
FBI agents used the GPS to locate the car at the scene of a bank robbery and followed the car on 
the highway until it wrecked in a ditch; the two occupants fled the vehicle and a brief foot chase 
ensued.875 A search of the car revealed evidence of BB gun weapons, clothing, and tools used in 
the bank robbery. Sparks moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracker as it 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.876  
The Supreme Court held in Jones that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a 
target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a 
‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”877 Furthermore, the Court held that a search occurred 
because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.878” However, the events in Sparks were conducted prior to Jones. As a result, the 
court relied on Davis’ good-faith exception, “where new developments in the law have upended 
the settled rules on which the police relied.”879 The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applied under Davis because even though the warrantless GPS surveillance did violate the Fourth 
Amendment rights, officers relied on “binding precedent” in the form of Knotts and Moore.880 
                                                          
874 U.S. v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013). 
875 Id. 
876 Id. at 61. 
877 Id. (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
878 Id. (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
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Therefore, suppression would not have the intended effect of deterring improper law 
enforcement tactics.881 
3. U.S. v. Hohn (BP) 
Sheriff’s deputies installed a warrantless “slap-on,” battery-powered Global Positioning 
System (GPS) device to Mr. Hohn’s truck on July 24, 2011.882 The sheriff’s deputy explained a 
hard-wired GPS device required a warrant, but the battery-powered “slap-on” GPS device did 
not require a warrant for installation and monitoring. Throughout the investigation, law 
enforcement officers replaced the batteries in the device to continue tracking. Law enforcement 
officers tracked the vehicle for 62 days, until November 9, 2011.883 Based on the information 
they had collected during the course of the investigation, including the GPS device, officers 
obtained a warrant to install hard-wired GPS devices to Mr. Hohn’s truck and another vehicle. 
Officers were unable to install the hard-wired GPS device to the truck, so they continued to use 
the “slap-on” GPS device.884 Finally, the officers obtained a warrant to search the truck on 
December 23, 2011. Hohn moved to suppress the information obtained through the use of the 
GPS device; however, the district court denied the motion.885 Mr. Hohn further argued that 
police should not be afforded good-faith exception as there was no clear precedent in their 
circuit.886 The district court reasoned that the device placement qualified as a warrantless search, 
based on Jones, but the officers had acted in good faith which did not require exclusion.  
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882 U.S. v. Hohn, 606 Fed.Appx. 902, 904-905 (10th Circ. 2015). 
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the use of the “slap-on” GPS device 
was an unreasonable search.887 However, the Tenth Circuit Court disagreed with Mr. Hohn’s 
analysis in that officers were following Supreme Court decisions.888 First, in United States v. 
Knotts, the Supreme Court held that warrantless monitoring through the use of beeper technology 
to track the defendant on public highways and streets did not constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.889 Second, in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court held that the 
placement of a beeper device and its subsequent transfer to the vehicle of the defendant was not 
considered a search.890 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the officers’ actions were following 
the binding precedent set forth in Knotts and Karo.891 Also, the Court mentioned that the Jones 
decision did not abrogate Knotts and Karo.892 As a result, the Court agreed with the district 
court’s analysis and found that law enforcement officers were acting in good-faith based on 
Supreme Court binding precedent. 
4. Elkins v. Elenz (BP)  
David Elkins appealed aerial monitoring of his vehicle, which took place along a public 
causeway.893 This surveillance was conducted by Drug Enforcement Administration agent 
Robbins. David Elkins also challenged the legality of his probation officer requiring him to 
submit a mental health examination. Elkins alleged that failure to comply with this request would 
                                                          
887 Id. 
888 “It is self-evident that Supreme Court decisions are binding precedent in every circuit.” U.S. v. Hohn, 606 
Fed.Appx. 902, 906 (2015)(citing United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Circ. 2014)). 
889 Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983)). 
890 Id. (citing United States. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984)). 
891 Id. at 907. 
892 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated, in contrast to the GPS device used in Jones, the beepers 
involved in Knotts and Karo “were not installed pursuit to a physical trespass, were not used for long-duration 
tracking, and provided only limited information.” U.S. v. Hohn, 606 Fed.Appx. 902, 907 (2015). 
893 Elkins v. Elenz, 516 Fed.Appx. 825, 826 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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have resulted in punishment by probation revocation.894 The district court held law enforcement 
were entitled to qualified immunity and accordingly, dismissed the allegations of constitutional 
violations.895  
Elkins argued that the district court erred in dismissing his constitutional claims.896 The Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that though “aerial surveillance” has been found to be 
constitutional in other courts, the use of a warrantless GPS device does constitute a search.897  
However, the events in this case, particularly the surveillance, occurred before Jones was 
decided. As a result, because Jones was decided after the violations, it did not clearly establish 
the relevant law; therefore, the Court concluded that the district court correctly held that Elkins 
suffered no violation of constitutional rights.898 
5. U.S. v. Aguiar (BP)  
In 2008, local police were looking into a drug distribution ring.899 Over the course of the 
investigation, police suspected Stephen Aguiar of transporting drugs and William Murray as the 
distributor. Soon after, DEA agents joined the investigation agents and installed a warrantless 
GPS device on Aguiar’s vehicle to monitor his movements.900 The taskforce continuously 
monitored Aguiar until he was arrested on July 30, 2009. DEA agents used the GPS data to 
identify numerous associates of Aguiar.901  
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On appeal, Aguiar argued the GPS data and evidence obtained as a result is a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment according to the recent decision of U.S. v. Jones.902 The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit started their analysis by describing the differences of pre-Jones and post-
Jones law. Additionally, the Court established their specific circuit “lacked” binding circuit 
precedent on GPS devices.903 Although the second circuit had no established circuit precedent, 
the Court explained the Supreme Court decisions of Karo and Knotts could acts as binding 
precedents for all circuit courts.904 As a result, since the event occurred before Jones was 
decided, the Court in Aguiar applied pre-Jones law (i.e., Karo and Knotts). Accordingly, the 
Court held that the officers in the current case of Aguiar had reason to believe they could attach a 
GPS device without a warrant based on the “then-binding precedent” of Karo and Knotts.905 
Based on this information, the Court felt it was necessary to apply Davis good-faith exception 
and allow the evidence to be admitted.906   
6. U.S. v. Katzin (BP)  
Harry Katzin and his brothers were prime suspects of a chain of burglarized pharmacies from 
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey from 2009 until 2010.907 The Katzin brothers had a 
criminal history of burglarizing which made them suspects of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. FBI agents placed a warrantless GPS tracker on Harry Katzin’s van to track the 
movements of his vehicle during December, 2010. Two days after the installation, the GPS 
device revealed the Katzin brothers had driven to the area of a Rite Aid at 10:45 a.m. and the van 
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905 Id. at 262. 
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907 U.S. v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 167 (3rd. Cir. 2014).  
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remained inactive for over two hours.908 The FBI contacted local law enforcement to investigate. 
When the van started moving, state troopers continued visual surveillance. Local law 
enforcement relayed that the Rite Aid had been burglarized and the troopers immediately pulled 
over the van.909 Inside the van, law enforcement found Harry, his brothers, and the merchandise 
and equipment from the burglarized Rite Aid, including pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins.910  
The appellees argued that the warrantless installation of the GPS device and the subsequent 
monitoring violated their Fourth Amendment rights.911 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit stated that the events of this case occurred prior to Jones, and thus, must apply pre-Jones 
law. First, the Court established that the third circuit court had no existing precedent which 
governed the use of warrantless GPS tracking devices. However, in instances such as these, the 
Court of Appeals explained the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent are binding to all circuits. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals turned to Knotts and Karo, which found that the use of beeper technology 
to track a suspect through public thoroughfares was not a search. The Court of Appeals 
concluded the agents installed the GPS device onto Katzin’s van, they exhibited an “objectively 
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful.” 912  
7. U.S. v. Brown (BP) 
In 2006, a warrantless GPS  device was attached to a Jeep owned by Kevin Arms who 
notified police that an associate, Troy Lewis, was transporting drugs inside the Jeep.913 Police 
followed the vehicle and subsequently stopped and arrested Lewis and his associates, including 
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912 Id. at 184 (citing Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011)). 
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Brown. Brown argued that the GPS device violated his Fourth Amendment rights and evidence 
should be suppressed.914  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided since the facts of this case occurred 
prior to Jones and therefore the relevant police conduct is not subject to the Supreme Court’s 
decision. In particular, the Court turned to “binding appellate precedent” in the form of United 
States v. Garcia.915 However, Garcia was not established until February 2007, which also was 
after the events of the present case. Thus, Brown contended there was no “binding appellate 
precedent” in 2006 to guide the use of warrantless installation of GPS device to monitor a person 
of interest.916 The Court turned to Knotts and Karo decisions to help them decide on the 
warrantless electronic surveillance issue. The Court explained through Knotts and Karo that 
tracking a vehicle’s location by GPS does not constitute a search.917 The Court concluded that 
Knotts and Karo provided law enforcement (and the lawyers guiding them) enough jurisprudence 
for objective reasonable reliance. Thus, the Court afforded law enforcement the Davis good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule based on officers’ reasonable reliance on Knotts and Karo to 
shape their conduct in this case.918 
8. U.S. v. Thomas (BP)  
On February 28, 2010, Jonathan Thomas drove to United States Border Patrol checkpoint.919 
He drove a pick-up truck with a large toolbox attached to the bed. Border Patrol Agent (BPA) 
LeBlanc had his drug-detection dog, Beny-A. As Thomas’ truck passed the first inspection zone, 
                                                          
914 Id. at 476. 
915 Id. at 477. 
916 Id. 
917 Id. 
918 Id. at 478. 
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the drug dog changed to “alert behavior.”920 As a result, BPA LeBlanc instructed Thomas to the 
second inspection zone. BPA LeBlanc instructed Thomas and his children to exit the vehicle. 
BPA LeBlanc and his drug dog walked around the truck. The drug dog, Beny-A, jumped up and 
placed his paws and nose on the vehicle’s toolbox.921  
After obtaining Thomas’ keys, BPA LeBlanc found bundles of marijuana inside the 
toolbox.922 Thomas argued that the drug dog, Beny-A, invaded a constitutionally protected area 
when his paws and nose were placed on the toolbox located inside the bed of the truck.923 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that the events of this case preceded Jones and 
Jardines, and therefore, must apply pre-Jones law.924 The Court turned to Illinois v. Caballes, 
which concluded the use of a dog sniff on a vehicle did “not rise to the level of constitutionality 
cognizable infringement.”925 Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that LeBlanc acted in objective reliance on binding precedent, the evidence (i.e., the marijuana 
seized) was admitted correctly and should not be excluded.926 
9. U.S. v. Ransfer (BP) 
A series of robberies took place between April 2011 and June 2011. 927 An informant tipped 
law enforcement officers to believe a group of six individuals were responsible for the robberies. 
Police attached a GPS tracking device to a vehicle without a warrant in connection with the 
series of robberies. Through the use of the GPS tracking device, several individuals were arrested 
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and soon after, physical evidence was recovered in connection with the robberies.928 In Jones, 
the Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS to a vehicle constituted a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.929 However, in Davis, the Supreme Court held that “searches conducted in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary 
rule.”930  
In the pre-Jones era during which the facts of this case occurred, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements on public thoroughfares does not constitute a search.931 The Court turned to 
the then-binding precedent of Michael, which held warrantless electronic surveillance of a 
vehicle required police to only have reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.932 Therefore, 
as a result of this precedent, the Court found that the Davis good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies, and that officers had the necessary burden of proof (i.e., reasonable 
suspicion) in this case. Therefore, the Court concluded that, the installation of an electronic 
tracking device on the outside of the vehicle without a warrant did not violate the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.933 
10. U.S. v. Oladosu (BP) 
Officer Robert DiFilippo of the Rhode Island State Police High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Area (HIDTA) task force suspected Abdulfatah Oladosu being part of a drug smuggling ring.934 
As a result, Office DiFilippo attached a warrantless GPS device to the undercarriage of 
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929 Id. at 921. 
930 Id. at 922 (citing Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2423-24, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011)). 
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Oladosu’s vehicle. Subsequently, the GPS device was used to track Oladosu for forty-seven 
days. The surveillance helped the task force to arrange a delivery of heroin where Oladosu and 
accomplices were arrested.935 The Court decided that Jones does not apply in this case as the 
events occurred before Jones was decided. Thus, the Court had to consider if the Davis good-
faith exception would apply.936  
The Court did not consider or mention the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, 
the court turned to the pre-Jones precedent case of Sparks, which allowed warrantless GPS 
monitoring for eleven days.937 As a result, the court concluded the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applied. Thus, the Court concluded that law enforcement were acting on 
objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent, based on Baez and Sparks.938 
Therefore, the Davis good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to this pre-Jones 
warrantless GPS case. 
11. U.S. v. Barraza-Maldonado (BP). 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were notified by an informant of a possible 
drug trafficking plot.939 The informant described the vehicle as a maroon 2006 Nissan Maxima 
and DEA agents found the car in a public parking lot. To monitor it, DEA agents installed a 
warrantless GPS device on a vehicle and tracked its whereabouts. Four weeks later, Barraza-
Maldonado drove the vehicle to travel from Arizona to Minnesota. Once it entered Minnesota, 
DEA agents notified Minnesota State Police.940 Trooper Schneider stopped the vehicle and found 
that neither of the occupants had a valid driver’s license. Additionally, when the Trooper brought 
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out the drug detection dog, the vehicle “tested” positive for narcotics. As a result, police 
discovered large amounts of drugs inside the vehicle after towing it to a nearby garage.941  
Barraza-Maldonado argued the warrantless installation of the GPS device and subsequent 
monitoring violated his Fourth Amendment rights.942 The events in this case occurred before 
Jones was decided. The Ninth Circuit had frequently held that the installation of GPS devices on 
a car did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, especially if there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle’s location.943 In this case, the warrantless GPS 
device was installed in a public lot in the Arizona area and eventually tracked through various 
public highways (i.e., the installation and tracking of the device occurred in non-private, public 
locations). Therefore, the Court held that “the agents acted in objectively reasonable reliance on 
binding Ninth Circuit precedent in installing the device, and binding Supreme Court precedent in 
using the device to monitor the car’s movements on public highways.”944 As a result, the Court 
concluded the officer’s actions qualified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.945  
12.  U.S. v. Holt (BP) 
Co-defendant Lewis filed a motion which claimed that federal law enforcement’s use of a 
GPS device to monitor and track her whereabouts from September 21, 2011 until September 29, 
2011 violated her Fourth Amendment rights.946 The co-defendant argued that according to U.S. 
v. Jones, the attachment of GPS devices by police to vehicles without a warrant, constitute 
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unreasonable searches. However, the events in this case transpired before Jones was decided. As 
a result, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Holt held that officers were acting in 
reasonable reliance upon then-binding appellate precedent.947 The Court concluded that the 
district court correctly applied the good-faith exception to the actions of the officers.948 
13. United States v. Taylor (BP) 
Indianapolis Metro Police received a tip that Dwan Taylor had in his possession both drugs 
and illegal firearms in 2011.949 The investigation was led by Detective Sergeant Garth 
Schwomeyer, who discovered Taylor had a history of drug related offenses. Further investigation 
of Taylor’s phone records showed his most frequent contact had also been convicted of 
distributing drugs. Detective Schwomeyer presented these facts to a Marion County Superior 
Court judge who allowed Detective Schwomeyer’s petition for permission to attach a GPS 
device to Taylor’s vehicle for sixty (60) days on Taylor’s vehicle.950 The vehicle was tracked to a 
storage facility two weeks later. At the storage site, Detective Schwomeyer learned that Taylor 
had rented a locker. A drug-detection dog was summoned to the scene, and the dog alerted 
positive for drugs in Taylor’s locker.951 Finally, based on the evidence, Detective Schwomeyer 
applied and obtained a warrant to search the locker.952 Inside the locker, police found drugs, 
firearms, and other drug paraphernalia. Taylor was charged with drug possession.  
Taylor argued that a warrantless attachment of a GPS device and the subsequent tracking of 
his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.953 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
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Circuit held that the police officers attached the GPS under existing binding appellate precedent 
and therefore, under this precedent, a search had not occurred. As a result, no warrant was 
required to attach the GPS device. 954 Additionally, since this case fell under the then-binding 
precedent doctrine, Davis’ good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied here to prevent 
the suppression of the drug evidence.955 
14. U.S. v. Robinson (BP) 
Fred Robinson was acting chair for a non-profit charter school, Paideia, in St. Louis in 
2006.956 Robinson also worked at the Parking Division of the St. Louis Treasurer’s office. Since 
1990, Robinson consistently recorded 40 hours of work at the Parking Division, including on 
holidays. This pattern continued to occur after the parking services were outsourced to another 
company in June 2009. This garnered the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).957 Special agents interviewed former employees who worked in the same division as 
Robison and the employees did not recognize or know of him. This prompted FBI special agents 
to conduct surveillance on Robinson between December 2009 and January 2010.958 On January 
22, 2010, “agents installed, without a warrant, a GPS device on his car while parked on a public 
street.”959 The FBI agents tracked and recorded data until March 17. The investigation led FBI to 
conclude Robinson no long inspected parking meters and was later charged with wire fraud, 
program theft, and various other charges.960 On appeal, Robinson argued that the admission of 
GPS evidence violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined if the GPS evidence warranted 
suppression. Robinson’s argument relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which 
required a warrant to be used when installing of a GPS device to track the movements of a 
suspect. However, the Court instead chose to use United States v. Knotts and United States v. 
Karo, as the facts of this case occurred prior to the Jones decision.961 In Knotts, the Court 
allowed the use of beeper technology to track and monitor a car traveling on public roads.962 
Additionally, in Karo, the Court allowed the government to track a target by using a beeper 
inside a can transferred to the target vehicle.963 The Court of Appeals held that the FBI “agents 
could reasonably rely on the precedent set forth by Knotts and Karo as binding appellate 
precedent.”964 Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that the district court properly admitted the 
GPS evidence during trial.965 Thus, the Court applied Davis’ good-faith exception. Additionally, 
the Court elaborated that Robinson’s vehicle was in public view and on “public thoroughfares” 
and therefore Robinson had no reasonable expectation of privacy, either. 
15. U.S. v. Rayford (PE)    
Rayford pleaded guilty in district court to various charges related to bank robbery.966 Rayford 
pushed for a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal district court decisions. 
Rayford claimed “his counsel was ineffective because they failed to seek suppression of 
evidence obtained through a warrantless satellite tracking device.”967 To support his claim, 
Rayford relied heavily on the decision of U.S. v. Jones.968 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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Circuit held that Rayford could not prove his defense counsel was ineffective.969 Accordingly, 
the Court denied Rayford’s Certificate of Appealablity (COA).970  
16. U.S. v. Baker (PE) 
Between January and March 2011, a sequence of retail stores being robbed in Kansas City 
led law enforcement to suspect Baker.971 During the commission of one of the robberies, a retail 
camera caught images of the vehicle owned by Baker’s girlfriend. Officers monitored the vehicle 
by installing a GPS device. Shortly after installation, the GPS device was used to link the vehicle 
to a recent robbery, where Baker was stopped and arrested. Arresting officers found cash and a 
loaded .40 caliber Glock handgun.972 Baker argued in his appeal that the GPS device installed 
without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.973 In Jones, the Supreme Court held 
that the attachment of a GPS device and its subsequent monitoring constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.974 However, Baker failed to place a motion to suppress the evidence in the 
district court and as a result, waived his right to do so. Therefore, the Court found that Baker 
waived his Fourth Amendment right to object to the use of the GPS device by police without a 
warrant.  Accordingly, his argument in the appellate court “cannot provide a basis for disturbing 
his conviction.”975  
17. U.S. v. Curbelo (PE) 
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In 2007, Ivan Curbelo worked as a carpenter for Jose Diaz.976 Diaz offered Curbelo an 
opportunity to be a part of an indoor marijuana growing operation. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) agents began investigating Diaz and placed a global-positioning-system 
(GPS) device on vehicles used by Diaz and his accomplices.977 The GPS device was placed on 
the vehicle without a warrant. The DEA also conducted GPS tracking of cellular phones.978 
However, DEA agents did obtained court approval to seize information through cellular phone 
communications. Soon after, Curbelo and other members of the Diaz’s organization were 
indicted in violation of Controlled Substances Act.979 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit examined the GPS tracking of the vehicles and cell phones. However, Curbelo did not 
file a motion to suppress the GPS tracking evidence in the district court.980 The Court held 
Curbelo failed to adequately challenge the tracking and waived his rights to challenge the Fourth 
Amendment issue.981 
18. Jones v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium (PE) 
Albert Jones was charged and convicted of drug crimes with intent to distribute (i.e., cocaine, 
crack cocaine, and marijuana) in 2001.982 Law enforcement obtained text message information 
from one of the co-conspirators to use as evidence against Jones. Jones challenged the evidence 
obtained on appeal, where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
holding.983 As a result, Jones filed multiple motions, including § 2255 and § 2241 Petition.984 
The district court had denied § 2255 because they had been previously been brought up in direct 
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appeal. The district court dismissed § 2241. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reviewed this case based on habeas relief under § 2241.985 The Court concluded that defendant’s 
argument was without merit for several reasons.  First, the Court explained the differences 
between factual and legal innocence in this case.986 This is important because Jones argued he 
was “actually innocent,” when in fact, Jones claimed he was wrongfully charged and convicted 
based on unlawfully obtained text messages, which is the basis for “legal” innocence.987 Second, 
Jones raised the text message issues in both his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion.988 
Thus, defendant argued his conviction was based on the unlawfully obtained text messages 
which violated his due process rights.  In addition, by admitting these text messages into trial, 
defendant argued his Fourth Amendment rights were also violated. Third, the Court explained 
“Jones deals the admissibility of the evidence and does not establish that Jones was convicted of 
a non-existent crime or is factually innocent of the charged drug conspiracy.”989 Fourth, Jones 
was not made retroactive to cases such as the defendant’s whose facts occurred prior to Jones. 
This citing case falls within the category of procedural error because the court did not 
specifically use the Jones search criteria, and listed the four previously mentioned reasons why 
Jones cannot apply to defendant’s case.  
19. U.S. v. Glay (PE) 
William Glay scammed financial institutions and retail establishments with counterfeit 
checks between the years of 1999 and 2007.990 On March 2, 2007, police obtained a search 
warrant for the apartment owned by Emily Jallah, the suspected mother of Glay’s child. Officers 
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had used information in obtaining this warrant from a previous warrantless tracking device on 
Glay’s vehicle.991 On March 6, 2007, law enforcement executed the search warrant and obtained 
evidence from the apartment to be used against Glay. Glay was later arrested and pleaded guilty. 
Glay argued based on Jones that his conviction must be re-visited. However, Glay waived his 
challenge to the warrantless use of the tracking device by pleading guilty.992 The Court 
referenced United States v. Delgado-Garcia in commenting that “[u]nconditional guilty pleas 
that are knowing and intelligent ... waive the pleading defendants’ claims of error on appeal, 
even constitutional claims.”993 Accordingly, the Court held that Glay waived his right to 
challenge. In sum, this case falls under the procedural error category.  
20. U.S. v. Johnson (PE) 
The government used a global positioning system device without a warrant during its 
investigation of Johnson’s crimes.994 Johnson filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.995 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
Johnson failed to properly establish a suppression motion and waived his argument.996 However, 
the Court quickly ran through the analysis if he had properly filed the motion. In Jones, the 
Supreme Court found that a search occurred when officers attached a GPS device to the vehicle 
of defendant Jones under a stale, expired warrant.997 Although the court in Johnson admitted that 
Jones may have had the effect of strengthening Johnson’s argument for a new trial, the Court 
ruled no error occurred in the district court when they denied Johnson’s motion.998 The Court 
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explained that pre-Jones law held “circuit precedent indicated that attaching an electronic 
tracking device to a vehicle was neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment” 
hence, it did not require police to obtain a warrant.999 Thus, the police acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent and the evidence obtained is not subject to the 
exclusionary rule in accordance with Davis.1000 Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
“government could present the same evidence at any re-trial which would ultimately lead to 
Johnson’s original conviction” and based on the reasons already mentioned, the Court found 
Johnson suffered no prejudice.1001 
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